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Abstract 
Media stories of violent young offenders “signal” to the public that youth crime is on the 
rise and worse, that today’s youth are capable of horrific crimes.  As a result, both the 
public and politicians call for change – legislation and the courts need to toughen up on 
youths.  The present study, guided by penal populism and focal concerns theory, fills a 
gap in the literature by examining sentencing decisions of young offenders convicted of 
violent offences in Ontario, Canada.  Three research questions were asked. First, drawing 
on penal populism is there evidence in Canada, particularly Ontario, of a penal populist 
turn?  Are judges taking a more punitive stance in sentencing young offenders convicted 
of sexual assault and physical assault?  Second, drawing on focal concerns theory, do 
sentencing decisions reflect an offender’s level of blameworthiness and the need for 
protection of the public?  Can extralegal factors, such as age and gender, explain 
disparities in sentencing?   Third, do the sentencing rationales provided by judges vary 
within and across offence type?  To answer these questions, a sample of sentencing 
decisions was analyzed to uncover quantitative and qualitative trends.  The findings 
provide limited support for penal populism and limited support for focal concerns theory.  
One prominent finding is that the courts appear to take a more punitive stance towards 
physical assault offenders regardless of their rehabilitative prospects than the sexual 
assault offenders. Three explanations are proposed for this difference.  First, it appears 
that judges believe that physical assault offenders are better rehabilitated with a custodial 
sentence, while rehabilitation for sexual assault offenders is best achieved through non-
custodial sentences.  Second, a disproportionate number of physical assaults were 
committed against strangers whereas sexual assaults were disproportionately committed 
against people known to the offender; the courts may view the former offenders as a 
greater threat to the community.  Lastly, there may be a lag between legislative changes 
and changes in sentencing patterns, as a result of “judicial inertia”.  Although this sample 
is not representative, there is evidence of increased use of custody within these cases that 
become precedents for future sentencing decisions.  As a result, judicial precedence may, 
in the future, result in harsher sentences for young offenders convicted of physical 
assault.   
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Chapter 1  
1 Introduction 
Criminal justice is one of many social issues that attract the attention of the public.  The 
discussion of sentencing, in particular, takes place in many different contexts, such as 
politics, the media, the courts, and academic writing, which opens the door for many 
misconceptions to be repeated and to take hold, particularly amongst those who wield 
influence (Ashworth, 1995: 251).  It may be within the area of sentencing that the media 
presents the most distorted views especially with respect to youth crime (Bala, 2003: 991; 
Newburn, 2002: 555; Roberts and Stalans, 1998: 36).   
Beginning in the 1990s there has been an increase in news reporting of crimes, 
particularly violent crimes by juveniles (Pollak and Kubrin, 2007: 60).  In fact, it has 
been argued that public concern over youth crime may not have reached the level it has, 
were it not for the tragic events that occurred in Bootle, Liverpool, UK, on February 12, 
1993 (Newburn, 2002: 556).  On the afternoon of February 12, 1993, two-year-old James 
Bulger was abducted from the Strand Shopping Centre in Bootle (Newburn, 2002).  
Photographic images from the shopping centre cameras were broadcast on national 
television showing James walking with, or being led by two young males, from the 
shopping centre.  These seemingly innocent images soon revealed something much more 
sinister.  On February 14, 1993 James Bulger’s battered body was found, just two miles 
from the shopping center, near a railway line in Liverpool, England.  Two ten-year-old 
boys were arrested and charged with the killing of James Bulger.  The arrest of the two 
boys “inspired a kind of national collective agony” (Newburn, 2002: 556).  Their trial 
took place in November 1993, amidst massive national and international media attention 
with the media’s coverage of the case expressing a harshly punitive sentiment, which 
resonated in many countries beyond the United Kingdom (Newburn, 2002).  This event 
provided further evidence to an already concerned public that “something new and 
particularly malevolent was afoot” (Newburn, 2002: 556); the youth of the 20th century 
were violent and out of control.  
  2 
Concern over youth homicide was not limited to the UK.  In Canada, for example, in the 
later part of the 1990s, the media focused attention on fourteen-year-old Reena Virk who 
was beaten and killed in Victoria, British Columbia (Batacharya, 2006).  On the night of 
November 14, 1997, Reena Virk was invited to a party near the Gorge waterway in 
Victoria, B.C.  Upon her arrival Reena, was surrounded by seven girls and one boy who 
proceeded to physically assault her.  One of the girls declared a stop to the assault 
allowing Reena to ‘walk’ away from the attack.  Two youths from the group, however, 
followed Reena to Craigflower Bridge where they continued to assault her.  The two 
offenders dragged Reena Virk into the water and held her head under until she drowned; 
her body washing ashore some eight days later.  Six youths were later charged and 
convicted of aggravated assault and two were tried for second-degree murder.  The eight 
youths involved in the assault and murder were between 14 and 17 years old when the 
crime was committed and seven of the eight youths were females.  The murder of Reena 
Virk, similar to James Bulger, drew worldwide media attention with media giants like 
CNN and Dateline leaping on the story to emphasize what they argued was an increase in 
girl-on-girl violence (Batacharya, 2006).  
In 2004, the year after the Youth Criminal Justice Act was enacted, there was another 
tragic event, which further contributed to the perception that youth violence was on the 
rise.  This case concerned the assault and murder of nineteen-year-old, Sebastien Lacasse.  
A seventeen-year-old male was charged as a ringleader in his assault and subsequent 
murder, and was sentenced to life in prison as an adult (CBC News, 2006; Canadian 
Criminal Justice Association [CCJA], 2010).  Sebastien was murdered at a house party by 
a group of teens in Laval, Quebec (Casavant and Valiquet, 2011; The Montreal Gazette, 
2006; National Criminal Justice Section Canadian Bar Association, 2010; News Canada, 
2010;).  He was severely beaten (e.g., hounded, covered with Cayenne pepper, trampled) 
and eventually stabbed to death.  While this incident did not receive the same media 
attention as the James Bulgar and Reena Virk cases, the recent 2012 amendments to the 
YCJA were to commemorate Sebastien Lacasse.  Bill C-4, titled “Sebastien’s Law”, set 
out a number of proposed legislative amendments to the YCJA sentencing principles with 
the general thrust of the amendments seeking to hold violent young offenders and those 
that ‘might’ be violent, accountable for their actions by adding such principles as 
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‘denunciation’ and ‘deterrence’, to section 38(2) (Canadian Criminal Justice Association 
[CCJA], 2010).  These changes were made with the goal of protecting the public (CCJA, 
2010).   
The three cases (James Bulger, Reena Virk, and Sebastian Lacasse) are definitely 
horrific; however, what needs to be understood, according to Beaulieu and Cesaroni 
(1999) is that these are “isolated” events.  These crimes, according to Innes (2004: 352) 
represent “signal crimes” wherein a criminal incident is interpreted as indicative of the 
collective’s level of risk, security, and hazard.  The public’s perceptions of criminogenic 
risk are, therefore, centered around certain ‘single’ incidents, with some crimes (e.g., 
murder and burglary) having more of an impact on the collectives’ understanding of 
crime and disorder (Innes, 2004:352).  Citizens, according to Simon (2007: 77) become 
fearful, classified into two categories: ‘actual’ and ‘potential’ victims.  In contrast, 
criminals – including sex offenders, gang members, drug kingpins, and violent crime 
recidivists – are classified as “monsters” whose presence forms “a constantly renewed 
rationale for legislative action.” (Simon, 2007: 77).  Horrific crimes and media attention 
to ‘monsters’ color public perception, thereby contributing to a view that youths are now 
capable of criminal acts inconceivable in previous decades (Beaulieu and Cesaroni, 1999; 
Roberts et al., 2003).   
A number of scholars (Roberts, et al., 2003 Roberts, 2004; Newburn, 2002, Young, 1996) 
have argued that the public often lacks accurate knowledge of the real trends in youth 
crime and youth justice, and instead are left with the impression that crime, in particular 
violent crime, is rampant, resulting in heightened public fears (Doob, Sprott, Marinos and 
Varma, 1998; Roberts, 2004: 497; Tanner, 2001: 40).  For example, a 1990 public 
opinion poll found that 75% of Canadians believed that violent crime accounted for 30% 
of all crimes when in reality, violent offences constituted less than 10% of crimes 
reported to police (John Howard Society, 1999).  In the early 1990s, polls indicated that 
the Canadian public believed young persons, and especially young offenders had 
“become worse” (House of Commons, 1993; Corrado and Markwart, 1999: 346).  
Roberts (2004) found that only 4% of Canadians had faith in the youth justice system and 
in 1998, 77% said that harsher sentences for all young offenders should be a high priority 
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(Corrado and Peters, 2015: 558).  More recently, Roberts et al., 2007) found that 74% of 
Canadians perceived sentencing in Canada was too lenient and this was also true of 
young offenders (Corrado and Peters, 2015: 558).  As Corrado and Markwart (1994: 345) 
argue, when the media sensationalizes youth crime and in particular youth violence, the 
result is a heightening in public fear, and anxiety about youth crime and the inadequacies 
of the justice system to deal with it ensues.  These media stories, therefore, construct a 
reality in which violence among youth is pervasive (Pollak and Kubrin, 2007: 74).  As a 
result, a strong consensus surfaces amongst members of the public, politicians, as well as 
judges that something must be done.  Legislation and courts must ‘toughen up’ to prevent 
crime.  
Ashworth (1995: 253) calls this the “hydraulic” theory: the belief is that if sentences go 
up, crimes go down and vice versa.  Many criminologists, according to Ashworth (1995: 
253), however, argue this is a rather naïve and perhaps faulty notion:  only a small 
percentage of crimes result in the passing of a sentence and there is a low probability that 
anything other than very extreme penalties have an impact on the recorded crime rates.   
While much of the media attention on youth crime since the 1990s and onwards has 
focused on violent crimes, the data consistently show that the bulk of youth crime during 
that period, involved property offences, such as arson, breaking and entering, motor 
vehicle theft, false pretenses, forgery, fraud, and possession of stolen property (Tanner, 
2001).  For example, in 1999 approximately half (49%) of young offenders charged were 
charged with property crimes whereas 21% were charged with violent offences.  The 
remaining 30% were charged with “other” criminal offences (e.g., mischief, arson) 
(Logan, 2001; Tremblay, 1999).  Furthermore, in terms of violent crimes, police statistics 
reveal that assault, specifically common assault1, is the   reported violent crime 
committed by young offenders (Tanner, 2001).   
                                                 
1
 In 1997, 13% of all youth charged were charged with common or major assault and young persons 
charged with these offences comprised approximately 71% of those charged with a violent offence (Tanner, 
2001).   
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More recent figures continue to show that crimes against property2 (38%) are more 
common than crimes against the person (26%) (Milligan, 2010).  Further, the crime rate 
appears to be decreasing (Statistics Canada, 2016); fewer youths were accused of crime 
in 2015.  For example, there were approximately 92,000 youths accused of a Criminal 
Code offence in 2015 and this was approximately 2,700 fewer than in the previous years.  
For every 100,000 youth in Canada there were 1,888 youth accused of property crimes by 
police and an even lower rate were accused of violent crimes (1,265 per 100,000 and this 
was a 1% reduction) (Statistics Canada, 2016).  To summarize, youth crime statistics 
show that youth crime is often not characterized by extreme violence.  In fact, even 
among those charged with violent offences, the largest proportion is charged with level 1 
(‘common assault’) or level 2 (‘assault causing bodily harm or assault with a weapon’) 
assault.   It is the non-violent crimes that have remained a staple of youth crime, 
reflecting the high level of charging for “administration of justice” offences, principally 
breach of probation and terms of bail (Corrado and Markwart, 1994; Doob and Cesaroni, 
2004; Milligan, 2010; Bala and Anand, 2012).  Nevertheless, the media’s attention to a 
few tragic cases gives rise to the common misconception that youth crime, in particular 
violent crime, is out of control, and therefore new levels of punishment are required 
(Roberts et al., 2003: 90).   
1.1 The Current Study  
This study focuses on penalties for youth crime and how these may have changed over 
time.  If the public believes that youth are out of control, and penalties have been too 
light, do these beliefs shape judges’ sentencing decisions?  Penal populist theory 
proposes that public pressure is a key factor in fueling not only legislative reform, but 
also sentencing (Beaulieu and Cesaroni, 1999: 364).  Legislation seeks to reform the 
activity of youth courts, and the sentencing decisions of youth court judges (Beaulieu and 
Cesaroni, 1999: 365-367).  In contrast, focal concerns theory (Steffensmeier et al., 1998; 
Steffensmeier, Kramer, and Streifel, 1993; Steffensmeier, Ulmer, and Kramer, 1998; 
                                                 
2
 The most frequent cases were crimes against property: theft (14%), break and enter (8%), mischief (7%) 
and possession of stolen property (6%) (Milligan, 2010). 
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Steffensmeier and Demuth, 2001) argues that judges take into account such factors as 
protection of the public, offender’s blameworthiness, practical constraints, age, race, and 
gender.  In this study, I explore judges’ sentencing of violent young offenders to assess 
these theories, and determine their applicability to the Canadian context.    
Research on youth sentencing has largely focused on the severity and types of sanctions 
that are imposed (Daly and Bouhours, 2008).  Less attention has given to what is said to 
young persons in the courtroom on the day of sentencing (Daly and Bouhours, 2008: 
497).  The current study seeks to fill this gap in the literature by exploring what judges 
say, and what rationales they provide for their sentencing decisions, during trials held 
under the Young Offenders Act and the Youth Criminal Justice Act in Ontario, Canada.   
In judicial decisions, youth court judges provide not only their official judgments, but 
also their assessment of an offender’s character (Daly and Bouhours, 2008).   Sentencing 
decisions entail the exercise of judgment, as judges weigh aggravating3 and mitigating4 
factors (Freiberg, 1995; Ashworth, 1995: 259).5  Thus, formal sentencing remarks are 
important, as they constitute the official record (albeit selected and partial) of ways in 
which the state legitimates and justifies its power to punish (Daly and Bouhours, 2008: 
502).  Thus, by analyzing the content of decisions, this study seeks to learn what 
rationales judges, who are the authorized spokesperson for the state in censuring and 
sanctioning crime, use when sentencing young violent offenders who appear before them.  
The focus in this study is on sentences imposed on youth convicted of two types of 
violent youth crime:  sexual assault and physical assault offences.  The two types of 
                                                 
3
 An aggravating circumstance is defined as “the fact or situation that increases the degree of liability or 
culpability for a criminal act” (Black’s Law Dictionary, 2004: 277).   
4
 Mitigated is defined as “to make less severe or intense” (Black’s Law Dictionary, 2004: 1093).  A 
mitigating circumstance is “a fact or situation that does not justify or excuse a wrongful act or offense but 
that reduces the degree of culpability and thus may reduce the damages (in a civil case) or punishment (in a 
criminal case)” (Black’s Law Dictionary, 2004: 277).   
5
 Section 718.2 (a) of the Criminal Code of Canada states “a court that imposes a sentence shall also take 
into consideration the following Principle: a sentence should be increased or reduced to account for any 
relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offence, or the offender, and, without 
limiting the generality of the foregoing.”  
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cases were chosen because they are comparable in severity as per the Criminal Code of 
Canada, the YOA, and the YCJA, but differ on penal populism or focal concerns 
dimensions.   
Three research questions were asked, which are as follows:  
1. Drawing on penal populism, this study asks, is there evidence that Canada, in 
 particular Ontario, has experienced a penal populist turn in regard to legislative 
 changes?  Are judges taking a more punitive stance in sentencing young offenders 
 convicted of sexual assault and physical assault?  
2.  Drawing on focal concerns theory, do legal decisions in particular, as they relate 
 to the type of sentencing (custodial or non-custodial) within the Ontario youth 
 justice system reflect an offender’s level of blameworthiness and need for 
 protection of the public?  Can extralegal factors, such as age and gender, explain 
 disparities in sentencing?    
3.      Is there evidence of variations in sentencing rationales provided by judges upon 
 sentencing within and across offence (physical and sexual assault) type?  
Although scholarly attention has been paid to violent young offenders (Bala, 2003; 
Corrado et al., 2015; Corrado and Markwart, 1994; Doob and Sprott, 2006), few studies 
have focused on sentencing decisions of youth sexual offenders.  For example, it was not 
until the 1990s that sexual crimes began receiving media attention, but the focus was on 
adult offenders (Roberts et al., 2003; Bouhours and Daly, 2007).  This led to greater 
societal awareness of the emotional and physical harm experienced by the victims 
however, media attention fostered the view that ‘sex offenders’ were all ‘sexual 
predators’, raising public anxiety and outrage (Roberts et al., 2003: 131).  The public, as a 
result, began to advocate for more punitive sentencing (p. 132).  Thus, youth sexual 
assault has only recently been approached as a social problem that requires strong legal 
and clinical responses (Bouhours and Daly, 2007).  As a result of the lack of research, 
very little is known about how such cases are handled in youth courts (Bouhours and 
Daly, 2007).  There is literature on the profile and patterns of youth sexual offending but 
the literature does not shed light on judges’ sentencing with respect to these crimes (Allan 
et al., 2002; Soothill et al., 2000, and Nisbett et al., 2004; Bouhours and Daly, 2007: 
375).  There is some concern that the push towards increasing punishment may result in 
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young offenders receiving more punitive sentences (e.g., custody) and not receiving the 
treatment they need (Roberts et al., 2003: 138).   
Morgan and Clarkson (1995: 4) state that judges may not always be consistent when 
sentencing as there may be a lack of agreement amongst judges as to what criteria ought 
to be taken into account in the sentencing decision and what weight should be given to 
such factors as prior record, age, supportive family, perceived future dangerousness, 
offender’s plea, and other such matters.  In this study, I explore what factors judges 
consider upon sentencing young offenders convicted of violent offences.  To analyze 
judges’ sentencing decisions for youth convicted of physical and sexual assault, I 
conducted both qualitative and simple quantitative (bivariate) analyses.  Guided by penal 
populism and focal concerns theory, I sought to identify common themes within judicial 
decisions to shed an important light on the youth criminal justice system, such as the 
impact of legislative change and public opinion on youth court judges’ decisions.  
In summary, by focusing on sentencing decisions, this study breaks new ground.  Few 
Canadian studies have explored the content of youth sentencing decisions, and analyzed 
the relative weight judges give to various factors.  This research not only tells us about 
the operation of youth courts in Canada, but it also provides insight into how societal 
values shape social practices, including legal decisions.  Moreover, research has not fully 
explored whether sentencing decisions respecting young offenders vary across offence 
type and legislative context.   
The rest of Chapter 1 will provide vital context for this study by reviewing youth crime 
legislation in Canada and the trends in youth crime.  I will discuss the three pieces of 
legislation that have governed young offenders in Canada, since 1908.  I will begin with a 
discussion of the Juvenile Delinquents Act (1908) (herein referred to as JDA) and will 
discuss the criticisms that came forward after the enactment of the JDA.  I will then 
discuss the Young Offenders Act (1984) (herein referred to as YOA) and will discuss the 
subsequent criticisms and amendments that emerged.  This section will end with a 
discussion of the Youth Criminal Justice Act (2003) (herein referred to as YCJA) and 
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will discuss the criticisms of the YCJA along with the recent 2012 YCJA changes under 
the Safe Streets and Communities Act.   
Chapter 2 provides a discussion of the underlying purposes and principles of sentencing 
along with a discussion of how young offenders are processed within the youth justice 
system in Canada.  Chapter 2 ends with a discussion of the two criminological theories of 
sentencing (penal populism and focal concerns theory) that guide this study.   
Chapter 3 outlines my research questions and discusses the methods used to address 
them.  I explain my data collection, sampling, operationalization of variables, and data 
analysis strategies.  For this study, both qualitative and simple quantitative analyses are 
used.   
Chapter 4 presents the results of the descriptive and bivariate analyses performed to 
answer research questions 1 and 2.  Chapter 5 presents the results of research question 3 
by reporting the findings of the in-depth content analysis of the sample of sentencing 
decisions included in this study.  The final chapter discusses the research findings, 
reviews the shortcomings of the two theories that guide this study, and provides a 
discussion of the limitations and considers implications for future research. 
1.2 The Youth Justice System in Canada: Legislative 
Changes and Public Concern 
Not long after Canada became a nation, youth justice became a social concern (Beaulieu 
and Cesaroni, 1999).  The first criminal laws (Juvenile Delinquents Act, 1908) governing 
young offenders ensured that children and youth would be confined in separate, custodial 
facilities (‘reformatories’) away from adults.  The rationale behind having a separate 
system to deal with young persons was the principle of ‘diminished moral 
blameworthiness’ or ‘culpability’ (Beaulieu and Cesaroni, 1999: 371).  The youth justice 
system was, therefore, to reflect young people’s lack of maturity through reduced 
accountability.  It is under this realm of thinking that the Canadian Federal Government, 
= over the last century, has enacted and amended three pieces of legislation:  The 
  10 
Juvenile Delinquents Act (1908), the Young Offenders Act (1984), and the Youth 
Criminal Justice Act (2003) to handle young offenders.   
It is important to point out that, while there was much concern over the effectiveness of 
each piece of legislation in decreasing the rate of youth crime in Canada, especially 
violent youth crime, much of the research has continually shown that youth crime has 
been on the decline since the early 1990s.  Furthermore, all of these Acts affirm the need 
for a separate system to process young offenders, distinct from that which processes adult 
offenders.  In the following section, I will discuss these three different pieces of youth 
crime legislation and the criticisms surrounding each piece of legislation in more detail.  
1.2.1 Juvenile Delinquents Act (1908-1984) 
The Juvenile Delinquents Act (JDA), enacted in 1908, was the first legislative framework 
for youth justice in Canada.  Prior to 1908 there was no separate criminal law that 
governed young offenders in Canada and as such any youth over the age of seven could 
be charged criminally and punished under the same laws as adults (Anand, 1998; Doob 
and Sprott, 2004).  Under the JDA, however, a child or youth’s negative social 
environment was seen as the cause of delinquency.  For example, youth who received 
inadequate moral training, poor schooling, experienced hunger, and/or poverty were 
believed to have learned the “wrong lessons’ in life (Rosen, 2000; Tanner, 2001).  In 
order to counteract these wrong lessons, society needed a juvenile justice system that 
provided active and timely intervention.  It was believed this system should be separate 
from adults and focused on the rehabilitation of juvenile delinquents (Rosen, 2000; 
Tanner, 2001).  
The JDA (1908) was philosophically grounded in the doctrine of “parens patriae”6 
wherein the state was to intervene as a “kindly parent” in situations where the main 
                                                 
6
 “Parens patriae means “parent of his or her country” (Latin meaning) and the principle was first stated in 
Eyre v. Shaftsbury (1772), 24 E.R. 659.  However, perhaps the best articulation of the definition of parens 
patriae is contained in R. v. Gyngall (1893), 2 Q.B. 232 at p. 248, where the court stated that “the 
jurisdiction… is essentially a parental jurisdiction and the description of it involves that the main 
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institutions in charge of child-rearing (family, school) were failing (Department of 
Justice, 2004).  The new youth justice system was to permit social intervention to “cure” 
the emotional ills of children in order to “save” them (Beaulieu and Cesaroni, 1999; 
Rosen, 2000).  The juvenile delinquent, therefore, under the JDA was believed to require 
help, guidance, and proper supervision (JDA, sec. 3[2]; Doob and Sprott, 2004).  They 
were not to be treated as criminals and instead were to be treated as “misdirected 
[children]… in need of aid encouragement, help and assistance” (Department of Justice 
Canada, 2004; Rosen, 2000: 1).  Thus, under the doctrine of ‘parens patriae’ no 
distinction was made between the ‘neglected child’ and the ‘delinquent child’; both were 
perceived as ‘misdirected’ or ‘misguided’ children who needed protection, guidance, 
education, supervision, and treatment (Beaulieu and Cesaroni, 1999: 372).  Furthermore, 
a juvenile delinquent would no longer be placed within an adult custodial facility and 
instead would be placed in a provincial training school or reformatory (Rosen, 2000).  
The JDA, while being a substantial improvement over the previous treatment of children 
and adolescents, was considered an imperfect solution (Department of Justice, 2004).  
Treatment of the offender was paramount under the JDA as the aim was to cure young 
persons who were actually or potentially criminal (Anand, 1998: 322).  By the mid-
twentieth century, the Act was increasingly criticized for the imposition of arbitrary and 
unfair sentences, and the neglect of the interests of youth.  Critics argued there was a lack 
of continuity between the ideals expressed in the JDA and the actual delivery of services 
to juveniles (Anand, 1999; Hutchinson and Smadych, 2005). For example, the provinces 
were given the power to decide upon the upper age limit of children who would fall under 
the jurisdiction of the legislation.  Such discretion resulted in inter-provincial variations 
in the maximum age (from fifteen to seventeen) of young persons being tried as juveniles 
(Hutchison and Smadych, 2005).  For example, in one province a 16-year old ‘juvenile 
delinquent’ could be punished as an adult and therefore punished more severely whereas 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
consideration to be acted upon in its exercise is the benefit or welfare of the child”” (Black’s Law 
Dictionary, 2004; Anand, 1998: 321).   
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in another province a 16-year-old could be punished as a juvenile and receive a lesser 
sentence (Tanner, 2001).  
By the 1960s, criticisms directed at the JDA increased when recorded levels of juvenile 
crime increased dramatically as the post-war baby boom generation moved into 
adolescence (Beaulieu and Cesaroni, 1999; Roberts, 2004).  The JDA, it appeared to the 
public, was not able to deter delinquent behaviour and it was therefore labeled too “soft” 
on youth crime.  Not only did reported crime rates reveal an increase in youth crime, but 
it became apparent that many juvenile delinquents were repeat offenders -- “recidivists” 
(Tanner, 2001; Beaulieu and Cesaroni, 1999).   Other concerns also emerged: the lack of 
uniformity in upper age limits across provinces, the informality of court procedures that 
led to widespread disparity in sentencing, and the widespread use of indeterminate 
sentences, which meant it was much easier for a young offender to ‘get into’ a 
correctional facility than to ‘get out’ of one.  Furthermore, many youth were charged with 
‘status offences’ (e.g., “incorrigibility” and “sexual immorality”) under the JDA, as status 
offences criminalized youth for behaviour that was legal for adults (Tanner, 2001; 
Beaulieu and Cesaroni, 1999; Sprott and Doob, 2009; Sprott, 2012: 310).  
Because the juvenile justice system under the JDA was governed by the overarching 
principle of the best interests of the child, “due process” rights were minimized in the 
interests of an informal process and the promotion of the welfare of children (Department 
of Justice, 2004; Beaulieu and Cesaroni, 1999: 374).  For example, since there was an 
emphasis on juvenile courts using informal dispositions, many juvenile delinquents’ 
cases were heard without the benefit of legal representation (Tanner, 2001).  Juvenile 
delinquents were denied the basic elements of “due process”, such as the right to counsel, 
the right of appeal, and determinate sentences as opposed to open-ended sentences 
(Rosen, 2000).  
The apparent ineffectiveness of the JDA (1908) spurred much debate among members of 
the public and the political parties in Canada.  Conservatives drew on data illustrating a 
rise in youth crime to support their argument that the JDA was ineffective at addressing 
youth crime.  Liberals and left-wing reformers in the legal and “caring” professions, on 
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the other hand, took a different view, arguing that the civil liberties of young offenders 
were being violated under the Act (Tanner, 2001).  Although, the two dominant political 
parties held different views, they were in agreement that juvenile justice reform was 
required.   
In 1981, Bill C-61, the Young Offenders Act (YOA) was introduced in Parliament.  This 
Act continued the existence of a separate youth justice system, but under the Act youths 
were to be held more accountable for their actions (Department of Justice, 2004).  Young 
offenders were no longer viewed as products of their environment but as involved and 
accountable participants.  At the same time, they would be granted due process rights 
(Casavant and Valiquet, 2011).  
1.2.2 Young Offenders Act (1984-2003) 
The Young Offenders Act (YOA) was proclaimed in April 1984, and was designed to 
remedy the shortcomings of the JDA (Department of Justice, 2004).  The language used 
in the YOA highlighted the importance of the protection of society as well as youths’ 
responsibility to the community and the victim (Beaulieu and Cesaroni, 1999).  The 
Declaration of Principle under the YOA states that young persons are not to be held as 
accountable for their acts as adults are; however, they must still “bear responsibility for 
their contraventions” (s. 3[1][a]; Bala and Anand, 2012; Rosen, 2000: 3).  Thus, 
underlying the model of justice is the notion that that young offenders need to be 
supervised, disciplined and controlled but still have “special needs” that require guidance 
and assistance (Rosen, 2000: 3).   
The Act attempted to balance concern for the special needs of youth and the recognition 
of their legal rights with the protection of the public (Bala, 2015: 132).  The Act moved 
away from the child-welfare philosophy of the JDA by abolishing the vague status 
offence of “sexual immorality” and focused on criminal offences (Bala, 2015: 132).  The 
Act also increased offenders’ rights.  The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
(1983) became a fundamental part of the country’s constitution and protected, among 
other things, legal rights such as a person’s right to life, liberty, and security of the 
person.   In this spirit, the YOA granted young offenders basic rights and freedoms that 
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were denied to them under the JDA, including the right to legal representation, the right 
to have a court-appointed lawyer, the same rights to bail as adults accused of an identical 
offence, as well as the general rules of evidence concerning the admissibility of evidence, 
and the right to appeal a conviction (s. 3(1)(e)(f)(g); Department of Justice, 2004; 
Beaulieu, 1991: 137).  
Under the YOA the legal and constitutional rights of young offenders were recognized 
and as such youths had the right to the least possible interference with freedom that is 
consistent with public safety.  A significant change under the YOA was the provision that 
raised the minimum age of criminal responsibility to 12 years old and set the maximum 
age at 17 years old (Department of Justice, 2004; Tanner, 2001).  
Custody was to be reserved for serious offences and to be a last resort.  When custody 
was imposed the maximum custodial sentence was two years; however, for more serious 
offences that would sentence an adult to life imprisonment, the maximum sentence for a 
young offender was three years.  In addition, probation orders could not exceed two years 
and community-service orders were not to exceed 240 hours (Beaulieu, 1991: 139).  A 
new section was also added and given the title “alternative measures” or what is also 
known as “diversion” wherein a decision not to prosecute a young person could be made.  
Instead he or she could be sentenced to participate in an education or community service 
program (Rosen, 2000). In other words, non-judicial procedures were to be considered, 
first and foremost to avoid the formal, time-consuming and harmful effects of 
prosecution and punishment (Rosen, 2000).  
The general public, the mass media, as well as many academics and criminal justice 
practitioners criticized the YOA for not providing clear legislative direction to the courts 
and agents of the youth criminal justice system respecting its appropriate implementation 
(Welsh and Irving, 2005).  Much of the criticism against the YOA came from the law-
and-order lobby groups who believed that the legislative prescriptions of the YOA were 
not doing enough to control, punish, or deter young offenders (Tanner, 2001).  The 
maximum custodial sentences, for example, were perceived as being too short; with 
Canadian politicians expressing concerns that the youth justice system was “too soft” 
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(Bala and Anand, 2012: 92).   For example, Conservative politicians were concerned over 
the inadequacy of the maximum three-year sentence for the most violent offences, such 
as those convicted of murder (Bala, 2015: 133).  Furthermore, in setting the minimum 
age of criminal responsibility at twelve, it appeared that those under the age of twelve 
were being allowed to commit crimes, including violent crimes, without consequences 
(Tanner, 2001).  The YOA reflected a hybrid model combining elements of the child - 
both the welfare and justice models (Anand, 1998; John Howard Society of Alberta, 
1999).   
Other critics argued that because the use of alternative measures was not mandatory 
under the YOA, there were large discrepancies between the provinces in youth 
sentencing (Rosen, 2000; Tanner, 2001).  Some provinces, such as Ontario, had higher 
incarceration rates while some other provinces (e.g., Quebec) were making better use of 
alternative measures.  In addition, provincial police and judicial authorities were given a 
great deal of discretionary power and as such the administration of justice was unevenly 
distributed resulting in the public’s perception that the YOA was ineffective (Sprott and 
Doob, 2008).   
Youth crime rates had also increased during the 1980s and early 1990s (Carrington 
1999), fostering criticism of the YOA, with the media playing a prominent role in raising 
public concern.  As we have seen at the beginning of this chapter, media reports often 
sensationalize youth crime, especially violent crime.  Sensationalized stories encourage 
public perceptions that legislation is “too lenient” (Roberts et al, 2003; Pratt, 2007; Doob 
and Sprott, 2004).  In fact, a consistent message from the media, along with politicians 
and the police, was that the increases in youth crime and violence were attributable to the 
YOA (Jaffe and Baker, 1999).  Even though youth crime rates had subsequently declined 
-- by 1996 the rate of youth crime had returned to the same level as in 1983 -- this 
decrease did not receive the same level of public and media attention as did the previous 
increase in crime rates (Carrington, 1999).   
Although critics tied high youth crime rates to the YOA, Carrington and Moyer (1994) 
show that this is unlikely the result of legislative change, since the increase predated the 
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YOA’s enactment.  Instead they argue that the per capita increase in youth crime rates 
can largely be accounted for by temporary “jumps” in police-reported youth crime, 
especially in Saskatchewan and British Columbia.  Moreover, the increase appears tied 
more to property offences than violent crime.  While proportions of young persons 
apprehended for serious offences against persons increased by 33% in this era, they 
accounted for very few of the offences relative to all young offenders that were 
apprehended (3% to 4%).  Property offences made up the bulk of all youth crime offences 
(Carrington and Moyer, 1994).  In fact, serious youth crime constituted a lower 
proportion of all youth crime during 1985-1990 (post YOA) than it did during the 1980-
1984 (pre-YOA) period (Carrington and Moyer, 1994).   
This trend appears to have reversed in the early 1990s, according to scholars Doob and 
Sprott (1998).  They argue that while the total number of youth court cases declined 
between 1991 and 1996, the number of cases that involved violence increased 16.4% 
(Beaulieu and Cesaroni, 1999).  However, they contend that youths were not getting more 
violent; rather “Zero Tolerance” policies towards violence in schools had increased the 
number of violent cases that were being brought in front of the courts (Doob and Sprott, 
1998; Beaulieu and Cesaroni, 1999).  For example, their results revealed that there was a 
31.3% increase in minor assault cases being brought in front of the court during this five-
year period.  Doob and Sprott (1998) concluded that school-yard scuffles, which would 
formerly have been handled more informally, were increasingly turned over to the police 
(Beaulieu and Cesaroni, 1999).  This crackdown on minor offences may have contributed 
to the perceived increase in crime (Beaulieu and Cesaroni, 1999; Doob and Sprott, 1998).   
In summary, while upon first glance the YOA may appear to have caused an increase in 
youth crime, many scholars (Bala, Carrington and Roberts, 2009; Beaulieu and Cesaroni, 
1999; Carrington, 1993, 1998; Doob and Sprott, 1998; Hutchinson and Smandych, 1995; 
Sprott and Doob; 2008) argue this was not the case.7  The YOA had changed the manner 
                                                 
7
 Many scholars hold that youth crime has decreased, but Gabor (1999) contends that given the limitations 
of official crime data (e.g., unreported crime and lack of recognition of different crimes emerging) “the 
concern over youth violence ought not to be dismissed” (p. 389).    
  17 
in which youths charged with crimes were dealt with in the various provinces 
(Carrington, 1999; 1993), but under this legislation, inter-provincial variations continued 
to be evident (Carrington, 1999; Doob and Sprott, 1996; Sprott and Doob, 2008).  As a 
number of scholars argue, since each of the provinces of Canada had a great deal of 
autonomy in deciding how to implement federal criminal legislation, variations in the 
treatment of accused and convicted young offenders may be inevitable (Bala, Carrington, 
and Roberts, 2009: 134).   
The YOA granted considerable discretion to provinces concerning how the act would be 
implemented, and in many provinces, this led to high rates of custodial sentences for 
young offenders (Bala, 2003; Bala, Carrington and Roberts, 2009; Doob and Cesaroni, 
2004; Doob and Sprott, 2004).  For example, in 1997/1999, 121,000 youths between the 
ages of 12 to 17 were charged with a Criminal Code or other federal offence.  Of those 
charges that proceeded to youth court, just over two thirds (67%) of the cases resulted in 
a finding of guilt (Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, 1991; John Howard Society, 
1999).  In 34 percent of youth cases the young offender received a conviction sentence 
that entailed a custodial disposition (CCJS, 1999; John Howard Society, 1999).  As 
noted, sentencing varied across provinces. A young offender who resided in Ontario, the 
Yukon, the Northwest Territories, or Prince Edward Island was more likely to serve time 
in custody.  In Ontario, for example, 10,999 (41%) of the 27,033 youth convicted of an 
offence in 1997/98 received a custodial sentence (John Howard Society, 1999: 7).   
It must also be noted that under the YOA, there were no parole provisions. Young 
offenders who were sentenced to incarceration remained in a custodial facility until the 
end of their sentence, unless upon judicial review their sentence was modified (Bala, 
Carrington, and Roberts, 2009).  In some instances, this led to harsher penalties for youth.  
For example, a study conducted by the John Howard Society (1999) compared custodial 
sentences received by adults and youths for similar crimes (e.g., theft under $5000).  It 
found that if a youth and an adult were given the maximum sentence of two years, the 
adult could be paroled after serving one-third (33%) of the sentence.  A youth, in 
comparison, was only able to have their sentences modified after a judicial review that 
was permitted after serving one year -- 50% of their sentence (John Howard Society, 
  18 
1999: 4).  Furthermore, because judicial reviews were difficult to arrange, they rarely 
occurred (Bala, 2003; Bala, Carrington, and Roberts, 2009).  Even in cases where a 
review hearing was held, some judges were reluctant to modify a young offender’s 
sentence (Bala, 2003).   
Jaffe and Leschied (1989: 180) argue that while the principles of the YOA attempted to 
balance protection of the community and recognition that adolescents may require special 
guidance because their stage of development, research suggests that this balance has not 
been achieved (Jaffe and Leschied , 1989; Markwart and Corrado, 1989).  Instead, “the 
Young Offenders Act to date [1989] has meant an increasing demand for custody beds 
with a dramatic increase in such court dispositions” (Jaffe and Leschied, 1989: 180).  
This is a trend that was consistent across the provinces except Quebec (p. 180).   
Thus, from the time it came into force, the YOA was criticized.  By the late 1990s 
professionals and academics expressed concern over the high rates of use of courts and 
custody in Canada (Bala, 2015: 134).  Some critics argued the Act did not set clear 
principles to guide its implementation.  Other critics complained that too much focus was 
being placed on the rehabilitation and reintegration of young offenders at the expense of 
the protection of the public (Casavant and Valiquet, 2011).  Beaulieu and Cesaroni 
(1999) state that “getting tough” on youth crime became the mandate of political pundits, 
resulting in three amendments to the YOA between 1984 and 1995 (Casavant and 
Valiquet, 2011).  Each amendment aimed to toughen up the Act, and create harsher 
provisions for young persons charged with serious, violent offences (Beaulieu and 
Cesaroni, 1999).    
In response to these public and political criticisms, that the House of Commons Standing 
Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs initiated a review of the YOA in the 1990s 
(Department of Justice, 2004).  A number of groups, including criminal justice 
professionals, children’s services organizations, victims, parents, young offenders, 
educators, advocacy groups, and social policy analysts were consulted.  In April 1997, 
the federal committee produced the “Renewing Youth Justice” report which outlined 
fourteen suggestions for change.  Among the principle recommendations were that youth 
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courts should be granted the jurisdiction to deal with 10 and 11-year olds, that young 
offenders names should be published, and that the Act’s declaration of principles should 
be replaced with a statement of purpose and enunciation of guiding principles 
(Department of Justice, 2004).   
In May 1998, the federal government released its response in a report titled “A Strategy 
for the Renewal of Youth Justice” which outlined how the government would reform 
juvenile justice (Bala, 2015; Department of Justice, 2004).  The report focused on three 
areas:  youth crime prevention; providing young persons with meaningful consequences; 
and rehabilitation and reintegration of young offenders.  The most prominent aspect of 
the strategy was legislative reform that intended “to respond more firmly and effectively 
to the small number of the most serious, violent young offenders” by creating the 
presumption that the most serious cases would result in adult sentences (Department of 
Justice, 1999; Bala, 2015).  Subsequently, the federal government reintroduced Bill C-7, 
which, after debate and discussion, was adopted and received Royal Assent on February 
19, 2002.  Providing time to the provinces to prepare for its implementation, the Youth 
Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) came into force on April 1, 2003, replacing the YOA 
(Department of Justice, 2004). 
1.2.3 Youth Criminal Justice Act (2003) 
The 2003 YCJA aimed to address the various criticisms leveled at the YOA.  The 
enactment of the YCJA in essence represented a political compromise (Newburn, 2002; 
Bala, Carrington, and Roberts, 2009).  On the one hand it sought to appease those who 
called for a “get tough on crime” agenda leading to punitive consequences especially for 
serious, violent, and repeat offenders (Jaffe and Baker, 1999).  On the other hand, the Act 
appears to reaffirm Canada’s commitment to the justice model of the youth court, 
introduced under the YOA, which evokes the concept of due process within adversarial 
proceedings and to special legal protections due to their immaturity (Bala and Anand, 
2012; Beaulieu and Cesaroni, 1999).  
A major change under the YCJA concerns sentencing, most notably as it relates to 
Canada’s over-reliance on the use of youth courts and youth custody. Under the YOA, 
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there were a large number of youths being processed through the courts and placed in 
custody, often for non-violet offences (Bala and Anand, 2012; Bala, Carrington, and 
Roberts, 2009).  The YCJA sought to reduce the role of the courts and increase the 
emphasis on the community.  Furthermore, it increased the use of diversionary options 
and community-based sentences.  For example, community supports, including the young 
person’s parents, are expected to work together to encourage young persons who have 
committed offences to get back on the right track.  Parents, family members and the 
community are seen as having a moral obligation to assist young persons to become law-
abiding citizens.  To accomplish this, young persons’ must be provided with the means 
and opportunities through which they can maintain or increase continuous contact and 
involvement with their parents, families, or other meaningful individuals in their lives 
(Department of Justice, 2002; Bala and Anand, 2012).  Such contact and involvement 
with a young person’s parents or significant others is to be guided by and be consistent 
with the protection of the public, of the personnel who are working with the young 
person, as well as the young person himself or herself (s. 83[2a]).   
As such, the overall presumption under the YCJA is that judicial proceedings shall not be 
the first choice of action when dealing with an alleged offender, especially those who are 
first time offenders and/or who have engaged in minor offences.  This presumption is 
made clear in the YCJA’s Declaration of Principle.  A prominent message, for instance, 
is that the youth justice system must respond to youth offending in a way that is 
“proportionate” to the offence (s. 3[1]) (Bala and Anand, 2012: 111).  The principles also 
require police and prosecutors to use restraint when invoking legal sanctions.  In this 
manner, in most provinces and territories (excluding New Brunswick, Quebec, and 
British Columbia) police could act on their own authority (without consulting the 
prosecutorial authorities) when deciding whether to lay a charge (Carrington and 
Schulenberg, 2008: 353).  A police officer upon first contact with an alleged offender and 
before beginning any judicial proceedings or taking any other measures, can choose any 
of the following:  take no further action; give a warning; administer a caution; or refer the 
youth to a community program or agency (s. 6[1]).  
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Such progressive intervention is illustrated by Schulenberg (2010: 118) who found that 
90% of officers used informal warnings along with involving the parents in their use of 
social control.  When parents appeared supportive and the officers believed there would 
be consequences imposed at home, they were more likely to use informal actions or 
divert the youth to a diversion program (p. 123).  In comparison, if there was little 
parental involvement, poor parental attitudes, or no accountability or consequences being 
imposed at home, a charge was more likely to be laid (p. 124).  Schulenberg (2010: 127) 
concluded that the actions of police officers were in keeping with the principles and 
objectives (providing meaningful consequences through the use of ‘graduated sanctions’) 
of the YCJA.   
Thus, while the YCJA was enacted under the premise that Canada would “get tough” on 
youth crime, it, in fact, was directed more towards reducing Canada’s reliance on the use 
of youth courts and youth custody by increasing the use of diversionary options and 
community-based sentences.  In addition, youth courts and custody were to be focused 
towards the more serious violent and repeat offenders; even then it is to be a last resort. 
As the Preamble of the YCJA specifically states,   
Canadian society should have a youth criminal justice system, that commands 
respect, takes into account the interests of the victims, fosters responsibility and 
ensures accountability through meaningful consequences and effective 
rehabilitation and reintegration, and that reserves its most serious intervention for 
the most serious crimes and reduces the over-reliance on incarceration for non-
violent persons (2003).   
The most effective means to successfully achieve these objectives, under the YCJA, is to 
rehabilitate and reintegrate young offenders back into the community.  Furthermore, with 
regards to custody, the YCJA requires that all sanctions be fair and proportionate (s. 
3[1]).  The justice system must reserve custody for only the most serious and repeat 
offenders (YCJA Preamble).  Further, when a young offender appears in front of a youth 
justice court, the court is not to impose a custodial sentence unless it has considered all 
other alternatives to custody (Bala and Anand, 2012: 111).  Only after determining that 
there are no other reasonable alternatives, or a combination of reasonable alternatives, 
can a court impose a custody order (s. 39[2]).   
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As noted earlier, under the YCJA (Preamble), there is an emphasis on “extra-judicial 
measures” especially community-based responses to youth crime.  Programs that are 
viewed as most effective are those aimed at “fostering responsibility”; “ensuring 
accountability through meaningful consequences”; providing “effective rehabilitation” 
and “effective reintegration” that is outside the formal justice system (Panko, 2005: 473).  
In providing such programs (e.g., community based responses, sentencing conferences) it 
is believed that Canada’s youth justice system will protect society and will reinforce 
societal values to ensure young offenders will become productive, responsible citizens 
(Panko, 2005: 473).    
In sum, the YCJA signaled a significant shift from the YOA in its attempt to strike an 
appropriate balance between “toughening up” measures to deal with serious violent 
offenders and pursuing a more rehabilitative approach with its increased emphasis on 
alternative measures for both violent and non-violent offenders (National Criminal 
Justice Section Canadian Bar Association, 2010).  The courts and law enforcement agents 
were also provided with more options for diverting young offenders away from the 
judicial system, especially first time offenders and those engaging in minor offences.  In 
addition, a number of guiding principles were provided to assist the courts in sentencing.  
Thus, the YCJA combined elements of the welfare, justice, and crime-control models.    
1.2.4 Safe Streets and Communities Act (YCJA post 2012 
amendments) 
The YCJA soon came under attack with critics contending it was too lenient on youth 
crime.  Interestingly, while there was much criticism over the ineffectiveness of the 
YCJA, the Act seems to have been effective in achieving its goal of restricting custodial 
sentences for youth, even for more serious offences that have reached youth court.  A 
study conducted by Milligan (2010), for example, found that not only have fewer youths 
appeared in court, but fewer youths also have been sentenced to custody.  For example, in 
2008/2009 only 15% of all guilty cases resulted in a custodial sentence, compared to 27% 
in 2002/2003 (Milligan, 2010).  Bala, Carrington, and Roberts (2009) have also shown 
that the per capita rate of custodial sentences dropped by 35% in 2003/2004 with a 
further drop of 36% in the three years following the enactment of the YCJA (2004-2007).  
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They concluded that this decline represents not only the decrease in the volume of cases 
in front of a youth court but also a decline in the number of custodial sentences being 
handed down.  The YCJA seems to have been effective, then, in achieving its goal to 
restrict custodial sentences for youth, even for more serious offences that have reached 
youth court (Bala, Carrington, and Roberts, 2009).  
The trend holds across provinces and territories:  there has been a decrease in the 
proportion of guilty cases receiving custodial sentences (Milligan, 2010), even though 
variations in the rate at which youths are brought into the court persists across provinces 
(Sprott and Doob, 2008).   For example, Quebec and British Columbia use youth courts 
the least while Saskatchewan appears to rely on youth courts the most (Thomas, 2005; 
Sprott and Doob, 2008).  The YCJA has had the biggest impact in the Atlantic region and 
Ontario; both provinces have reduced their use of youth courts (Bala, Carrington, and 
Roberts, 2009).  There has been limited impact in the Prairie Provinces and British 
Columbia.  Overall, though, Canada’s youth incarceration rate, which includes custody 
and detention, has declined by approximately 50% under the YCJA (Bala, Carrington, 
and Roberts, 2009).    
When the Conservative government came into power in 2006, it proposed a complete 
overhaul.  As part of the government’s larger and ongoing tough-on-crime overhaul of 
the Canadian justice system, the Conservative government argued that harsher sentences 
needed to be implemented, as this would have a deterrent effect especially on repeat 
offenders and potential offenders.  Responding again to both criticisms of the YCJA, the 
Government of Canada brought forth amendments under the Safe Streets and 
Communities Act (SSCA).  These amendments to the YCJA came into force on October 
23, 2012 and were designed to strengthen the ways in which the youth justice system 
deals with serious violent and repeat offenders.  Public protection and accountability 
were moved to the foreground over rehabilitation and prevention.  For example, the 
legislation broadened the criteria for holding youth in pre-trial detention (s. 29 [2]) and 
sentenced custody (s. 39[1]) and added deterrence and denunciation as sentencing 
objectives a youth court ‘may’ consider (s. 38[2][f]) (YCJA, 2003; Mann, 2014: 60).  The 
amendments were reportedly aimed at better protecting Canadians from violent and 
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repeat young offenders and making the protection of society the paramount consideration 
in the management of young offenders within the justice system.  While the YCJA, when 
enacted in 2003, sought to move towards a more rehabilitative model for sentencing, the 
2012 amendments appear to have encouraged a transition back towards a “get-tough 
approach” to young offenders.   
Critics of the YCJA, had complained about the “the absence of deterrence as an explicit 
purpose of sentencing at the youth justice court level” (Roberts and Bala, 2003).  The 
2012 amendments, therefore, were designed to strengthen the ways in which the youth 
justice system deals with young offenders.  The protection of society continued to be an 
overriding consideration under the act; however, the principle of deterrence, among other 
principles (e.g., denunciation), were reintroduced into the YCJA.  The amendments were 
directed towards the handling of violent and repeat young offenders, especially.  Thus far, 
it is not entirely clear whether the 2012 legislation will lead to harsher sentences, or 
whether the trend towards lighter sentences under the YCJA will continue.  
1.3 Chapter Summary 
While youth crime statistics have revealed youth crime has been decreasing since the 
1990s, high profile media stories suggest to the public that youth are literally getting 
away with murder.  This chapter has provided an overview of youth crime legislation, 
youth crime trends and youth court statistics, to illustrate how legislative changes, within 
Canada, have sought to alter sentencing practices of young offenders.  In Chapter 2, I will 
provide a discussion of the underlying purposes and principles of sentencing, giving 
particular focus to the guiding principles and purposes underlying the YOA and the 
YCJA.  I also will discuss how young offenders are processed within the youth justice 
system in Canada, followed by a discussion of the two criminological theories (penal 
populism and focal concerns theory) of sentencing that guide this study.  
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Chapter 2  
2 Introduction 
Chapter one outlined youth crime legislation in Canada discussing how this legislation 
has altered sentencing practices. In general, the chapter revealed a tension underlying 
political and public debates about how best to deal with youth crime: should we, as a 
society, be “lenient” with sentencing in order to rehabilitate youth, giving them an 
opportunity to turn their lives around?  Or should we enact harsher sentences, to deter 
youth from committing crimes and protect society from high-risk violent offenders?  
Canadian legislation has attempted to find a balance between these two extremes in what 
essentially has become a debate between protecting the best interests of young offenders 
and protecting the best interests of the public.  
In order to examine the forces that shape sentencing, this chapter looks at the youth 
justice system, sentencing trends and sentencing theories, to shed more light on the 
adjudication of violent young offenders.  The chapter will proceed as follows:  I will 
begin with a discussion of the judicial system wherein I will discuss the process young 
offenders’ may experience when they come in contact with criminal justice agents.  A 
section is included on the principles and purposes of sentencing wherein I will discuss the 
prominent goals or purposes behind youth justice legislation in Canada.  Given the 
prominence of responsibility, accountability, rehabilitation and reintegration, and to a 
lesser degree deterrence, under the YOA and YCJA, I provide a more detailed discussion 
of accountability, rehabilitation, and deterrence.  I then provide a discussion of youth 
court judges and sentencing, noting the role of judicial discretion in Canada.  The last 
sections of this chapter will focus on the two theoretical perspectives that guided this 
study: penal populism and focal concerns theory.  Following this section will be an 
introduction to the present study.    
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2.1 Judicial System  
Canada is a constitutional monarchy, federal state and parliamentary democracy wherein 
the responsibility for governing at the federal level is shared by the legislative, executive, 
and judicial branches (Welsh and Irving, 2005).  The Constitution Act of 1867 assigned 
to the federal parliament the authority to enact criminal laws as well as set the procedures 
that are to be followed in criminal matters.  The primary source of both substantive8 and 
procedural9 criminal law is the Criminal Code of Canada; yet under the Constitution Act 
of 1867, Canada’s ten provinces and three territories have jurisdiction over the 
administration of justice and the responsibility to establish and maintain the system of 
provincial and territorial criminal courts (Welsh and Irving, 2005; Doob, 2016).  Thus, 
under the Canadian Constitution, responsibility for the criminal justice system is a 
“shared responsibility” between the federal and provincial governments (Welsh and 
Irving, 2005; Doob and Sprott, 2005).  As noted, the federal government legislates 
criminal laws whereas the provincial governments have the responsibility for 
administering these laws, which includes the provision of police services, courts, and 
correctional services (Welsh and Irving, 2005; Doob and Sprott, 2005; Carrington and 
Schulenberg, 2008: 351).   
As with all common-law countries, Canadian law adheres to the doctrine of stare decisis, 
which requires judges to apply established principles of law to all future cases (Hall and 
Wright, 2008: 92; Lens, 2003: 29).  The general principle is that similar fact-based cases 
are decided in a manner that produces similar and predictable outcomes.  The principle of 
precedent is the mechanism by which that goal is attained.  In other words in common 
law legal systems precedent is a principle or rule established in a previous legal case that 
is either binding or influential on a court (Lens, 2003 Hall and Wright, 2008).  
                                                 
8
 Substantive law is defined as “the part of the law that creates, defines, and regulates the rights, duties, and 
powers of parties (Black’s Law Dictionary, 2004: 1567).  
9
 Procedural law is defined as “the rules that prescribe the steps for having a right or duty judicially 
enforced, as opposed to the law that defines the specific rights or duties themselves” (Black’s Law 
Dictionary, 2004: 1323). 
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The public often has the perception that courts have the ability to reduce or control crime, 
as it is the courts that impose sentencing restrictions on offenders (Ashworth, 1995).  The 
passing of a sentence, however, is only one stage in a long series of decisions that range 
from the decision to charge an offender, to the prosecutorial review, the mode of trial, 
venue, the plea negotiation, the presentation of facts to the court and subsequently to the 
enforcement of sentences and decisions on early release (Ashworth, 1995: 264).  Since 
discretionary practices are embedded within the laws, the principles of the youth justice 
legislation (such as the YOA or the YCJA) are applied and interpreted through the 
discretionary powers of the police, crown attorneys, and the courts.  For example, as 
discussed in Chapter 1, a police officer when dealing with an alleged offender, and before 
beginning any judicial proceedings or taking any other measures, can choose to take no 
further action, give a warning, administer a caution, or refer the youth to a community 
program or agency (YCJA, 2002: s. 6(1); Schulenberg, 2010).  It is the police who are 
most likely the first contact with a youth and are responsible for investigating and laying 
charges (Bala and Anand, 2012; McGoey, 2004).   
Once a charge has been laid, the decision to prosecute is based on the Crown Attorney’s 
assessment of whether there is “credible evidence relevant to what is alleged to be a 
crime” (R. v. Boucher, 1955: para. 26; Bala and Anand, 2012: 428).  This objective 
standard is higher than a “prima facie”10 case that requires there be evidence upon which 
a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could convict.  It also does not require a 
“probability of conviction,” wherein a conclusion that a conviction is more likely than not 
(McGoey, 2004).  A recent and more detailed pronouncement of the judiciary role of the 
Crown within the youth court justice system, is reported by McGoey (2004):   
…the role of the Crown Attorney in the administration of justice is of critical 
importance to the courts and to the community. . . The Crown prosecutor must be 
a symbol of fairness, prompt to make all reasonable disclosures and yet 
scrupulous in attention to the welfare and safety of witnesses.  The community 
looks upon the Crown prosecutor as a symbol of authority and as a spokesman for 
                                                 
10
 Prima facie is defined as “at first sight; on first appearance but subject to further evidence or 
information” (Black’s Law Dictionary, 2004: 1310).   
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the community in criminal matters [emphasis added] (R. v. Logiacco (1984), 11 
C.C.C. (3d) 374).   
In summary, the juvenile justice system is a complex system with a number of players.  
Sentencing young offenders is but one part of a broader criminal justice process, albeit 
one that is shaped by the multiple claims and interpretations of the actors involved 
(Doob, 1995; Ashworth, 1995: 264).  The laws define certain “matters” that may legally 
become the focus of public state action (Minow, 1987; Moore and Wakeling, 1997).  
Only some portion, however, of all of these events that in principle could become part of 
the juvenile justice system will actually do so, as there are a number of institutions that 
determine which ‘potential’ cases become ‘actual’ cases (Moore and Wakeling, 1997). 
The courts in many jurisdictions, therefore, receive only a selection of cases (Doob, 1995; 
Ashworth, 1995: 264).   
2.2 Principles and Purposes of Sentencing: Young 
Offenders in Canada 
One cannot have a discussion about judicial sentencing without first discussing the goals 
that are to be achieved (Bushway and Forst, 2012).  Criminal law guiding the 
administration of justice pertaining to violent offences embodies differing policy 
determinations and philosophies of the juvenile justice system, such as retribution, 
incapacitation, deterrence, rehabilitation, and accountability (Thomas and Fitch, 1981).  
There is much controversy and contention surrounding such sentencing principles 
especially when considering how best to respond to youth crime.  Such controversy can 
and often does lead to sentencing disparities.  In this section, I discuss the prominent 
goals that underlie the principles and purposes of sentencing under Canada’s youth 
justice legislation.   
Rehabilitation plays a key role in the sentencing decisions included in this study, and as 
such, I provide a more detailed discussion of rehabilitation under the YOA and the 
YCJA.  Since there has been much debate over the meaning of accountability, under the 
YCJA, I also include a discussion of accountability.  Lastly, deterrence has been 
prominent under the YOA, excluded under the YCJA (2003-2012), and reintroduced after 
the 2012 amendments of the YCJA, and as such I discuss deterrence as well.   
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2.2.1 Deterrence Model 
Criminal law makers and adjudicators formulate and administer criminal laws under the 
assumption that laws nearly always influence a person’s conduct; it is believed that 
punishment can prevent future offending.  Criminal justice measures which are aimed at 
apprehending and punishing individual offenders seek to prevent future crimes from 
occurring either by deterring people from committing offences or by incapacitating 
offenders (Ashworth, 2002; Bala and Anand, 2012: 138; Robinson and Darley, 2004).   
Incapacitation is based on the notion that an offender or group of offenders can be 
identified who are likely to do harm again in the future, as such, special protective 
measures (usually in the form of lengthy incarceration) should be imposed (Ashworth, 
2002).  This approach allows the courts to go beyond “proportionate” sentencing under 
the guise of ‘public protection’ and focuses on violent and repeat offenders who are 
considered likely to do serious harm (von Hirsch and Ashworth, 1996; Ashworth, 2002). 
For example, if a violent or repeat young offender is incarcerated, they are not and cannot 
be out on the streets committing crimes; the assumption is that crime rates will decline 
and delinquency will have been deterred (Tanner, 2001; Ashworth, 2002).   
Deterrence theory is based on the premise of rational choice.  Beccaria and Bentham, two 
classical theorists, introduced a “cost-benefit analysis” to illustrate how individuals weigh 
the costs (consequences) against the benefits (pleasure) gained by engaging in criminal 
activity (Kennedy, 1983).  Under this model, individuals are perceived as responsible and 
predominantly rational calculating individuals (Ashworth, 2002).  Thus, deterrence 
theory assumes that individuals who fear punishment or the threat of punishment will 
consider their actions by assessing the costs of offending in relation to the gains of 
committing the offence (Kennedy, 1983).   
There are two types of deterrence:  general and specific.  Specific deterrence seeks to 
deter specific offenders from offending again through punishment (Ashworth, 2002).  A 
first-time offender may require little to no punishment whereas a repeat 
offender/recidivist may require an escalation of penalties, as the seriousness of the 
offence is more important.  General deterrence, on the other hand, involves calculating 
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the penalty based on what may be expected to deter others from committing a similar 
offence.  Proponents of the deterrence model emphasize the greatest good for the greatest 
number of people; as a result they believe it may be justifiable to punish one person 
severely in order to deter others effectively, even if such sentences override the principle 
of proportionality (Ashworth, 2002).  
The deterrent effect relies on three components:  certainty, celerity, and severity of 
punishment (Lab, 2000).  Certainty in punishment results when an offender or potential 
offender is certain that criminal or delinquent behaviours will lead to identification, 
apprehension, conviction, and sentencing (Lab, 2000).  Celerity refers to the speed at 
which punishment is imposed; the longer the delay in determining and imposing 
sanctions for delinquent or criminal behaviour, the less impact it will have in deterring 
future offences.  Severity refers to the severity of the punishment needed to achieve 
deterrence.  Punishment must provide enough pain to offset the pleasure gained from the 
criminal act.  As such the severity of the punishment not only inhibits the pleasure gained 
but it replaces pleasure with a negative, unwanted pain (Lab, 2000).  A criminal justice 
system that is based on a deterrence model should, therefore, introduce policies that are 
able to achieve the greatest level of certainty, celerity, and severity of punishment (Goff, 
2001).  Furthermore, agents of the criminal justice system and lawmakers must make it 
clear to an offender or a potential offender that the risks or costs are greater than the gains 
that results from criminal activity (Kennedy, 1983).   
2.2.1.1 Deterrence and Young Offenders  
Deterrence, as a guiding principle in sentencing young offenders, has been controversial 
in Canada, illustrating the complexities faced by judges when interpreting the meaning of 
legislation and considering what sentence best responds to youth crime (Cesaroni and 
Bala, 2008).  The YOA did not clearly articulate the principles that govern youth 
sentencing, and as a result there was much controversy among judges as to whether to use 
deterrence as a guiding principle (Cesaroni and Bala, 2008).  In 1993, the Supreme Court 
of Canada resolved this controversy in R. v. J.J.M, concluding that general deterrence 
should be considered in sentencing, albeit to a lesser extent than it is for adult offenders 
(Cesaroni and Bala, 2008).  The court stated   
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There is a reason to believe that Young Offenders Act dispositions can have an 
effective deterrent effect.  The crimes committed by the young tend to be a group 
activity…. If the activity of the group is criminal then the disposition imposed on 
an individual member of the group should be such that it will deter other members 
of the group [emphasis added].  For example the sentence imposed on one 
member of a “swarming group” should serve to deter others in the gang 
[emphasis added] (R. v. J.J.M., 1993: at para. 34).  
With the enactment of the YCJA in 2003, the debate over deterrence continued (R. v. 
B.V.N. 2004; R. v. B.W.P. 2004; Cesaroni and Bala, 2008).  The Supreme Court of 
Canada in R. v. B.W.P. (2004) upheld the Manitoba Court of Appeal, ruling that 
deterrence was not to be a factor in sentencing.  Relying upon the Preamble to the YCJA, 
the Declarations of Principles (section 3), the Sentencing Principles (Section 38) and the 
specific words of Section 50, Justice Charron wrote: 
The YCJA introduced a new sentencing regime . . . Hence, general deterrence is 
not a principle of youth sentencing under the present regime [emphasis added].  
The YCJA also does not speak of specific deterrence [emphasis added].  Rather, 
Parliament has sought to promote the long-term protection of the public by 
addressing the circumstances underlying the offending behaviour, by 
rehabilitating and reintegrating young persons into society and by holding young 
persons accountable through the imposition of meaningful sanctions related to the 
harm done [emphasis added]. . . I conclude that Parliament has not included 
deterrence as a basis for imposing a sanction under the YCJA (R. v. P. (B.W.), 
2006: at para. 4).   
While a sentence that holds a young person accountable through the use of meaningful 
sanctions may have a deterrent ‘effect’, according to Justice Charron (2006), there is a 
fundamental difference, albeit subtle, between deterrence as an ‘effect’, and deterrence as 
a ‘purpose’ of sentencing (Cesaroni and Bala, 2008).  In other words, while deterrence 
was a guiding principle under the YOA, it was not to be an approach that should be 
followed in responding to youth crime, under the YCJA (Cesaroni and Bala, 2008; Bala 
and Anand, 2012: 142).   
As was noted in Chapter 1, the 2012 Safe Streets and Communities Act renewed a “get-
tough on crime” agenda, and as a result section 38(2)(f)(i) and (ii) of the YCJA was 
amended and the following two objectives to sentencing principles were added:  “to 
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denounce unlawful conduct” and “to deter the young person from committing offences”.  
Hence, recently, deterrence is once again a principle to be considered in sentencing.   
2.2.2 Rehabilitation 
Rehabilitation and the reintegration of offenders back into the community has been a 
prominent focus of youth sentencing, especially in Canada (Bala and Anand, 2012).  This 
approach aims to prevent further offending through the use of rehabilitation programs, 
such as therapy, counseling, intervention in the family, cognitive-behavioural programs, 
skill training, and so on (Ashworth, 2002).  To rehabilitate an offender, the sentences 
should be tailored to the needs of the young persons and focus on the processes of 
diagnosis, treatment, and completion of, for example, an accredited treatment/ 
rehabilitation program.  The argument behind this model is that some or many criminal 
offences are to a significant extent determined by social pressures, psychological 
difficulties or situational problems of various kinds experienced by the offenders. 
Offenders are seen as unable to cope in certain situations and as such, turn to crime.  
With the aid of therapy, supports, and expert guidance they can learn to cope with these 
pressures without further engaging in criminal activity (Ashworth, 2002).  We must 
reveal the general forces leading to such unwanted behavior (Christie, 2004: 108).  As 
Christie (2004) states “punishment should be the last alternative, not the first” (p. 108).  
2.2.2.1 Rehabilitation and Young Offenders 
It has been recognized, since the introduction of the JDA, that youth justice legislation is 
to be distinct from the law (Criminal Code of Canada) that is applicable to adult 
offenders, as adolescents have special and differing needs (Bala and Anand, 2012: 130). 
The YOA was amended in 1995 with Section 3(1)(a) being added which recognized that 
“crime prevention is essential to the long term protection of society and requires . . . 
identifying and effectively responding to children and young persons at risk of 
committing offending behavior in the future” (Bala and Anand, 2012: 140).  Under the 
guidance of the YOA, youth courts recognized rehabilitation was to be an underlying 
principle; however, some youth court judges were using incarceration as a means for 
rehabilitation (Anand, 1998).  Parliament attempted to structure judicial discretion in the 
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sentencing of young offenders with s. 24(1.1)(a) of the YOA; however, this section was 
too narrowly drafted to be effective (Anand, 1998: 341).  Section 24(1.1)(a) directs youth 
court judges not to give custodial sentences on the basis of rehabilitation (p. 341).  Anand 
(1998) argued that this section was too narrowly drafted, and as such, it left open the 
option to use custodial sentences for rehabilitative purposes.  There is much evidence to 
show that the courts were sentencing in this manner (Anand, 1998: 341).  
Rehabilitation is a central feature of the YCJA’s Preamble and Declaration of Principle.  
A youth justice system is to focus on responding to youths who have committed offences 
and the crimes they have committed.  The best way to protect society is to rehabilitate 
offenders and as such a youth justice system, whether through the use of extrajudicial 
measures or a youth justice court decision, should consider the “circumstances underlying 
[a young person’s] offending behavior” (Bala and Anand, 2012: 141).  In particular, 
Section 38(1) states   
 the purpose of sentencing is to hold a young person accountable for an offence 
 through the imposition of just sanctions that have meaningful consequences for 
 the young person and that promote his or her rehabilitation and reintegration into 
 society [emphasis added], thereby contributing to the long-term protection of the 
 public.  
In other words, the YCJA recognizes that adolescents are impressionable and amenable 
to rehabilitation and it is through the use of rehabilitation that the long-term protection of 
the public can be achieved (Bala and Anand, 2012: 132).  For the more serious and repeat 
offenders it is imperative that their special needs are understood as it is in the offenders’ 
best interest, as well as society’s best interest, that they be rehabilitated (p. 133)11.   
In summary, the YCJA is distinct from the law that is applicable to adult offenders as it 
recognizes that adolescents have special needs and are impressionable and amenable to 
rehabilitation (Bala and Anand, 2012: 130).  While the emphasis on rehabilitation is 
found in the YOA, it is more specifically stated under the YCJA.  The YCJA’s Preamble 
                                                 
11
 It must be noted that some troubled youths have ongoing needs that cannot be met by the criminal justice 
system and as such, their needs may be best met in child protection, education, or mental health systems, 
either concurrently with a youth justice response or instead of it (Bala and Anand, 2012: 133).   
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and the Declaration of Principle places more of an emphasis on rehabilitation.  The YCJA 
rejects the approach of the JDA along with decisions under the YOA; the rehabilitative 
and welfare needs of a young offender cannot be used to justify a longer sentence in 
custody (p. 130).  It also directs that alternatives to custody “must” be considered when 
imposing sentencing, especially for Aboriginal young offenders (s. 3[2][d]) (Anand, 
2003: 946). Section 38 also makes clear that the principles of offender accountability and 
proportionality are also to be taken into account when sentencing.  The following section 
focuses on the meaning of accountability, under the YCJA, and responsibility under the 
YOA.   
2.2.3 Accountability 
Youth court judges, when considering and making various decisions about sentencing, 
must balance the principles of accountability, protection of society, as well as how best to 
respond (e.g., rehabilitation and deterrence) to the needs of a young offender (Bala and 
Anand, 2012: 133).  Accountability was an important consideration under the YOA; 
however, it was emphasized through holding a young person “responsible” for their 
actions (Bala, 1994: 647).  This is reflected in Section B of the YOA (Principles of the 
Act), which states “young persons are said not to be as accountable for their acts as are 
adults, but even so they must "bear responsibility for their contraventions” (emphasis 
added). 
Accountability is also mentioned in three of the most important decisions to be made 
under the YCJA:  whether to divert the young person away from the court, whether to 
impose a custodial sentence, and whether to sentence him/her as an adult (YCJA, 2003; 
Roach et al., 2009: 1).  The YCJA’s Preamble states that along with reducing the use of 
custodial sentences for all but the most serious offences, the central purpose of the YCJA 
is to hold young people “accountable” for their wrongdoing.  The youth justice system 
can ensure accountability through the use of extrajudicial measures or a youth court 
sentence, both of which are proportionate to the seriousness of the offence and the degree 
of responsibility of the young person (s. 3(1)(a)(i); Bala and Anand, 2012).  
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Proportionality is encompassed under the notion of retribution, which is based on the idea 
that punishment should fit the seriousness of the offence and the harm done (von Hirsch, 
1976; Bottoms and Preston, 1980; Ashworth, 2002; Bala and Anand, 2012).  A criminal 
sentence is to communicate the degree of censure that an offender deserves for the wrong 
through the severity of the sanction imposed (von Hirsch, 1984; Roach et al., 2009: 7).  
As Roach et al. (2009: 7) state “justice demands that we punish each person precisely 
according to the degree of censure that he deserves in virtue of his moral culpability of 
wrongdoing”.  For example, a long prison sentence communicates a high degree of 
censure, conversely a less serious sentence (e.g., a small fine) communicates a low 
degree of censure (Roach et al., 2009: 7). The goals of retribution, unlike incapacitation 
and deterrence, are, therefore, focused on past events and the focal point in determining 
an appropriate sentence is based on the nature of the offence committed, not who the 
offender is or whether the offender may re-offend in the future (O’Grady, 2014).  It is 
wrong, therefore, to impose a harsher sentence on one young offender than would be 
imposed on another young offender (on the basis of moral culpability for their offence) as 
both deserve the same degree of censure (von Hirsch, 1985; Roach et al., 2009: 7).   
The YCJA did not, however, provide an explicit definition of accountability, which 
raised the question, what does the YCJA mean when it states that young persons must be 
held “accountable”? (Roach et al., 2009)  This question is one of the central issues that 
face youth court judges in Canada, with the passing of the YCJA (Thorburn, 2009: 307; 
Roach et al., 2009: 1).  Roach et al. (2009) sought to determine what to make of the 
YCJA’s language of accountability.  While the principle of retribution states that the 
severity of the sentence should be proportionate to the offender’s moral culpability for 
the offence, that is only one important aspect of accountability; it is far from an 
exhaustive list (Roach et al., 2009).   
There is to be some concern over proportionality, but there must also be concern over the 
type of sanction imposed that will ensure the young person recognizes the wrongfulness 
of their conduct thereby helping to rehabilitate and reintegrate them back into society.  
Thus, accountability, according to Roach et al. (2009: 3) is concerned with more than just 
the severity of the sentence; it is also concerned with the decision to impose a custodial 
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sanction.  A youth court judge, for instance, may decide that accountability requires a 
sentence that does not meet the rehabilitative needs of the young offender.  For example, 
a decision to transfer and impose an adult sentence upon a young offender may be 
appropriate to hold the young offender accountable, but it is less likely that rehabilitation 
will occur (Roach et al., 2009).  It should, therefore, be recognized as Bala and Anand 
(2012) state that “while prevention of crime, rehabilitation, and reintegration are 
important guiding principles for the youth justice system, their application must be 
realistic” (p. 133).  For instance, there are some cases wherein a decision is “relatively 
easy” and it is possible to impose a sentence that holds a young person accountable while 
at the same time addressing their rehabilitative needs (Bala and Anand, 2012: 133).  In 
other instances, the decision is much more challenging.  
In summary, the fundamental goals of both the YOA and the YCJA, when sentencing 
young offenders are to impose a sentence with “meaningful consequences” that holds 
them accountable, but more importantly the impositions must promote the “effective 
rehabilitation and reintegration” of the young person (Roach et al., 2009: 4).  It is difficult 
and perhaps impossible to achieve all the goals of sentencing, and as such judges are left 
to weigh the needs of the young offender against the best interests of the community.  
When sentencing youth, judges are to be concerned not only with matching the 
seriousness of the young person’s offending behavior but also with ensuring their 
rehabilitation and reintegration into society, while holding the young person accountable 
(Roach et al., 2009: 5).  With regards to custody, the YCJA provides clear guidelines that 
a custodial sentence which is more severe than warranted by accountability, should not be 
imposed to achieve rehabilitative objectives or to address social concerns, such as lack of 
housing or an abusive home life (Bala and Anand, 2012: 494).   Following this notion, it 
can be assumed that when the court is concerned with the choice between custodial and 
non-custodial sanctions, under the YOA and the YCJA, both the proportionality and the 
reintegration/rehabilitation aspects of accountability and responsibility are to be kept in 
mind (Roach et al., 2009: 5).   
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2.3 Youth Court Judges and Sentencing 
The most fundamental role the courts play in Canada relates to sentencing -- a process 
whereby judges make reasoned decisions on how to punish convicted offenders 
(O’Grady, 2014: 210).  Guided by legislation and precedent, judges are thought to be 
‘mechanistic’ in that they are perceived to be restrained by rules that prevent their 
subjective beliefs and opinions from seeping into their decisions (Lens, 2003: 29).  
Judges do play a central role in the youth justice system but they do not make decisions 
in a vacuum and instead operate against a backdrop of social change and public pressures 
(Doob, 2001: 3; Beaulieu and Cesaroni, 1999: 364).  Judges, for example, while bound 
by precedent, do have the ability to exercise discretion when applying the principles that 
guide the court when sentencing, and as such, we must acknowledge that judges are not 
isolated from the world around them.  Whether consciously or unconsciously their 
decisions may reflect the philosophy of the time in which they live.  In other words, their 
decisions may be reflective of social needs (e.g., doctrine of ‘parens patriae’, get tough on 
crime, reduce incarceration rates) and collective values (Beaulieu and Cesaroni, 1999: 
364; Doob, 2016).   
Under the YOA, for example, there were no explicit sentencing principles and the Act’s 
Declaration of Principle provided only “general guidance” for sentencing (Bala and 
Anand, 2012: 493).  With the lack of clear guidance, individual judges adopted different 
approaches to sentencing and as a result, as discussed in Chapter 1, there was significant 
inter-provincial variation in sentencing practices with many young offenders being 
incarcerated for minor or first-time offences (Anand, 1998; Bala and Anand, 2012: 493; 
Doob and Sprott 2004; 2005).  Reducing the use of custody in youth courts was a central 
stated objective of the YCJA (Department of Justice, 2009; Doob, 2016: 300).  The 
YCJA provided a detailed set of sentencing principles for youth court judges to apply, 
which included explicit directions to reduce the discretionary role of the courts in order to 
reduce the level of custodial sentences being imposed (Anand, 1998; Bala and Anand, 
2012; Department of Justice, 2010; Doob, 2016).   
Youth court judges in Canada occupy a unique role; one that provides substantial power 
to affect the composition of the social landscape and includes many non-traditional 
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functions, such as providing a combination of judicial, administrative, collaborative, and 
advocacy functions (Edwards, 1992; Beaulieu and Cesaroni, 1999: 364).  When 
sentencing (under the YOA), as noted, judges must balance many different 
considerations.  An illustration can be found in a study conducted by Doob (2001) 
wherein he asked youth court judges to rate on a five-point scale, the importance of each 
of the following principles or purposes of sentencing, when sentencing for three types of 
offences (violent, property, and administration of justice):  denunciation, general 
deterrence, deterring this young person (specific deterrence); proportionality (handing 
down a sentence in which the severity of the sentence reflects the seriousness of the 
offence); rehabilitating this young person, incapacitation (ensuring that this young person 
is separated from society and protection of the public (Doob, 2001).   
Doob (2001) revealed that a number of judges indicated it was difficult or impossible to 
answer the questions posed.  Youth court judges, Doob (2001) concluded, appear to work 
in quite different “youth justice environments” and respond in considerably different 
fashions to the cases that come before them (p. 59).  Doob (2001: 59) reported that on 
almost every question in the study there were answers at each end of the continuum.  For 
instance, when asked how helpful probation is for controlling young persons, 26% of the 
judges stated it was very useful, 60% stated somewhat useful, 24% stated that it was only 
occasionally useful, 2.6% said they did not know, and 0.9% said it depended on the 
adequacy of resources that are available to probation services and the particular probation 
officers (p. 59).  
Rehabilitating a young person ranked the highest (4.64)12 for both the violent offences 
and property offences (e.g., B&E, business establishment), whereas specific deterrence 
ranked the highest for the administration of justice offences (e.g, failure to appear) and 
the second highest for the violent offences.  Thus, under the YOA, rehabilitation and 
deterrence were important principles and purposes when sentencing young violent 
                                                 
12
 Rated on a five-point scale (1 = not important at all; 5 = very important). 
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offenders.  Incapacitation ranked the lowest on all three offences: moderately serious 
violent offences, property offences, and administration of justice offences.   
Judges varied with respect to the importance they attributed to the various factors 
considered when sentencing.  In deciding whether to impose a custodial sentence, offence 
seriousness and criminal record were identified as the two most important factors.  
Welfare concerns were also relevant in that over a third of judges reported that a youth 
being “out of control” was a relevant factor in deciding whether to send a youth to 
custody (p. 60).  A youth’s well-being was also a consideration for many judges in 
sentencing, generally, and in the handing down of short sentences, in particular (p. 59).  
Thus, Doob (2001) concluded that rehabilitation was an important factor for judges and 
yet the use of custody as a rehabilitative measure, especially for the “out of control” 
youths also appeared to be relevant.   
What these results illustrate is not only the variation in judges’ approaches to decision 
making in youth court, but also the level of discretion that is afforded to them (Doob, 
2001: 60).  Just as no two offenders are alike, no two judges are alike.  While bound and 
directed by legislation and precedent, judges cannot avoid exercising some level of 
discretion.  As one judge commented, “It was not possible to rank on a generalized basis 
– each case is different” (Doob, 2001: 59).   
2.3.1 Judicial Discretion 
The YOA (Section 24) gave judges a great deal of discretion in deciding whether or not a 
custodial sentence should be imposed, which led to much sentencing disparity.  The 
YCJA, however, placed judges under a different sentencing regime.  There were more 
mandatory restrictions on the use of custody in section 39(1) of the YCJA (Bala and 
Anand, 2012: 494).  Moreover, with the enactment of the YCJA, the precedents decided 
under the YOA became of limited value (R. v. P. (B.W.), 206 at para. 21).  The courts 
would no longer have the “luxury” of turning to precedents from earlier youth justice 
regimes or to adult sentencing regimes for guidance in the interpretation of the YCJA’s 
sentencing provisions (Thorburn, 2009: 308).  In a sense, judges continued to have 
discretion, under the YCJA, when making sentencing decisions.  The Act sought to 
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reduce the wide disparities in youth court sentencing that had occurred under the YOA by 
providing more specific legislative direction (Cesaroni and Bala, 2008; Marinelli, 2002). 
Nonetheless, judges would continue to have the freedom to choose among different 
sentencing goals (e.g., deterrence, rehabilitation, retribution, protection of the 
community), thereby contributing to variations in the exercise of sentencing discretion 
(Forst and Wellford, 1981; Bushway and Forst, 2012: 204).   
Discretion, if used skillfully, can counterbalance any ill-conceived or vague laws and 
policies (Bushway and Forst, 2012: 215).  It can also be used to minimize wrongful 
arrests and convictions, excessive punishments, and failures to bring culpable offenders 
to justice (p. 215).  Anand (2003), for example, believed that if youth court judges used 
their discretion to interpret the legislation correctly, it could lead, not only to a reduction 
in overall youth incarceration rates, but to a better correlation between the seriousness of 
a young person’s offence and the punitiveness of the penalty for committing an offence.  
It would also increase or lead to better uses of reparative/restorative sentences, and a 
more equitable use of rehabilitative sentences (p. 946).   In addition, if youth court judges 
interpreted the legislation in accordance with Parliament’s objectives, Aboriginal young 
peoples would be sentenced more leniently than non-Aboriginal young persons who 
committed similar offences in similar circumstances.   
While this is beyond the scope of this study given the small sample size, it should be 
noted there is some debate over Section 38(2)(d) of the YCJA which states that “all 
available sanctions other than custody that are reasonable in the circumstances should be 
considered for all young persons, with particular attention to Aboriginal young persons”.  
In particular, while proportionality will determine punishment for many young offenders, 
it would not determine punishment for Aboriginal offenders and as a result, while judges 
cannot impose more severe sentences than the principle of proportionality, they may 
impose disproportionately lenient youth sentences on such offenders (Anand, 2003: 959).  
In other words, on the one side are those (Rudin and Roach, 2002) that contend 
sentencing reforms can be used as one of the many remedies for Aboriginal 
overrepresentation in custodial institutions.  Others contend that equality among 
offenders could be breached by not having proportionality determine sentencing for all 
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offenders:  “it is not fair to sentence non-Aboriginal and Aboriginal offenders differently 
solely by reason of their race and without regard to any other characteristics which they 
may share” (Roberts and Stenning, 2002: 84).  It should be noted that Roberts and 
Stenning (2002) are not advocating for more carceral sentences for Aboriginal offenders, 
rather they suggest a preferable alternative to the Aboriginal sentencing provision, such 
as a more general “social disadvantage” mitigating factors that would be equally 
available to all eligible offenders regardless of race, ethnicity, or any other categorical 
classification (Roberts and Stenning, 2002: 94).  
Judicial discretion, on the other hand can be misused or ‘abused’, such as when decisions 
result in the immediate harm to those convicted or when it results in damages to the 
legitimacy of the criminal justice system (Bushway and Forst, 2012: 215).  According to 
Simon (2007: 128), most of the complaints against the sentencing process are concerned 
with the broad discretion held by judges; with many critics arguing that the wide varying 
use of discretion has been detrimental to both the fairness and effectiveness of criminal 
sanctions.  In the U.S., for example, federal judges, prior to the adoption of sentencing 
guidelines, could sentence offenders to probation or custody with a wide range of 
minimum and maximum sentences.  A parole officer could release an offender prior to 
the maximum sentence; however, not before the minimum sentence had been served.  As 
a result, judges had “real” power over who went to prison as well as the length of 
offenders’ sentences (Simon, 2007: 128).  
Research in the United States has documented the misuse of judicial discretion as shown 
by racial, ethnic, and gender disproportionalities of those charged, convicted and 
sentenced (Daly and Bordt, 1995; Steffensmeier, Kramer, and Streifel, 1993; 
Steffensmeier, Ulmer, Kramer, 1998; Spohn and Holleran, 2000; Daly and Tonry, 1997: 
202).  Racism and sexism, according to Daly and Tonry (1997: 202) are perpetuated and 
reinforced by ‘white men’s social, economic, and political dominance over less powerful 
women and minority group men’.  Some argue the U.S. judicial system is rife with racial 
and gender discrimination, favoring the interests of whites over blacks (or other minority 
groups) and of men over women (Daly and Tonry, 1997: 203).  For example, the “war on 
drugs” in the United States resulted in harsher treatments of Blacks and Latino men and 
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women and no federal sentencing guidelines were able to reduce such racial 
discrimination in judicial sentencing (Albonetti, 1997; Spohn and Holleran, 2000; 
Roberts et al., 2003; Wacquant, 2005).  In Canada, it is Aboriginal offenders who are 
over-represented in custodial facilities.  In 2013 it was reported that 21.3% of all 
federally incarcerated Aboriginal offenders were 25 years of age or younger as compared 
to 13.6% of non-Aboriginals (Backgrounder, 2013).  Aboriginal women are also 
overrepresented in the federal correctional system compared to Aboriginal men.  In 
2010/2011, 41% of females and 25% of males sentenced to custody (provincially, 
territorially, and federally) were Aboriginal (Backgrounder, 2013).  
To summarize, in Canada, higher rates of incarceration for Aboriginal peoples have been 
linked to economic social disadvantages, substance abuse, and intergenerational loss, 
violence, and trauma (Backgrounder, 2013).  More importantly, higher rates of 
incarceration for Aboriginal peoples have been linked to systemic discrimination and 
attitudes based on racial or cultural prejudice within the justice system; an illustration of 
the misuse of judicial discretion.  To undo such misuses of judicial discretion, “the courts 
must take judicial notice of such matters as the history of colonialism, displacement and 
residential schools and how that history continues to [be translated] into lower 
educational attainment, lower incomes, higher unemployment, higher rates of substance 
abuse and suicide, and of course higher levels of incarceration for Aboriginal peoples” 
(Justice LeBel for the majority in R. v. Ipeelee, 2012: at para. 60; Backgrounder, 2013). 
2.3.1.1 Judicial Discretion and Sentencing Young Offenders 
In theory, the YOA was supposed to transform Canada’s juvenile justice system, from a 
system that lacked due process rights for young offenders to one that required stringent 
adherence to their rights (Anand, 1998: 325).  Under the realm of sentencing, the YOA 
was enacted to reduce and structure judicial discretion with the overall goal of enhancing 
uniformity in the sentencing of young offenders.  Noncustodial dispositions could be 
given to a young offender, under the YOA, regardless of the offence committed; 
however, a custodial disposition was tied to the type of offence committed and as such 
was “offence-specific” (p. 326).  The Declaration of Principle as well as the principles 
and purposes of sentences contained many conflicting, inconsistent, and non-prioritized 
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elements.  As a result, youth court judges had considerable discretion when it came to 
sentencing young offenders.  The result was disparity in sentencing with many young 
offenders being incarcerated for minor and first-time offences (Anand, 1998: 328).   
The YCJA, on the other hand, was enacted with the overall goal of promoting continuity 
and reducing the ambiguity in judicial sentencing.  Youth court judges were provided 
with a great deal of legislative direction, to reduce the level of discretionary power 
afforded to judges under the YOA (Anand, 2003: 946).  The courts’ sensitivity to the 
unique circumstances of young offenders is stated in section 3(1)(c)(iv) of the 
Declaration of Principle which indicates that a young person who commits an offence 
should be treated in a manner that “respect[s] gender, ethnic, cultural, and linguistic 
differences and respond[s] to the needs of Aboriginal persons” (Bala and Anand, 2012: 
72).  As stated by Bala and Anand (2012), the treatment of Aboriginal peoples in 
Canada’s justice system is a “long and well-documented tragedy” that reflects at best 
insensitivity at its worst blatant racism (p. 69).   
2.4 Sentencing Outcomes: Theoretical Framework 
This study asks:  what forces and factors shape judicial decisions concerning young 
offenders who have been convicted of violent offences in Canada?  Criminologists have 
advanced several theories of sentencing and the forces that shape it over time.  In this 
section, I discuss two perspectives that guide this study: Penal Populism and Focal 
Concerns Theory.   
2.4.1 Penal Populism 
Sir Anthony Bottoms (1993) was one of the first writers on penal populism (Pratt, 2007: 
9).  Shils (1956), however, was the first to examine the term populism.  Populism, 
according to Shils (1956) exists “wherever there is an ideology of popular ‘resentment’ 
against the order imposed on society by a long established, differential ruling class which 
is believed to have a monopoly of power, property, breeding and fortune” (cited in Pratt, 
2007: 9).  Canovan (1981) added to Shils’ definition by noting that populism is a 
“particular kind of political phenomenon where the ‘tensions’ between the elite and the 
grass roots loom large” (Pratt, 2007: 9).  Populism, according to Canovan (1999: 4) “in 
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modern democratic societies is best seen as an appeal to ‘the people’ against both the 
established structure of power and the dominant ideas and values of society.”  What Shils 
(1956) and Canovan (1981) are saying, according to Pratt (2007) is that populism 
represents, in various guises, the moods, sentiments and voices of a significant and 
distinct segment in society, in particular the segment who feels they have been 
disenfranchised and who want their voices heard.  Thus the term populism reflects 
particular groups in society such as the victims of crime or those who speak on behalf of 
victims, who believe they are being ‘ignored’ by the criminal justice system (Canovan, 
1999; Pratt, 2007).  In fact, Simon (2007: 75) argues that it is the crime victim who is “at 
the center of this new lawmaking rationality.” 
Drawing on this notion of “populism”, Bottoms (1995: 18) coined the term “populist 
punitiveness” to describe the ways in which politicians tap into and use, for their own 
purposes, the public’s generally punitive stance.  Penal populist researchers (Bartlett, 
2009; Bottoms, 1995; Christie, 2004; Freiberg and Gelb, 2008; Garland, 2001; Matthews, 
2009; Pratt, 2007; Roberts, 2008; Roberts et al., 2003) argue that when it comes to the 
creation and implementation of penal policies, most politicians’ are more concerned with 
winning votes than creating and implementing effective policies that reduce crime and 
promote justice.  Bottoms (1995) argues that politicians will, therefore, draw on claims 
makers (e.g., pressure groups, citizens’ rights advocates, talkback radio hosts and their 
callers) in order to present themselves as representing the voice of ‘ordinary people’ 
within society (Pratt, 2007).  The term penal populism is, therefore, a label used to 
describe the pressure on politicians to devise punitive penal policies that are ‘popular’ 
with the general public (Pratt, 2007).  Responsiveness and popularity are two necessary 
ingredients of populism (Roberts et al., 2003: 5).  As Roberts et al. (2003) state “polices 
are populist if they are advanced to win votes without much regard for their effects” (p. 
5).  The relationship between public opinion and sentencing policy is, therefore, situated 
within the broader context of the relationship between law and public opinion, with the 
central tool of penal populism being incarceration (Roberts, 2011; Pratt, 2007; Roberts et 
al., 2003: 5).   
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Penal populists propose that, as a result of legislative changes and public opinion, judges 
may become harsher in response to either pressure from prosecutors (Crown) or perhaps 
from judicial perception that society favors the imposition of harsher punishments 
(Roberts et al., 2003: 18).  For instance, youth courts, similar to adult courts, are 
conducted in an adversarial manner wherein the defence counsel argues for the accused 
and the Crown prosecutor argues for the people of Canada.  The community looks upon 
the Crown as a symbol of authority and as a spokesperson for the community in criminal 
matters (R. v. Logiacco, 1984).  This is especially true in the U.S.  As a result of the war 
on crime, prosecutors have become more powerful agents that have the potential to affect 
the lives of every citizen (Simon, 2007: 36).  Their role as important government officials 
is signified by their growing interest claiming a broad mandate to be involved in public 
policy, under the banner of “community protection” (Simon, 2007: 36).  It can, therefore, 
be inferred that the Crown is more likely to recommend to the court that a harsher more 
punitive sentence be imposed.  In contrast, the defence counsel is more likely to 
recommend a lighter sentence.  In response to such direct or indirect pressures, judges 
may impose harsher sentences.  
2.4.1.1 Penal Populism and Sentencing Literature 
Some criminologists contend that a “punitive turn” spurred on by penal populism has 
been witnessed in several Western countries (Garland, 2001; Pratt and Clark, 2005; 
Roberts et al., 2003; Simon, 2007).  However, others have argued that Canada is the one 
exception to this trend (Christie, 2004; Comack and Silver, 2008; Crow and Bales, 2006/ 
Doob, 2016; Meyer and O’Malley, 2005; Moore and Hannah-Moffit, 2005; Pratt, 2007; 
Roberts et al., 2003).  
Societies, according to Christie (2004) are constructed in such a way that it is not difficult 
to define any unwanted behavior as an act of crime (p. 51).  When criminal anomalies 
occur (e.g., murder) within a society, they may result in more state power (p. 45).  That 
is, informal social control mechanisms may be reduced or replaced by more formal 
measures, including the prison system (Christie, 2004).  The penal populist trend is 
particularly evident in the United States.  For example, Christie (2004: 58) shows that 
while Canada had 116 prisoners per 100,000 inhabitants, the US had 730.  Furthermore, 
  46 
Canada’s adult prison population has been steadily on the decline, while the US prison 
population has risen (p. 59).  What can explain this difference?  Christie (2004) provides 
four ‘hunches’.  
First, Canada is a well-regulated state, with orderly behavior and polite relations.  
Second, Canada is a ‘welfare state’ and as a result the situation of the poor is 
fundamentally different than in the US.  Third, Canada’s staff of civil servants make a 
conscious policy to keep the prison population under control.  Lastly, Canadian society is 
less likely to use the penal system as a ‘functional alternative’ to social welfare.  A 
culmination of these factors has resulted in the steady decline in incarceration rates, thus 
illustrating Canada’s resistance to penal populism (Christie, 2004: 59).  Meyer and 
O’Malley (2005) mirror such claims.  Most Canadians feel safe in their community and 
do not view crime as a priority issue for the government (Public Safety Canada, 2001; 
Meyer and O’Malley, 2005: 212).  Furthermore, support for ‘get tough’ remedies for 
handling crime is not very strong, as many Canadians indicate more support for 
rehabilitative initiatives (Public Safety Canada, 2001; Meyer and O’Malley, 2005: 212).  
Comack and Silver (2008) sought to determine whether Winnipeg, Manitoba, with its 
move to implementing zero-tolerance policing, was affected by penal populism.  This 
study found that while many of the residents who lived and worked in Winnipeg’s inner 
city were concerned about safety and security issues, they had a much more nuanced 
view of crime control strategies than could be captured by using the term “penal 
populism”.  In fact, most of the residents were not supporters of the punitive turn.  For 
example, while the inner-city residents had become accustomed to dealing with the daily 
presence of gangs, drugs, and violence, they held a strong sense of pride in their 
community and were optimistic that things could get better.  One resident stated “I think 
this community is a very vibrant community.  I think a lot of good things are happening 
in this community. . . I think that one of the biggest keys to change things is to really 
focus on this community as a community that has a lot of strength” (p. 839).   
The residents did not condone criminal behavior within their neighborhoods, and they 
also did not support harsher responses either.  They believed the police should work 
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‘with’ the community to implement community-driven solutions for the problems that 
engender crime and violence (p. 840).  Thus, Comack and Silver (2008) concluded that in 
the case of Winnipeg, many of the citizens were resisting “get tough” strategies of crime 
control and instead were advocating for a police role in community mobilization 
(Comack and Silver, 2008: 840).   
Moore and Hannah-Moffit (2005) also propose that the punitive turn does not hold true in 
Canada.  While Ontario has embraced some aspects of the new punitiveness, as 
illustrated by its establishment of boot camps, mega-jails, and the demise of parole, the 
province has also been committed to following the therapeutic modeling regarding 
punishment as set out by the Correctional Service of Canada [CSC] (Moore and Hannah-
Moffit, 2005: 89).  The CSC has specifically not adopted the practices characterized by 
the punitive model of punishment.  For example, the CSC has been moving towards 
smaller, not larger prisons and has refused to engage in privatization (Moore and Hannah-
Moffit, 2005: 89).   The CSC also regularly defends the use of programming and parole 
opportunities, as being integral to the overall goal of reducing recidivism.  Thus, even in 
Ontario, which is often held up as being the most harsh, brutal, and punitive system in 
Canada, with many Ontario politicians claiming Ontario was going to ‘get tough’ on 
crime, the punitive turn has not taken hold.  Those who are responsible for implementing 
policy changes have had a strong commitment to the idea of rehabilitation (Moore and 
Hannah-Moffit, 2005: 89).13  
Other scholars have examined the influence of “penal populism” on sentencing in 
Canada.  Much of this research, however, has been at the adult level (Hough and Roberts, 
1999; Roberts and Doob, 1989) and has suggested that the gulf between the courts and 
public opinion has been overstated.  It was not until 2002, that the first empirical analysis 
(Tufts and Roberts, 2002) explored public sentencing preferences in cases involving 
                                                 
13
 Moore and Hannah-Moffit (2005: 96) do note that a dangerous assumption regarding punishment is that 
a penal system that offers therapeutic intervention is not acting punitively, or is acting far less punitively, 
towards its inmates.  While Canada, as a nation, has not taken a punitive turn, the therapeutic interventions 
provided by our penal systems, can be punitive in their operation (Moore and Hannah-Moffit, 2005; Meyer 
and O’Malley, 2005: 207).   
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young offenders.  Tufts and Roberts (2002) compared the sentencing preferences of 
Canadians to actual sentencing trends in youth court.  Their study also explored the effect 
of three legally relevant factors (age of offender, nature of offence, and criminal history 
of offender) on public sentencing preferences.  Lastly, they sought to evaluate the 
relationship between important respondent variables (such as victimization history) and 
attitudes toward the use of incarceration for young offenders (p. 51).   
In comparing the incarceration rates derived from the public and youth courts, the study 
found that the differences between the two did not support the proposition that members 
of the public are far more punitive than the courts (Tufts and Roberts, 2002).  The public 
also made an important distinction between the sentencing of adults and juveniles, in that 
the public showed strong support for the imposition of mitigated punishments for young 
offenders.  The type of offence the offender had been convicted of also had an effect on 
perceptions of the appropriate sanction.  For example, the public perceived burglary to be 
the more serious offence as compared to assault.  Furthermore, the odds of choosing a 
prison sentence was almost five times higher if the offender was a repeat offender rather 
than a first time offender (Tufts and Roberts, 2002: 53-55).   
Tufts and Roberts (2002) proposed that community sanctions, such as probation may not 
be very salient to people when they think of sentencing.  That is, a lack of familiarity 
with justice alternatives may explain some of the public support for imprisonment (p. 56).  
Tufts and Roberts (2002) sought to examine whether respondents were familiar with 
alternatives to incarceration, and if they were, would their support for incarcerating the 
offender decline.  Their results revealed that respondents, who had chosen incarceration 
when first asked to determine a sentence, were open to substitute sanctions.  Specifically 
respondents were asked “If a judge sentenced the offender to 1 year of probation and 200 
hours of community work, would that be acceptable?”  Almost half the respondents 
stated they would find the alternative sanction acceptable as a replacement for a term of 
imprisonment (Tufts and Roberts, 2002: 57).   Tufts and Roberts (2002) therefore 
concluded that if alternative sanctions were made more available then some of the 
public’s support for using incarceration, as an appropriate sanction would decline.   
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Tufts and Roberts (2002) used only two offence categories in their study and as such their 
study cannot speak to the relationship between public sentencing practices and judicial 
practices for more serious offences, such as sexual assault, murder, and manslaughter.  
Public support for incarceration may be found to be higher for the more serious offences 
(Tufts and Roberts, 2002: 61).   
Bouhours and Daly’s (2007) study was the first to examine judicial justifications and 
interactions in sentencing youth sex offenders.  They sought to analyze judges’ 
sentencing remarks on youth sexual offenders between the period of 1995 to mid-2001 in 
South Australian Youth Court.  Bouhours and Daly (2007) argue that there is a need to 
examine not only the youth justice legislation and political rhetoric surrounding youth 
crime, but to also examine the actual practices in youth courts.  Youth sexual violence, up 
until the 1980s, was largely ignored and as a result it has only recently been viewed as a 
social problem that requires strong legal and clinical responses.  As a result of the lack of 
research, very little is known about how such cases are handled in youth courts 
(Bouhours and Daly, 2007).  They sought to examine the ways in which judges 
characterized sexual offences and how judges justified and explained their sentences.  
The major finding from Bouhours and Daly’s (2007) study is that judges’ orientations 
towards sentencing youth sexual offenders varied, but were consistently patterned by the 
victims’ age, offence, and criminal history.  Furthermore, consistent with the literature on 
adult offenders and child victims, the judges considered sexual offending against young 
children as a particularly serious form of offending.  Moreover, judges were concerned 
that the youths who abused children had the potential of becoming ‘entrenched sexual 
offenders’ unless they received specialized treatment intervention.  The young offenders 
who abused children that were closer in age to the offender, on the other hand, were 
viewed as less serious and were seen as ‘experimenters’ whose sexual misbehaviour 
would disappear with maturity.  There was a group of youths who were viewed as 
dangerous because of their violent or persistent offending; however, the danger was 
linked to their general anti-social attitude as compared to their sexual offending 
(Bouhours and Daly, 2007).   
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When sentencing offenders, judges appeared to use a retributive approach with the 
serious and persistent offenders; however, the goal was still not so much to punish but to 
warn the young offender against further offending (specific deterrence) while allowing 
for their rehabilitation (Bouhours and Daly, 2007).  Bouhours and Daly (2007) argue that 
in general, there was a symbolic and political commitment towards a justice model of 
accountability for young offending with a ‘backward-looking approach’ to punishing the 
crime.  The actual court practices suggested there was a continued interest in retaining 
rehabilitative approaches when dealing with young offenders.  Bouhours and Daly (2007) 
argue that their findings support other studies (e.g., Doob and Sprott, 2006, Kupchik, 
2004, and Muncie, 2005) of youth courts in western nations (excluding the United 
States), and concluded that despite the political rhetoric of punitiveness, especially when 
responding to violent and sexual offenders, the actual court practices appear to be 
rehabilitative and reform-oriented.    
In a recent study conducted by Doob (2016), it was proposed that in the early part of the 
twenty-first century a completely different sentencing landscape emerged, brought about 
by the Conservative Party of Canada, under the leadership of Stephen Harper (p. 2).  This 
sentencing landscape, between 2006 and 2015, was a “striking contrast with Canada’s 
long-standing past traditions” (2016: 2).  Not only was the “talk” but also the “actions” of 
the Conservative government reflective of a get-tough-on crime approach (p. 11).  
Legislative changes under the Harper government, however, did not have a large effect 
on Canadian imprisonment rates (p. 23).  Thus, Doob (2016) concluded that Canada had 
“weathered” the penal populist storm.  While Doob’s (2016) study focused on adult 
incarceration rates, he found that the criminal justice system was no tougher on crime 
than it had been in previous decades.   
In summary, there is a growing literature exploring the impact of penal populism on the 
Canadian criminal justice system; however, much of this research has focused on adult 
offenders.  Few studies have applied penal populism to the sentencing of young offenders 
in Canada.  While the research that has been conducted in Canada has supported the 
claims that penal populism has not taken hold in Canada, Meyer and O’Malley (2005) 
caution that making such broad claims about Canadian criminal justice policies and 
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practices is problematic.  The criminal justice system, from policing to courts to prisons, 
is complex, and as shown by previous studies (discussed in Chapter 1) differs from 
region to region and city to city.  As such, to know how a person will be sentenced in 
Canada, one needs to know the current practices in the trial courts and what the 
provincial court of appeal has said about the particular offence (Doob, 2016: 23).  This 
present study draws on these claims, and adds to the penal populist literature, by 
examining penal populist claims and investigating the impact of legislative change in 
Canada on judicial practices in Ontario youth courts.  
2.4.2 Focal Concerns Theory 
Focal concerns theory recognizes that sentencing is a multifaceted and complex process 
wherein judges must simultaneously consider numerous relevant factors and diverse 
sentencing goals (Kurlychek and Johnson, 2004; Steffensmeier, 1980; Steffensmeier, 
1993; Steffensmeier et al., 1998; Steffensmeier and Demuth, 2001; Steffensmeier, 
Kramer, and Streifel, 1993; Steffensmeier, Ulmer, and Kramer, 1998). The focal 
concerns perspective first originated with Walter Miller (1994) who introduced and 
focused on subcultural focal concerns in his study of lower-class delinquency.  Drawing 
on Miller’s concept “focal concerns”, Steffensmeier and his colleagues (1998) 
reformulated the theory into what is today known as the focal concerns theory of 
sentencing.  Based on prior research and their own work, Steffensmeier et al., (1998) 
posited three focal concerns that they argue influence judicial sentencing:   
1) Judges’ assessment of the blameworthiness or culpability of the offender; 
 
2) Judges’ desire to protect the community by incapacitating dangerous offenders or 
deterring potential offenders; 
 
3) Judges’ concerns about the practical consequences, or social costs of sentencing 
decisions (Steffensmeier, 1993; Steffensmeier, 1998; Hartley et al. 2007).   
In this context, blameworthiness concerns the perceived permanence of behaviour and 
predictions as to an offender’s level of dangerousness, and includes considerations of 
both the characteristics of the offender and the offence.  It is often associated with the 
retributive philosophy of punishment and emphasizes the offender’s culpability and 
degree of injury caused to the victims (Steffensmeier, 1998; Baumer, Messner, and 
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Felson, 2003).  Blameworthiness is measured by prior criminal history, the seriousness of 
the offence, type of offence, and the degree of injury that has been caused by the offense 
(Steffensmeier, 1998; Hartley et al., 2007).  Additional factors linked to blameworthiness 
include biographical factors, criminal history (increased perceived blameworthiness and 
risk), prior victimization (mitigates perceived blameworthiness), criminal intent, and the 
offender’s role in the offence (Steffensmeier, 1980; 1993; 1998; Hartley et al., 2007). 
Prior research on sentencing, according to Steffensmeier et al. (1998) has found that 
seriousness of the offence (measured in terms of offender culpability and the harm caused 
by the offence) is the most significant factor in sentencing.  Research has also shown 
support for the relevance of offender characteristics, such as criminal history (which 
increases perceptions of blameworthiness and risk), prior victimization at the hands of 
others (which tends to mitigate perceived blameworthiness), and the offender’s role in the 
offense, such as whether the offender was a leader, organizer, or a follower (which are 
linked with blameworthiness).  It is the more serious crimes and the more experienced 
criminals who are perceived as more blameworthy, thereby resulting in the increased 
severity of sentencing (Kurlychek and Johnson, 2004).   
The second focal concern, protection of the community, involves a judge’s ability to 
predict the future dangerousness of the offender.  Thus, the focus is on the likelihood that 
an offender will reoffend and includes such factors of an offender’s criminal history, use 
of weapons in the offence, education, employment, and family history (Steffensmeier et 
al, 1998; Hartley et al., 2007).  The risk of future violence is measured by criminal 
history, facts of the crime (e.g., use of a weapon) and the characteristics of an offender 
(e.g., drug dependency, education, employment, or family history) (Steffensmeier et al., 
1998: 767).   
The third focal concern of judges relates to practical constraints and consequences:  a 
justice system’s efficiency with regards to the consequences, or the social costs of 
sentencing decisions (Steffensmeier et al. 1998). Practical constraints and consequences 
include organizational concerns such as the relationship among courtroom actors, case 
flow, and awareness of state and federal correctional resources (e.g., over-crowding) 
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(Hartley et al., 2007).  It should be noted that the third focal concern will not be examined 
in this study as the information included in the sample of judicial decisions did not permit 
for a measure of the practical constraints and consequences youth court judges may face 
upon sentencing. 
These focal concerns and their interplay are complex and since judges rarely have 
complete information with regards to the cases or the defendants, they rely on offenders’ 
demographic characteristics, such as age, gender, race, and ethnicity; what Steffensmeier, 
et al. (1998) refer to as perceptual shorthand.  Judges, for example, are often faced with 
constraints on the amount of time they can spend on each case and other factors, and as a 
result they generally receive incomplete information on defendants and their cases.  As a 
result, judges may rely on extra-legal factors such as sex, race, ethnicity, and age as 
markers of blameworthiness or risk to the public.  Unfortunately, judges’ use of 
perceptual shorthand may open the door for disparity in sentences as well as the potential 
for discrimination (Hartley et al., 2007: 60).   
Steffensmeier et al. (1998) argue that prior research in related areas of decision making 
not only supports focal concerns theory of sentencing, but finds evidence of the use of 
demographic characteristics as perceptual shorthand (p. 768).  For example, females may 
be perceived as less of a risk to the community or less likely to reoffend while male 
offenders may be perceived as more culpable and therefore more responsible for their 
crimes (Baumer, Mesner, and Felson, 2003; Steffensmeier, Ulmer, and Kramer, 1998; 
Rodriquez et al., 2006).  As a result, females may be less likely to receive a custodial 
sentence, and if they do, they receive shorter sentences than males (Rodriquez et al., 
2006; Steffensmeier, Kramer, and Streifel, 1993; Steffensmeier, Ulmer, and Kramer, 
1998; Ulmer and Kramer, 1996).  Males, on the other hand, may not only be seen as more 
culpable and as such more responsible for their crimes, but they may also be portrayed as 
being better able to do the time in custody than females (Albonetti, 1991; Baumer, 
Messner, and Felson, 2000; Rodriquez et al., 2006;Steffensmeier, Ulmer, and Krmer, 
1998; Steffensmeier, Ulmer, and Kramer, 1998).  
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2.4.2.1 Focal Concerns Theory and Sentencing Literature 
The imposition of a more punitive sentence may reflect the responsibilities of the courts 
in ensuring protection of the public.  There has been special attention focused on whether 
the characteristics of the offender, such as sex, age, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status, 
are correlated to decisions made by the courts.  Similar to penal populism, there are few 
studies that examine sentencing of young offenders, under the age of eighteen years old.  
Furthermore, there are a limited number of studies that draw on focal concerns theory in a 
Canadian context.  In one of the first significant studies using focal concerns theory, 
Steffensmeier et al. (1998) explored the effects of offense type, offense severity, prior 
record, multiple convictions, type of trial, size of court, race, sex, and age on the decision 
to incarcerate as well as the length of sentence.  In particular their U.S. study sought to 
examine whether young black males received harsher sentences relative to young white 
males and to other race-gender-age groups (e.g., older offenders of both races and 
younger and older females).  
The results of this study revealed that offence seriousness and criminal history were the 
strongest predictors of sentencing outcome; however, race, sex, and age interacted to 
affect sentencing.  For example, among males, the younger offenders were sentenced 
more harshly than the older offenders.  The effects of age were negligible among female 
offenders.   
Harsher sentencing of black defendants as compared to white defendants occurred for the 
young offenders but not for the older offenders (older black offenders and older white 
offenders received similar sentences).  For instance, the criminal records of young black 
males were defined as more serious and indicative of future crime risk compared to other 
types of offenders (including the older black offenders). Offenders over 50 and under 21 
years old received the least severe sentences.  In addition, the odds of females being 
incarcerated were almost half those of males.  
Among the black and white offenders, those over 50 years old were the least likely to be 
incarcerated, and if they were incarcerated they received the shortest sentences.  Black 
and white offenders aged 21-29 received the most severe sentences, as they were 
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perceived as a greater threat to the community and less likely to reform.  This pattern was 
more pronounced among black than white offenders.  It also appeared that some judges 
were reluctant to send white offenders to state prisons as they feared white offenders 
would be victimized by black inmates (prison populations were over 65% black).  
Women offenders and the older offenders were, therefore, defined as being less 
dangerous to community safety compared to young black males.  It was the young black 
males who were most at risk of receiving the harshest sentences (Steffensmeier, et al., 
1998).   
Spohn and Holleran (2000) examined sentencing in relation to gender, age, and ethnicity 
in Chicago, Kansas City, and Miami.  Their results revealed that gender had the most 
significant direct effect on sentencing decisions followed by age and race.  In Chicago, 
both black and Hispanic offenders faced greater odds of being incarcerated than white 
offenders.  In Miami, Hispanics, but not black offenders, were more likely than white 
offenders to be sentenced to incarceration.  Lastly, in Kansas City, black offenders were 
sentenced to prison at the same rate as white offenders.  The effect of gender was 
similarly variable in that males were significantly more likely than females to be 
sentenced to prison in Chicago and Kansas City; however, this was not the case in 
Miami.  What is important to note about Spohn and Holleran’s (2000) study is that their 
results provide evidence in support of the notion that ‘certain types of offenders’ are 
regarded as more problematic than others and therefore are perceived as being more in 
need of formal social control.   
Drawing on Spitzer (1975), Spohn and Holleran (2000) argue that it appears there is a 
certain segment of the deviant population who are viewed as particularly threatening and 
dangerous (Spitzer, 1975: 645; Spohn and Holleran, 2000: 302).  Spitzer (1975) uses the 
term “social dynamite” to describe this segment of the deviant population (Spohn and 
Holleran, 2000).  Spitzer (1975) argues that social dynamites “tend to be more youthful, 
alienated and politically volatile” and as such, these are the offenders who are more likely 
than other offenders to be formally processed through the criminal justice system 
(Spitzer, 1975; Spohn and Holleran, 2000).  Spohn and Holleran (2000) concluded that 
while the results of Steffensmeier and his colleagues (1998) highlight the “high cost of 
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being black, young and male,” their results suggest that offenders with other 
constellations of characteristics (e.g., the social dynamites) also pay a punishment penalty 
(Spohn and Holleran, 2000).   
In another U.S. study guided by focal concerns theory, Kurlychek and Johnson (2004) 
investigated the sentencing of young offenders (under the age of 18) who were 
transferred and processed in adult criminal court to compare their sentencing outcomes 
with young adult offenders (between the ages 18 and 24). They argue that if the purpose 
of transferring juvenile offenders to adult criminal courts is to redefine these juveniles as 
‘adults’ then one needs to determine whether the transferred juveniles are receiving 
similar sentences to adult offenders.  This study found that judges appear to assign a 
greater level of culpability and dangerousness to juveniles who were transferred to adult 
court.  These young offenders were regarded as more serious offenders, who posed a 
threat to the community and/or had a low potential for rehabilitation.  The young 
offenders who were convicted of violent crimes and transferred to adult court were also 
more severely sentenced, in that the length of sentences increased by 97% as compared to 
their adult counterparts.  As a result, it was the young offenders convicted of violent 
crimes that were viewed as more dangerous and blameworthy by the courts.  Thus, 
Kurlycheck and Johnson (2004) concluded that the transfer process from youth court to 
adult court may have signaled to the judges and other courtroom actors that these 
particular young offenders lacked rehabilitative potential.  
Overall, the literature has found some support for the focal concerns theory of sentencing.  
For instance, research suggests that some youths are perceived as more blameworthy and 
lacking in rehabilitative potential, and it is these youths who are more likely to receive 
tougher sentences, as they pose a greater threat to the community.  However, there are no 
research studies focusing on the sentencing decisions of young offenders convicted of 
physical and sexual assault, in Canada. 
2.5 Summary: Young Offender Sentencing in Canada 
As discussed in this chapter, the forces and factors influencing sentencing are numerous.  
Legislation provides guidance to judges concerning what principles should be considered 
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in their decisions (Anand, 1998; Bala and Anand, 2012).  When sentencing young 
persons, judges are directed to consider accountability and proportionality, weigh the 
value of custody compared to other possible forms of punishment, consider prospects for 
rehabilitation, public protection, and other considerations.  They may also be influenced 
by social pressures such as penal populism and may take into account focal concerns such 
as blameworthiness, community protection, and the predicted dangerousness of an 
offender.  Although some studies have sought to identify which of these factors are most 
prevalent in shaping sentencing outcomes, many studies have focused on adult offenders, 
and have used sentencing data in the United States.    
While research on overall crime rates and custodial sentences have found inter-provincial 
variations, there is a dearth of information on how each province imposes sentences by 
offence type (Doob, 2016: 23).  There is also a dearth of research on youth sentencing in 
Canada at the court level.  To better understand the forces that shape judicial sentencing 
in Canada, research needs to examine the current practice in the trial courts along with 
what the provincial court of appeal has stated on the subject of a particular offences 
(Doob, 2016: 23).  This study seeks to fill in the gap by examining the current practices 
in trial courts.   
Perceptions of juvenile delinquency, and the legislation written to address it, have 
changed substantially over the last century in Canada. With the enactment of the YCJA, 
for example, youth court judges were required to think in an entirely different way about 
some of the critical decisions they would have to make about young people who appear 
before them in the courts.  As such, legislation can be said to fundamentally shape 
sentencing practices.  Research, however, has not fully examined how legislative change 
has, or has not, altered sentencing practices within the judicial court system.  This study 
answers this call, undertaking an investigation of the impact of criminal justice policies 
and practices on youth sentencing in Ontario youth courts.   
As we have seen penal populists contend that judges, in particular in the United States, 
are influenced by a get-tough approach advocated by the public and politicians.  The 
United States, for example, has adopted statues that require mandatory minimum prison 
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sentences for certain violent, drug, and property offences (Roberts et al., 2003: 35).  Such 
mandatory minimum sentences, has not only resulted in increases in sentencing lengths, 
but also increases in the number of admissions to custody (Roberts et al., 2003: 35).  In 
comparison, Canada, according to a number of criminologists, has not followed the path 
of its neighbor to the south, and as such is the exception to the trend (Christie, 2004; 
Comack and Silver, 2003; Doob, 2016; Meyer and O’Malley, 2005; Moore and Hannah-
Moffit, 2007; Pratt, 2007; Roberts et al., 2003).  Meyer and O’Malley (2005), however, 
caution that making such broad claims about Canadian criminal justice policies and 
practices is problematic as criminal justice interventions – from policing to courts to 
prisons – are complex and may differ from region to region and city to city.  They, 
instead, call for closer investigations of the ways in which criminal justice policies and 
practices emerge and play out in particular local contexts (Meyer and O’Malley, 2009).   
This study, therefore, attempts to fill this gap in the literature by examining whether and 
how legislative changes has affected judges’ sentencing decisions, by examining judicial 
sentencing decisions heard under the YOA, the YCJA, and the YCJA post the 2012 
amendments.  Drawing specifically on penal populism, this study asks, is there evidence 
that Canada, in particular Ontario, has experienced a penal populist turn in regard to 
juvenile justice?  Are judges taking a more punitive stance in sentencing young offenders 
convicted of violent offences (e.g., physical and sexual assault)?  
Focal concerns theory, on the other hand, argues that judges consider blameworthiness, 
the predicted level of dangerousness an offender poses, and potential for rehabilitation 
when sentencing offenders.  Much of the research on focal concerns theory has provided 
only partial support, as this research has had some theoretical and methodological 
shortcomings (Hartley, et al., 2007: 62).  Furthermore, as Hartley et al. (2007) argue, 
although testable hypotheses have been developed, this theoretical framework still needs 
further elaboration (p. 63).  This study, therefore, aims to add to the theoretical literature 
by analyzing the content of judicial sentencing decisions of young offenders convicted of 
both sexual assault and physical assault, in the province of Ontario.  Drawing on focal 
concerns theory, this study asks do legal decisions, in particular, as they relate to the type 
of sentencing (within the Ontario youth justice system) reflect an offender’s level of 
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blameworthiness and need for protection of the public?  Can extralegal factors 
(perceptual shorthand), such as age and gender, explain disparities in sentencing?   
The principles and rationales of ‘accountability’, ‘responsibility’, ‘rehabilitation and 
‘reintegration’, and to a lesser degree ‘deterrence’ underlie youth justice legislations in 
Canada guide the courts.  However, it is the presiding judge, drawing on precedent who 
exercises his or her discretion in determining how to balance these various principles 
when making sentencing decisions.  This study will seek to examine legal decisions as 
they relate to the type of sentencing (custodial or non-custodial) given within the Ontario 
youth justice system to determine if they reflect an offender’s level of blameworthiness, 
accountability, rehabilitation, and the need for protection of the public.  This study asks:  
is there evidence of variations in sentencing rationales provided by judges upon 
sentencing within and across offence type?  While the imposition of a more punitive 
sentence may reflect the responsibilities being placed on the courts to ensure the 
protection of the public, it may also reflect the courts’ fear of adverse public criticism.  
Further, a punitive sentence may reflect the youth court judges’ discriminatory practices.  
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Chapter 3  
3 Introduction 
This study is guided by two contrasting theories of sentencing (Penal Populism and Focal 
Concerns Theory) and analyzes judicial sentencing decisions of young offenders 
convicted of violent offences.  Judicial decisions were chosen for this study as they are 
detailed repositories that show what kinds of disputes come before courts, and more 
importantly for this study, how the parties frame their disputes and how judges reason 
their decisions (Hall and Wright, 2008; 2011).  It is from this factual and analytical 
richness of judicial opinions that this study examines the substantive legal importance of 
judicial reasoning.  These decisions outline judges’ rationales and the factors (the facts of 
a case, legal issues, prior cases) they consider when sentencing (Hall and Wright, 2008; 
Hall, 2011).   
In this chapter, I will outline my research questions and discuss the methods used to 
address them.  I explain my data collection, sampling, and data analyses.  This chapter 
also details how I operationalized the variables that reflect the two theoretical 
perspectives, penal populism and focal concerns theory.  For this study, both qualitative 
and simple quantitative analyses (descriptive, bivariate, and cross-tabulation analyses) 
were used.    
3.1 Research Questions 
Building on my review of the literature, I began with an interest in what factors shaped 
judicial decisions concerning young offenders in the province of Ontario.  Did the type of 
crime or the characteristics of the offender appear to be significant?  Was there attention 
to populist beliefs in sentencing rationales?  What other factors appear to be significant?  
I decided to limit my analysis to two kinds of judicial sentencing decisions (cases):  
young offenders convicted of physical assault and young offenders convicted of sexual 
assault.  The two types of cases were chosen because they are comparable in severity (as 
per the Criminal Code of Canada, the YOA, and the YCJA), but could differ on penal 
populism or focal concerns dimensions, such as protection of the public.  
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I began my analysis with three general, and open-ended questions.  First, what do Ontario 
youth criminal justice decisions tell us about how judges deal with physical assault and 
sexual assault cases in relation to sentencing?  Second, drawing on penal populism, is 
there evidence that decisions have changed over time, influenced by legislative change?  
For instance, do cases post-2003 (after enactment of the YCJA) and post the 2012 
amendments, demonstrate more or less of a ‘get-tough-on-crime’ approach than cases 
under the YOA?  Third, drawing on focal concerns theory, what themes emerge in the 
judicial decisions especially as they relate to the judge’s discourse upon sentencing?   
I moved towards greater precision as more information emerged, during my analysis, 
with my final research questions as follows:   
1. Drawing on penal populism, this study asks, is there evidence that Canada, in 
 particular Ontario, has experienced a penal populist turn in regard to legislative 
 changes?  Are judges taking a more punitive stance in sentencing young offenders 
 convicted of sexual assault and physical assault?  
2. Drawing on focal concerns theory, do legal decisions in particular, as they relate 
 to the type of sentencing (custodial or non-custodial) within the Ontario youth 
 justice  system reflect an offender’s level of blameworthiness and need for 
 protection of the public?  Can extralegal factors, such as age and gender, explain 
 disparities in sentencing?    
3.     Is there evidence of variations in sentencing rationales provided by judges upon 
sentencing within and across offence (physical and sexual assault) type?  
To answer these research questions, I analyzed the content of judicial sentencing 
decisions tried in youth court between 1993 and 2016.  These judicial decisions were 
obtained from the database Quicklaw.  The start date of 1993 was chosen because this 
was the date of the first sentencing decisions given under the YOA yielded by the 
Quicklaw database search.    
To address research question one and two, I conducted simple quantitative analyses of the 
data.  To answer research question three, I conducted a more detailed content analysis.  
Guided by focal concerns theory and the sentencing principles under the YOA and the 
YCJA, I paid particular attention to the themes “rehabilitation”, “responsibility”, and 
“accountability”.  In Section 3.2.2, I will discuss how the sample of cases was selected 
for this study. 
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3.2 Data and Sampling 
This study examines judicial discourse – the official record of judicial decision-making – 
and explores decisions made by judges, and the rationales provided by them for these 
decisions.  The sample  utilized in this study consisted of 44 judicial decisions on 
physical and sexual assault cases tried in youth court between 1993 and 2016.  More 
details regarding case selection is provided below in 3.2.2.These decisions are a highly 
valuable source for systematic study as they are the published opinions that set legal 
precedent and guide lawyers.  Judges intend their published opinions to not only be forms 
of communication to the parties in the case but they also recognize that these are forms of 
communication with other judges, other lawyers, other litigants, and other actual and 
potential participants in the legal system (Trujillo, 2005; Hall and Wright, 2008).  After 
all, in “the theory of the common law, these opinions are the law; they stand in the centre 
of the legal system.  Their power is enhanced by the common law doctrine that links 
them in a chain of influence and causation – the doctrine of precedent” (Friedman, 2006; 
Hall and Wright, 2008: 92). 
3.2.1 Violent Offences Against Persons 
3.2.1.1 Physical Assault 
The focus of this analysis was on two types of violent offences against persons, sexual 
assault and physical assault cases.  Under s. 265(1) of the Criminal Code of Canada, a 
person commits an assault when (a) without the consent of another person, he applies 
force intentionally to that other person, directly or indirectly; (b) he attempts or threatens, 
by an act or a gesture to apply force to another person, if he has, or causes that other 
person to believe on reasonable grounds that he has, present ability to effect his purpose; 
or (c) while openly wearing or carrying a weapon or an imitation thereof, he accosts or 
impedes another person or begs (Criminal Code, 1985).  Section 266 of the Criminal 
Code states that everyone who commits an assault is guilty of (a) an indictable offence 
and is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years; or (b) an offence 
punishable on summary conviction for a term of maximum 6 months or a fine of $5000 
(Criminal Code, 1985).  The above range of sentences under the Criminal Code are 
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sentences imposed upon adult offenders; the sentences for young offenders are restricted 
(guided by the YOA and the YCJA) and will be discussed later in the chapter.  
Section 267 of the Criminal Code states that an assault with a weapon or causing bodily 
harm occurs “when an individual, in committing an assault (a) carries, uses or threatens 
to use a weapon or an imitation thereof, or (b) causes bodily harm to the complainant and 
is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten 
years or an offence punishable on summary conviction and liable to imprisonment for a 
term not exceeding eighteen months” (Criminal Code, 1985).   
Section 268 (1) states an aggravated assault occurs when the “assault wounds, maims, 
disfigures or endangers the life of the complainant.”  A person “who commits an 
aggravated assault is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term 
not exceeding fourteen years” (s. 268 [2]). 
In summary, assault is categorized into three levels under the Criminal Code of Canada.  
Level 1 (s. 265) assault is the least serious form of assault and can include such 
behaviours as pushing, slapping, punching and face-to-face threats.  If convicted of a 
level 1 assault, the maximum indictable punishment (for adults) is 5 years or 6 months or 
$5000 fine if convicted of a summary offence.14  A level 2 (s. 267), assault, represents an 
assault with a weapon or an assault that causes bodily harm.  If convicted of a level 2 
assault, the maximum indictable sentence is 10 years and the maximum sentence is 18 
months if convicted of a summary offence.  Level 3 (s. 268) or aggravated assault 
represents an assault that wounds, maims, disfigures or endangers the life of the victim 
and a person found guilty of an indictable offence is liable to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding fourteen years (s. 268[2]).   
For this study, the term physical assault will be used and represents the level 2 and level 
3 assault categories.  It is important to recall that under the YOA and the YCJA, custodial 
                                                 
14
 Summary offences are less serious and are usually tried at a lower-level court, such as a provincial court.   
As compared to indictable offences, which are more serious and are tried at a higher court (Department of 
Justice, 2015).   
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sentences are to be reserved for the serious violent and repeat offenders and as such, only 
the offences for which custody could be a potential sentence were included in this 
sample; level 1 assaults were excluded. 
3.2.1.2 Sexual Assault 
In 1983, the Criminal Code of Canada was amended to replace crimes of rape and 
indecent assault with three new categories of sexual assault offences.  Sexual assault 
under Section 271 of the Criminal Code is defined as  
(a) an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10  
years or, if the complainant is under the age of 16 years, to imprisonment for a 
term of not more than 14 years and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment 
for a term  of one year; or 
  
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction and is liable to imprisonment for a  
term of not more than 18 months or, if the complainant is under the age of 16 
years,  to imprisonment for a term of not more than two years less a day and to a 
minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of six months.   
Those guilty of sexual assault with a weapon, threats to a third party or causing bodily 
harm, under s. 272 include 
(1) every person who in committing a sexual assault,  
 
(a) carries, uses or threatens to use a weapon or an imitation of a weapon; 
(b) threatens to cause bodily harm to a person other than complainant; 
(c) causes bodily harm to the complainant; or 
(d) is a party to the offence with any other person 
 
(2) every person who commits an offence under subsection (1) is guilty of an 
indictable offence and liable:   
 
(a) if a restricted firearm or prohibited firearm is used in the commission of the  
offence or if any firearm is used in the commission of the offence and the 
offence is committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association 
with a criminal organization, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 
years and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of: 
 
(i) in the case of a first offence, five years, and 
(ii) in the case of a second or subsequent offence, seven years; 
 
(a.1)  in any other case where a firearm is used in the commission of the offence, 
to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years and to minimum   
punishment of imprisonment for a term of four years; and  
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(a.2)  if the complainant is under the age of 16 years, to imprisonment for life and 
to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of five years; and  
 
(b) in any other case, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years. 
 
Those guilty of aggravated sexual assault under Section 273 include those who, in 
committing a sexual assault, wound, maim, disfigure or endanger the life of the 
complainant.  Persons who commit an aggravated sexual assault are guilty of an 
indictable offence and are liable  
 
(a) if a restricted firearm or prohibited firearm is used in the commission of the 
offence or if any firearm is used in the commission of the offence and the offence 
is committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with, a 
criminal organization, to imprisonment for life and to a minimum punishment of 
imprisonment for a term of: 
 
(i) in the case of a first offence, five years, and 
(ii) in the case of a second or subsequent offence, seven years; 
 
(a.1)  in any other case where a firearm is used in the commission of the offence, 
to imprisonment for life and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for 
a term of four years; and 
 
(a.2)  if the complainant is under the age of 16 years, to imprisonment for life and    
to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of five years; and 
 
(b) in any other case, to imprisonment for life.   
 
In summary, assault and sexual assault are categorized into three levels under the 
Criminal Code of Canada.  This study focuses on level 2 and level 3 assault and level 1 
and level 2 sexual assault, because the maximum sentences under the Criminal Code of 
Canada are similar in severity.  Furthermore, given the principles under the YOA and the 
YCJA, it would be the violent offences that could result in custodial sentences.  Crown 
prosecutors are obligated to consider seeking an adult sentence when a youth is found 
guilty of murder, attempted murder, manslaughter, or aggravated sexual assault 
(Department of Justice Canada, 2015).  Hence, level 3 sexual assaults are treated 
differently, and were excluded from this study.  
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The unit of analysis in this study, therefore, consists of judicial decisions respecting 
physical assault and sexual assault in Ontario youth courts heard under the YOA and the 
YCJA.  There is a lack of research on how decisions are rendered in each province in 
Canada.  While all provinces currently operate under the YCJA and prior to 2003, the 
YOA, there has been a great deal of interprovincial variation (John Howard Society, 
1999; Rosen, 2000; Tanner, 2001; Bala, Carrington, and Roberts, 2009; Sprott and Doob, 
2008; Thomas, 2005).  I chose to focus on Ontario for this study, as it is often held up as 
being the most harsh, brutal, and punitive system in Canada (Hannah-Moffit, 2005).  For 
example, during the mid 1990s, more of Ontario’s youth per capita were dealt with in 
youth court than most other jurisdictions in Canada.  In fact, Ontario during that period 
was higher than the national average and almost three times higher than Quebec (John 
Howard Society of Ontario, 1998: 2).  Further as discussed in Chapter 2, under the YOA, 
a young offender who resided in Ontario was more likely to serve time in custody.  
I chose violent offences against persons, as these are the crimes that, as illustrated in 
Chapter 1, often become the focus of both media publications, and social and political 
debate.  While young persons, under the YOA and YCJA, are subjected to the same 
substantive criminal laws as adults, Section 5015 makes clear that the principles and 
provisions of the Criminal Code as they apply to adults, do not apply to the sentencing of 
young offenders (Bala and Anand, 2012: 492).  In other words, the Criminal Code 
defines the offences from which both adults and youths can be charged and convicted, 
but it is youth justice legislation (e.g., YOA and the YCJA) that governs Canada’s youth 
justice system and ensures that adolescents who are found guilty of criminal offences are 
dealt with by a different set of principles than that of adults (Bala and Anand, 2012: 493).   
                                                 
15
 Subject to section 74 (application of Criminal Code to adult sentences), Part XXIII (sentencing) of the 
Criminal Code does not apply in respect of proceedings under this Act except for paragraph 718.2[3] 
(sentencing principle for Aboriginal offenders), sections 722 (victim impact statements), 722.1 (copy of 
statement) and 722.2 (inquiry to court (subsection 730[2]) (court process continues in force)) and sections 
748 (pardons and remissions), 748.1 (remission by the Governor in Council) and 749 (royal prerogative) of 
that Act, which provisions apply with any modifications that the circumstances require.  (2) Section 787 
(general penalty) of the Criminal Code does not apply in respect of proceedings under this Act.   
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Under the provisions of the YOA, and especially the YCJA, custodial sentences are to be 
reserved primarily for serious repeat and violent offenders.  The Act also provides that a 
young person is not to be sentenced to custody unless, for example, the young person had 
committed a violent offence, which is interpreted as an offence in which the young 
person causes, attempted to cause, or threatened to cause bodily harm (Department of 
Justice, 2016).   
The YCJA provides youth court judges with different sentencing options which include 
both community based sentences (e.g., the youth serves his or her sentence in the 
community, often under strict conditions) and custody and supervision sentences 
(hereafter CSO) which include both a period of time in a youth custodial facility and a 
period of community supervision (Department of Justice, 2015).  Section 42(2)(n) directs 
that for most offences, the maximum sentence of custody and supervision is two years.  
For offences from which an adult can be punished by a maximum sentence of life 
imprisonment, a young person may receive a sentence of up to three years of custody and 
supervision (Bala and Anand, 2012: 617).  Section 15 directs youth courts that if more 
than one youth sentence is imposed with respect to different offences, the continuous 
combined duration of those sentences shall not exceed three years, except if one of the 
offences is first degree or second degree murder in which case the combined duration 
shall not exceed ten years and seven years respectively (YCJA, 2002).  
In summary, I chose to focus on the violent offenders (level 2 and level 3 assaults, and 
the level 1 and level 2 sexual assaults) as they are both violent offences with identical 
range of sentencing.  Secondly, given the principles under the YOA and the YCJA, it 
would be the violent offences that could result in custodial sentences.  
3.2.2 Data Collection 
The sample of cases (also referred to as judicial sentencing decisions) used in this study, 
was obtained from LexisNexis Quicklaw.  LexisNexis Quicklaw and WestlawNext 
Canada are the two main legal research services in Canada.  After consulting with 
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practicing lawyers for advice as to how best to undertake a search for this study, I chose 
Quicklaw.16  Quicklaw is an electronic legal research database that provides court 
decisions from all levels of Canadian courts, provincial and federal legislation, as well as 
news reports, journals, and a wide range of other legal commentary (LexisNexis, 2016).  
This web-based search engine also provides users with access to case law and statutes 
and contains a comprehensive up-to-date collection of legislation that enables users to 
search statutes, regulations, and Rules of Court cases (LexisNexis, 2016).  As confirmed 
by the legal experts who I consulted for this study, using Quicklaw would allow me to 
obtain a sample of cases that are representative of the discourse of official case law that 
gets replicated and debated in courtrooms across Ontario.  It should be noted, however, 
that the decisions in Quicklaw are not representative of all cases that appear before the 
courts, as not all cases are reported to Quicklaw, which is a limitation for this study.  
Nevertheless, the cases that are reported constitute the official record of judicial decision-
making.  More specifically, these cases constitute a primary source of case law upon 
which the Crown attorneys and Defence counsel rely when preparing and presenting their 
submissions and recommendations to the court.  These are also the decisions that judges 
rely upon in their decision-making.   
Under the guidance and advice of legal experts (practicing lawyers) it was advised that I 
choose keywords that would be broad enough to capture the violent offences (level 2 and 
level 3 physical assault and level 1 and level 2 sexual assault) but would also provide a 
manageable number of retrieved cases.  Thus, the keywords used to obtain the physical 
assault cases were “aggravated assault” because it narrowed the search results such that 
only the assaults causing bodily harm (level 2) and aggravated assault (level 3) offences 
were identified.  In order to obtain decisions that include sexual assault (level 1 sexual 
assault) and sexual assault with a weapon (level 2 sexual assault), I used the keyword 
“sexual assault”.  In the next section, I will discuss the steps that were followed to 
retrieve legal decisions under Quicklaw.   
                                                 
16
 To increase the trustworthiness of the sample, I did a quick comparison search using Westlaw. Upon a 
quick review of the cases, the search produced the similar number of cases as was produced under the 
Quicklaw search.    
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Once I retrieved the physical and sexual assault cases in Ontario, under each piece of 
legislation, I reviewed each case to determine if it was eligible for inclusion in this study.  
After retrieving the cases, I read each fully.  I then categorized the sample of cases into 
ten groupings:  “Court of Appeal Decisions”, “Transfer Decisions/Adult Sentences”, 
“Admissibility of Evidence Decisions”, “Trial Decisions” (conviction or acquittal), 
decisions relating to “Other Criminal Charges” (e.g., cases showed up in search because 
offender had a youth record), cases pertaining to “Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
Decisions”, “Interim Release Decisions”, “Miscellaneous Decisions” (e.g., child 
protection, stay motions, motions for publication), “Non-Youth Decisions (adult 
decisions showed up in search keywords) and “Sentencing Decisions”.  Table 3.1 and 
Table 3.2 provide a summary of the number of cases that were included in each category 
by offence type and legislation.   
Guided by both penal populism and focal concerns theory, it was decided that the 
“Sentencing Decisions” were best suited for this study.  The Court of Appeal decisions 
are based on appeals over errors of law or principle and as such, they did not provide 
insight into all the facts of the case that were dealt with in the trial decisions.  Further, the 
original trial and sentencing decisions, upon which the appeal decisions were based, were 
not produced through the Quicklaw search.  The cases relating to admissibility of 
evidence, other criminal charges, decisions related to Charter Rights and Freedoms, and 
the miscellaneous decisions did not relate to the research questions, and therefore they 
were excluded from the sample.   
The test for transfer decisions under the YOA and for adult sentencing under YCJA 
differs, and, therefore these cases were excluded from the sample.  Under the YOA 
(section 16), a transfer to ordinary (adult) court was automatic in instances where the 
young person was 16 or 17 years of age at the time of the offence, and was charged with 
a serious indictable crime such as homicide, manslaughter, or aggravated sexual assault 
(YOA, 1984; John Howard Society of Alberta, 1999).  A transfer was also possible if an 
accused was over 14 when he/she committed a serious offence and the court decided it 
was in the best interest of both the youth and the community to try the young person as an 
adult.  The transfer hearing had to take place prior to the trial and the adjudication of a 
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youth.  Either the prosecution (Crown) or defence could apply for a transfer; however, the 
onus fell on the applicant to show that a transfer was appropriate (YOA, 1985; John 
Howard Society of Alberta, 1999).   
The YCJA eliminated the transfer hearing to adult court.  Deciding if an adult sentence is 
appropriate takes place after a finding of guilt in youth court.  Whether an adult sentence 
is appropriate depends on the type of offence, for example, an adult sentence could be 
given if the youth has been found guilty of one of the following serious violent offences:   
first or second degree murder, attempt to commit murder, manslaughter, aggravated 
sexual assault.  The Crown must give notice to the youth and the court, if they are 
seeking an adult sentence and must satisfy the court that the seriousness of the offence 
and the threat to society posed by the youth requires an adult sentence (YCJA, 2003; John 
Howard Society of Alberta, 1999; Bala, 2015: 160).   
Therefore, after careful consideration of the different categories of cases, I decided to 
focus on “sentencing decisions” as these decisions provided the most detail and were best 
suited to testing penal populism and focal concerns theory.  In the next section, I provide 
a discussion of Quicklaw search that I followed to obtain both the physical assault and 
sexual assault cases, heard in Ontario, under the YOA and the YCJA.   
First, to obtain the physical assault decisions heard under the YCJA, I conducted a “basic 
search” using the terms and connectors “aggravated assault” and “Youth Criminal Justice 
Act”.  I selected “all Canadian jurisdictions” and “all Canadian courts”.  The search 
produced 392 cases, which I sorted from newest to oldest.  I then selected only the 
“Ontario judgments” from within those cases.  Choosing only the cases in Ontario 
narrowed the sample down and I was left with 122 reported physical assault cases.17   
                                                 
17
 The sample of sexual assault cases heard under the YOA included in this study occurred between 1993 
and March 31, 2003.  The sample of physical assault cases, heard under the YOA, occurred between 1997 
and March 31, 2003.  The sample of sexual assault and physical assault cases heard under the YCJA 
included in this study occurred between April 1, 2003 to 22, 2012.  The sample of sexual assault and 
physical assault cases that were heard under the SSCA and included in this study ranged from October 23, 
2012 to August 2016.   
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The same steps were followed to identify sentencing decisions under the YOA.  First I 
searched for “aggravated assault” and “Young Offenders Act” to obtain a sample of 
physical assault cases heard under the YOA.  I selected “all Canadian jurisdictions” and 
“all Canadian courts”.  This search produced 345 cases which I sorted from newest to 
oldest.  I then selected only the “Ontario judgments” from within those cases, which 
narrowed the sample of cases down and I was left with 82 judicial decisions respecting 
physical assault cases between 1993 and March 31, 2003.   
After separating the cases into their respective categories, as discussed above, I was left 
with eighteen physical assault sentencing decisions heard under the YCJA.  I divided 
these cases into two groups (see Table 3.3):  Group 3 represents the cases heard under the 
YCJA between the period April 1, 2003 to 22, 2012.  Group 5 represents the cases heard 
under the SSCA (the YCJA cases post October 23, 2012 amendments under the SSCA).    
Since the YOA was enacted in 1984, I chose only the cases between 1985 and March 31, 
2003 (the date the YCJA was enacted).  It should be noted that if a young person was 
charged under the YOA, the young person would be tried and sentenced under the YOA 
even if the trial was heard after the enactment of the YCJA.  As such, I confirmed in my 
search that there were no cases past April 1, 2003 that should be included in the YOA 
sample.  Group 1 (see Table 3.3) represents the ten decisions heard under the YOA.   
Table 3.1:  Selection of Physical Assault Sentencing Decisions 
 
Cases 
Young Offenders Act Youth Criminal Justice Act 
Court of Appeal Decisions 6 7 
Transfer Decisions/Adult 
Sentences 
10 0 
Admissibility of Evidence 4 17 
Trial Decisions (conviction 
or acquittal) 
6 14 
Other Criminal Charges 5 10 
Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms Decisions 
3 2 
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Miscellaneous Decisions 16 13 
Non-Youth Decisions 24 28 
Interim Release 5 
 
8 
Sentencing Decisions 3 23 
Total Cases (Physical 
Assault) 
82 122 
Similar steps were followed to retrieve sexual assault cases under the YCJA and YOA.  A 
basic search for sexual assault cases under the YCJA in Canada produced 568 cases. I 
then selected only the “Ontario judgments” from within those cases.  By choosing only 
the cases in Ontario, the sample was narrowed down and I was left with 191 reported 
sexual assault cases between the period of 2003 and 2016.  The search for sexual assault 
cases under the YOA initially produced 932 cases.  Selecting only the “Ontario 
judgments” narrowed the sample of cases down and I was left with 253 reported sexual 
assault cases between the period of 1985 and 2003.  
Table 3.2 provides a summary of the number of cases that were included in each category 
by offence type and legislation.  After separating the cases into their respective 
categories, as discussed above, I was left with ten sexual assault sentencing decisions 
heard under the YCJA.  I divided these cases into two groups (see Table 3.3):  Group 4 
represents the cases heard under the YCJA between the period April 1, 2003 to 22, 2012.  
Group 6 represents the cases heard under the SSCA (the YCJA cases post October 23, 
2012 amendments under the SSCA).    
Since the YOA was enacted in 1984, I chose only the cases between 1985 and March 31, 
2003 (the date the YCJA was enacted).  It should be noted, if a young person was 
charged under the YOA, the young person would be tried and sentenced under the YOA 
even if the trial was heard after the enactment of the YCJA.  As such, I confirmed in my 
search that there were no cases past April 1, 2003 that should be included in the YOA 
sample.  Group 2 (see Table 3.3) represents the three physical assault cases heard under 
the YOA.   
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Table 3.2:  Selection of Sexual Assault Sentencing Decisions 
 
Cases 
Young Offenders Act Youth Criminal Justice Act 
Court of Appeal Decisions 27 19 
Transfer Decisions/Adult 
Sentences 
23 4 
Admissibility of Evidence 36 29 
Trial Decisions (conviction 
or acquittal) 
40 35 
Other Criminal Charges 23 15 
Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms Decisions 
22 15 
Miscellaneous Decisions 21 19 
Non-Youth Decisions 48 33 
Interim Release 3 
 
4 
Sentencing Decisions 10 18 
Total Cases (Physical 
Assault) 
253 191 
The final sample for this analysis was comprised of 44 judicial cases, five of which dealt 
with multiple offenders, for a total of 54 offenders.  Of the 54 offenders, 26 were 
convicted and sentenced for physical assault and 28 were convicted and sentenced for 
sexual assault.  All decisions were made between 1993 (the first reported sexual assault 
sentencing decision that resulted from the Quickaw search) and 2016.   
To keep the hard copy of the cases in order, I organized them into categories by offence 
(physical assault and sexual assault).  I then organized the cases by date (year), and by 
governing statute (YOA, YCJA, and YCJA post the 2012 amendments).  I then grouped 
each judicial decision into six groupings:   
Group 1:  Sentencing of young offenders convicted and sentenced for sexual 
      assault under the Young Offenders Act; 
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Group 2:  Sentencing of young offenders convicted and sentenced for physical            
assault under the Young Offenders Act; 
 
Group 3:  Sentencing of young offenders convicted and sentenced for sexual 
assault under the Youth Criminal Justice Act; 
 
Group 4:  Sentencing of young offenders convicted and sentenced for physical 
assault under the Youth Criminal Justice Act; 
 
Group 5:  Sentencing of young offenders convicted and sentenced for sexual 
assault under the Youth Criminal Justice Act (post the 2012 
amendments); and  
 
Group 6:  Sentencing of young offenders convicted and sentenced for physical 
assault under the Youth Criminal Justice Act (post the 2012 
amendments). 
The number of cases in each group is shown in Table 3.3.  Group 1 contained 10 judicial 
sentencing decisions for sexual assault convictions, heard under the YOA, between 1993 
and March 31, 2003.  Group 2 contained 3 judicial sentencing decisions for physical 
assault convictions, heard under the YOA, between 1997 and March 31, 2003.  Group 3 
contained 13 judicial sentencing decisions for sexual assault convictions, heard under the 
YCJA, between April 1, 2003 and October 22, 2012.  Group 4 contained 18 judicial 
sentencing decisions for physical assault convictions, heard under the YCJA, between 
April 1, 2003 and October 22, 2012.  Group 5 contained 3 judicial sentencing decision for 
a sexual assault conviction, heard under the YCJA, post the October 23, 2012 
amendments (October 23, 2012 to August 2016).  Group 6 contained 4 judicial 
sentencing decisions for physical assault convictions heard under the YCJA, post the 
2012 amendments (October 23, 2012 to August 2016).   
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Table 3.3:  Judicial Decision Groupings18 
Offences YOA YCJA SSCA
19 
Sexual Assault 
Group 1:  10 
decisions heard 
between 1993 and 
March 30, 2003 
Group 3:  13 
decisions between 
April 1, 2003 and 
2012 October 22, 
2012 
Group 5:  5 
decisions 
between 
October 23, 
2012 and 
August 31, 
2016 
Physical Assault 
Group 2:  3 decisions 
heard between 1997 
and March 30 2003 
Group 4:  18 
decisions between 
April 1, 2003 and 
October 22, 2012  
Group 6:  5 
decisions 
between 
October 23, 
2012 and 
2016 
Once the judicial decisions were categorized into groups, I conducted content analysis.  I 
coded the decisions, and subsequently inputted the data into Excel and SPSS software 
programs.  These steps will be discussed in the following sections.  
3.3 Content Analysis 
To analyze the judicial decisions, I drew on what Krippendorf (1980) calls “open 
coding”, which refers to making notes and headings while reading and relating these 
themes to what is written in the text.  Content analysis is an appropriate methodology for 
this study because it can be applied to any piece of writing or communication and 
provides researchers with a tool to identify conceptual and relational themes that arise 
when examining the written text.  For this study, content analysis allowed for the 
examination of certain wording, phrasing, and concepts within judicial decisions, and the 
exploration of what interpretations and discourse are used by the courts in sentencing 
                                                 
18
 While the YOA was enacted in 1985, the first reported sentencing decisions for sexual assault and 
physical assault obtained from the Quicklaw database search was in 1993 and 1997, respectively.  The 
cases prior to 1993 and 1997 were not sentencing decisions and as such were excluded from the sample.   
19
 Groups 5 and 6 represent the cases heard under the YCJA, post the 2012 amendments under the Safe 
Streets and Communities Act (2013-2016). 
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young offenders convicted of sexual assault and physical assault, heard under the YOA 
(1984), the YCJA (2003) as well as the YCJA (post the 2012 amendments).   
Content analysis was first used in the nineteenth century to analyze written, verbal, or 
visual communication messages such as hymns, newspapers, and magazine articles, 
advertisements and political speeches.  It has been increasingly used in the fields of 
journalism, sociology, psychology, and business (Cole, 1988; Kripendorrf, 1980). The 
epistemological roots of content analysis for exploring judicial decisions; however, lies in 
the study of Legal Realism, which argues that the law is what judges do (Hall and 
Wright, 2008).   
Fred Kort (1957), a political scientist was the first to use content analysis to explore 
written judicial opinions (Hall and Wright, 2008).  Kort sought to study all United States 
Supreme Court opinions discussing the constitutional right to legal counsel in criminal 
cases; which comprised a total of 28 cases decided between 1932 and 1956.  In his study, 
Kort (1957) developed a coding scheme to record and categorize various facts that were 
discussed in the judicial decisions.  He developed a coding system that would allow a 
reader to predict the outcome of similar cases and used that scoring system to correctly 
predict the outcomes of 12 of the 14 remaining cases in his study with an 85% accuracy 
rate (Kort, 1957; Hall and Wright, 2008).   
During the same period, the late 1950s and early 1960s, lawyers and legal scholars were 
beginning to develop a self-taught method that mirrored content analysis (Hall and 
Wright, 2008). P.J. Federico, an attorney, moved beyond traditional legal commentary on 
case law towards a more systematic reading of the texts in his 1956 analysis of patent 
invalidity decisions.  He studied fifty recent United States Courts of Appeal decisions, 
which invalidated a patent and recorded consistent information about each of them, 
including the stated grounds for invalidity.  While content analysis of judicial decisions 
began in the 1950s, it was not until the 1990s, that legal and other scholars adopted 
content analysis at accelerating rates (Hall and Wright, 2008).   
In summary, content analysis is a method of analyzing documents that allows researchers 
to examine theories and obtain a more detailed and enriched understanding of written 
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content; it is concerned with meanings, intentions, consequences, and context (Cavanagh, 
1997; Downe-Wamboldt 1992; Krippendorff, 1980).  Further, it is a research method that 
makes replicable and valid inferences from data to their context, in order to provide 
knowledge, new insights, an accurate representation of facts, and a practical guide to 
action.  Thus, content analysis was used for this research study as it enabled a systematic 
and objective means for describing and quantifying phenomena (Krippendorff, 1980).  I 
also chose content analysis as it can be used with both qualitative and quantitative data, 
and it can be used in both inductive and deductive research.   
3.3.1 Coding 
Hall and Wright (2008: 88) argue that content analysis may lose relevance, or external 
validity, in situations where aspects of legal interpretation are impossible to code 
objectively (e.g., nuances that are related to infrequent or complex factual and procedural 
patterns).  However, “content analysis is internally valid if it accurately measures the 
particular components of the decision that the researcher wants to study” (Hall and 
Wright, 2008: 88).  To increase internal validity, I used systematic defined coding 
techniques in order to remove and minimize elements of researcher bias and to improve 
the thoroughness, precision, and accuracy of the analysis.  I developed a strategic, 
systematic technique for sorting cases to assist in identifying cases that belonged in the 
final sample and kept records of those removed from the initial sample.  For example, I 
kept recording sheets for each category of cases (discussed in the previous section) 
wherein I recorded the case number, the name, year, and description of each case.  Such 
coding strategies strengthen the objectivity and replicability of such case law 
interpretation (Hall and Wright, 2008: 88). 
Once I decided upon the sample of cases (sentencing decisions) that would be included in 
this study, I read each judicial sentencing decision again in more detail and made notes 
and headings on separate “coding sheets” in order to discover themes related to the two 
theoretical perspectives that guided this study. I sought to establish whether there were 
any identifiable themes with regards to penal populism, in particular whether or not I 
could establish a concern for punitiveness underlying the sentences imposed by the 
courts.  I also sought to establish whether there were any identifiable themes linked with 
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focal concerns theory, such as whether or not the courts referred to the level of offenders’ 
blameworthiness, their prospects for rehabilitation, and whether age and gender 
influenced sentencing.  
In the next stage of the data coding and thematic analysis, I drew upon the “coding 
sheets” and reviewed the cases again.  I manually coded the hard copies (e.g., making 
notes of themes that could potentially be linked to penal populism and focal concerns 
theory) of the sentencing decisions by studying the cases repeatedly to allow emerging 
themes (or categories) to develop.  I considered the possible meanings behind each theme 
and coded category to determine how and if they fit within each developing theme.  
When new codes and themes emerged, I changed the coded categories accordingly and 
the judicial decisions were reread according to the new coding structure.  
For the third stage of data and coding (discussed in more detail in Section 3.4), I coded 
the cases electronically by importing them into NVivo (a qualitative software program) 
and stored the data in both Excel and SPSS (discussed in more detail in the following 
section).   The three stages of coding enabled me to double-check and verify my analysis, 
since I was the main person coding and analyzing the data.  Throughout each stage of 
coding, I sought to identify themes, and often times returned to cases that were already 
reviewed and coded to re-examine potential links between cases, and to make certain that 
nothing was missed in the early rounds of thematic coding.  Once the themes were 
initially selected, I maintained a level of flexibility by returning to the cases to develop 
more refined, analytical themes, thereby increasing the level of trustworthiness of the 
research process. 
Overall, as I will explain in more detail in the next section, I identified and coded 
offenders’ characteristics (e.g., gender, age), case details (e.g., plea, criminal history, 
offence, pre-trial custody), and other details (e.g., Crown’s recommended sentence, court-
imposed sentence).  I imported the cases into NVivo (discussed in more detail in Section 
3.4) to further identify and verify the variables in order to increase the reliability of these 
measures, which I then imported into Excel.  I then imported the data from Excel into 
SPSS to calculate descriptive statistics and to conduct simple statistical analyses.  I 
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subsequently identified themes (e.g., blameworthiness and prospects for rehabilitation 
and sentencing principles) first by manually coding the hard copies.  I also used NVivo’s 
“word query” function (discussed in more detail in Section 3.4 and later in Chapter 5) to 
identify the frequency and location of the key and consistent principles or purposes of 
sentencing that are found under the YOA, the YCJA, and the SSCA (responsibility, 
accountability, rehabilitation, and reintegration).   
3.4 Data Analysis 
This study sought to document what judges “do”, rather than to assess how well judges 
perform.  Three software programs (NVivo, SPSS, and Excel) were used to assist in the 
coding and analysis of the textual data.  First, I chose NVivo, as it is a software program 
that supports both qualitative and mixed methods research (QSR International, 2016).  
NVivo, is a qualitative data analysis software that facilitates analytical flexibility and 
enhance transparency and trustworthiness of the qualitative research process (Kaefer, 
Roper, and Sinha, 2015: 1).  Another important advantage of using NVivo is that it is 
compatible with SPSS (Statistical Packages for the Social Sciences), which I used to 
calculate descriptive statistics, and to conduct simple quantitative analyses to examine 
and explore the relationships between the variables used in this analysis.  Third, NVivo is 
designed to help organize, analyze, and find insights in unstructured, or qualitative data, 
such as interviews, open-ended survey responses, articles, and so on.  It is also an 
electronic storage place wherein I was able to store and manage my data in an organized 
manner that facilitated data analysis.  Lastly, it provided me with a tool that allowed me 
to ask questions about the data in a more efficient way, in order that I could examine the 
theoretical perspectives guiding this study along with the sentencing principles that guide 
the YOA, the YCJA, and the SSCA (QSR International, 2016).  NVivo was used as it 
allowed this study to include quantitative elements, such as word frequency analysis 
(Mayring, 2000; Kaefer, Roper, and Sinha, 2015: 4).  
As previously discussed, I developed a systematic technique for sorting and coding the 
judicial decisions.  These cases were subjected to detailed readings, and key themes 
related to the theories being examined were identified.  The use of certain words and the 
presence of themes were counted by running Word Frequency queries, using NVivo.  
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Word frequencies determine the number of times the words appeared and where within 
the judicial decisions that words, such as responsibility, accountability, rehabilitation, and 
reintegration occurred.  Subsequent analyses and readings were conducted that focused 
on the meaning attached to these words and whether such meanings appeared to vary 
within and across offence type.  
Once I assigned codes to the cases, I entered the coded information into Excel 
spreadsheets.  The Excel spreadsheets were used as codebooks in order to organize the 
data20 according to the many categories, including case characteristics, trial name, date of 
hearing, type of offence, age and gender of offender, interim custody, and the legislation 
in effect (YOA, YCJA, YCJA post 2012 amendments).  I examined penal populism 
themes.  For example, did the Crown recommend a custodial or non-custodial sentence 
and what was the sentence imposed by the court (e.g., custodial versus non-custodial).  In 
addition, were the courts more punitive under the YCJA than under the YOA?  I also 
considered themes relating to focal concerns theory.  For example, what was the 
offender’s plea (guilt or not guilty), was the offender a first-time offender or repeat 
offender, the court’s prediction as to the level of risk to the community as reflected by an 
offender’s prospects for rehabilitation and, lastly, did the young offender serve time in 
interim custody.  Each of these categories or variables will be discussed in more detail in 
the following section.  
After the qualitative content analysis, I conducted some basic quantitative statistical 
analyses of the study data and SPSS was used for this portion of the analysis.  
3.5 Research Question 1 
The first research question draws on Penal Populism and asks: is there evidence that 
Canada, in particular, Ontario, has experienced a penal populist turn in regard to 
legislative changes?  Are judges taking a more punitive stance in sentencing young 
                                                 
20
 See Table 3.4 for a list of variables included in this study.   
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offenders convicted of sexual assault and physical assault?  In the following section, I 
will discuss the themes identified and the variables created for this study. 
3.5.1 Penal Populism: Themes and Variables 
Roberts et al. (2003: 17) propose that official sentencing policy is not the only 
explanation for trends with respect to increases in incarceration rates.  A second 
explanation, and one that is potentially more likely, is that judges may become harsher in 
response either to pressure from prosecutors or from judicial perception that society 
favours the imposition of harsher punishments (Roberts et al., 2003: 18).   
To operationalize and examine penal populism, I considered first, whether the sentencing 
recommendations of crown prosecutors, whose role is to represent the public interests in 
court, influenced the sentences imposed by the courts.  Second, to capture public 
perceptions, I took into account the legislation and period under which each case was 
tried.  The YOA, for example, did not provide a single, primary goal for sentencing 
young offenders and as a result in the years following its enactment, as discussed in 
earlier chapters, provincial youth courts had considerable discretion concerning how the 
act would be implemented which led to high rates of custodial sentences (Bala and 
Anand, 2012; Carrington, 1999; John Howard Society; 1999; YOA, 1984).  Alternatively, 
the overall presumption under the YCJA is that judicial proceedings are not to be the first 
choice of action, especially for first time offenders and/or those who have engaged in 
minor offences.  Deterrence, in particular general deterrence, was not to be a guiding 
principle of sentencing.  As a result, according to the stated goals of the YCJA and as 
shown in studies reported in Chapter 2, Canada experienced an overall decline in 
custodial sentences handed out to young offenders under the YCJA compared to the 
YOA.21  
With the emphasis, under the YCJA, on reducing incarceration and in particular using 
custody as a last resort, one might expect that even the young offenders convicted of 
                                                 
21
 The Safe Streets and Communities Act (2012) pushed for a more get-tough approach to sentencing and 
as a result deterrence was reintroduced as a guiding principle of sentencing under the YCJA.   
  82 
violent offences would receive lighter sentences (e.g., non-custodial sentences).  In 
contrast, penal populism would suggest that custodial sentences would continue to be 
imposed at high rates for violent offences.  Simple quantitative analyses were conducted 
to determine if there is evidence of either trend.  
To examine penal populist theory, the following variables were constructed.  The first 
represents the court-imposed sentence and was a measure to contrast custodial sentences 
(open and closed) and non-custodial sentences (e.g., probation).  Three other variables 
were created.  Crown’s recommended sentence reflects whether or not the Crown 
recommended a custodial sentence or a non-custodial sentence.  Legislation reflects the 
three pieces of legislation (YOA, YCJA, and the YCJA post the 2012 amendments) that 
govern young offenders in Canada since 1985.  Lastly, a variable offence was created to 
distinguish the physical assault and sexual assault offenders.  If the push towards punitive 
policies is influencing the judicial decisions included in this study, then one would expect 
that the court-imposed sentences would vary with time (e.g., across legislation), and 
would be in line with the Crown’s recommended sentence.  
3.5.2 Court Imposed Sentence 
Sentencing involves a two-stage process wherein first a judge makes a decision whether 
to incarcerate a young offender.  Second if incarceration is imposed what is to be the type 
and length of custody and probation, and if incarceration is not imposed what is the type 
and length of the non-custodial sentence to be imposed.  The variable, court-imposed 
sentence, for this study is a dichotomous measure of sentencing outcome, which reflects 
the first decision made at sentencing.  Did the offender receive a custodial sentence 
(which included both closed and open custody) or a non-custodial sentence (which 
included probation)? 
3.5.3 Crown Recommended Sentence 
As discussed in Chapter 2, “the community looks upon the Crown prosecutor as a symbol 
of authority and as a spokesman for the community in criminal matters” (R. v. Logiacco, 
1984: paras. 378-379).  In this respect, I infer that the Crown will be more ‘punitive’ and 
as such will seek a harsher sentence, in particular recommending a custodial sentence be 
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imposed.  To examine the ‘punitiveness’ of the judge, in this study I compare the Crown 
recommendation with the sentences that are actually imposed by the courts.  As such, a 
variable was created that reflected the Crown’s recommended sentence as it relates to 
custody.  Here I contrast whether the Crown recommended a custodial sentence, or a non-
custodial sentence. 
3.5.4 Legislation 
Judges must interpret, implement and maintain their focus on the guiding principles and 
purposes that underlie each piece of legislation, which also raises the question whether 
judges are influenced by the penal populist agenda.  To assess if legislative changes are 
associated with judges’ sentencing and punitiveness, a nominal variable, legislation, was 
created.  This measure reflects the legislation under which each case was brought before 
the court: the YOA, the YCJA, and the YCJA after the 2012 amendments.  
3.5.5 Offence 
A third measure was created, offence, to contrast sentences for physical assault and 
sexual assault.  Recall under the Criminal Code, physical assault (level 2 and level 3) and 
sexual assault offences (level 1 and level 2) are treated the same in terms of offence 
severity as reflected in the maximum sentences that can be imposed.  As such, one would 
expect that the courts would perceive the level of blame would be no different for the 
physical assault offenders as compared to the sexual assault offenders.  Nevertheless, 
there is evidence, recounted in Chapter 2, that the public regards sexual assault to be the 
more egregious offence.  Penal populist theory (Roberts et al., 2003) suggests if the 
courts are influenced by public and political pressure, the sexual assault offenders would 
receive harsher sentences compared to the physical assault offenders.    
3.6 Research Question Two 
Drawing on focal concerns theory of sentencing, this study asks: do legal decisions, as 
they relate to the type of sentencing (custodial or non-custodial) within the Ontario youth 
justice system, reflect an offender’s level of blameworthiness and the need for protection 
of the public?  Can extralegal factors, such as age and gender explain disparities in 
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sentencing?  In the following section, I provide a discussion of the themes and variables 
created to answer the second research question.   
3.6.1 Focal Concerns Theory:  Themes and Variables 
Focal concerns perspectives on sentencing also provided a valuable framework to guide 
this study.  This theory recognizes sentencing is a multifaceted and complex process 
wherein judges must simultaneously consider numerous relevant factors and diverse 
sentencing goals (Kurlychek and Johnson, 2004; Steffensmeier, 1980; Steffensmeier et 
al., 1998; Steffensmeier and Demuth, 2001).  Judges, according to focal concerns theory 
assess three primary considerations before making a sentencing decision:  1) the level of 
offender’s blameworthiness, 2) protection of the public (reflected by the potential for 
offender rehabilitation), and 3) the practical constraints and consequences of their 
decision.  Lastly, extra-legal factors such as age, gender, and race (referred to as 
perceptual shorthand).  Therefore, drawing on focal concerns theory, I assess whether 
judicial decisions, in particular as they relate to sentencing within the Ontario youth 
justice system, reflect the level of an offender’s blameworthiness, their prospects for 
rehabilitation (the latter is related to the level of public protection that is required), as 
well as age and gender.  Practical constraints and consequences of their decision were not 
included in this analysis as the judicial decisions did not provide enough information 
about these issues.   
3.6.2 Level of Blameworthiness 
The first focal concern is the level of blameworthiness of the young offender and is 
usually associated with the retributive philosophy of punishment; the punishment should 
be proportionate to the seriousness/harm of the crime (Hartley, et al., 2007; 
Steffensmeier, et al., 1998; Steffensmeier & Demuth, 2000).  In addition to offence 
severity, an offender’s criminal history, and level of remorse are aspects of 
blameworthiness considered in this study.  
A dichotomous variable was created to measure whether the offender was a first time 
offender (FTO) or a repeat offender.  Drawing on focal concerns theory, one would 
expect that the repeat offender would be perceived as being more blameworthy than the 
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first-time offender.  Repeat offenders could also be perceived as a greater threat to the 
community, which of course is the second focal concern identified by this theory.  
A second dichotomous variable was created to measure the level of an offender’s 
culpability (Plea), which reflects a young offender’s level of remorse, represented by 
whether they entered a guilty.  One would expect that a convicted offender who pled not 
guilty to the offence with which they were charged would be perceived by the courts as 
being less blameworthy as compared to the offender.   
A third measure was created, offence, which measures offence type and severity.  Recall, 
under the Criminal Code physical assault (level 2 and level 3) and sexual assault offences 
(level 1 and level 2) would be treated the same in terms of offence severity.  As such, one 
would expect that the courts would perceive the level of blame would be no different for 
the physical assault offenders as compared to the sexual assault offenders. 
In summary, in this study, it was expected that if the courts perceived an offender as 
having a higher level of blame, they would be more punitive towards the repeat offender, 
and the offender who pled not-guilty to the offence.  Since the two offences (sexual 
assault and physical assault) included in this study reflect similar levels of severity as 
reflected under the Criminal Code, it was expected there would be no difference in the 
perceived level of blame by the courts. 
3.6.3 Protection of Community 
The second focal concern is protection of the community, which focuses on incapacitating 
offenders or deterring would-be offenders (Steffensmeier et al., 1998).  The YOA and the 
YCJA require that criminal justice agents, which include judges, consider public safety 
and the prevention of recidivism, when assessing an offender’s prospects for 
rehabilitation.  Coding for this variable was a much more detailed and difficult process 
because it required me to make inferences about the judges’ rationales upon sentencing.   
Using content analysis to identify themes related to the protection of community, I 
examined the discourse used by judges to determine whether judges demonstrated 
concern for the ‘protection of the community’ when sentencing.  In particular, I examined 
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whether the judges took into consideration an offender’s prospects for rehabilitation.  
Included in this measure are judges’ assessments concerning the likelihood of a repeat 
offence.  The assumption is that if a young offender had favourable prospects for 
rehabilatation, they would pose less of a risk to the community and as such would require 
a less punitive sentence.  Conversely, if a young offender had less favourable or poor 
prospects for rehabilitation, they would pose a higher risk to the community and as such 
would require a more punitive sentence.   
Some indicators were clear cut.  For example, in R. v. A.B. (2010), a sexual assault case 
heard under the YCJA, the judge was “… favourable towards A.B.’s rehabilitation and 
his low risk to re-offend”.  In contrast, the judge in R.v. D.A. (2011), a sexual assault 
case heard under the YCJA, stated the offender “exhibits a dishonest nature and an 
aversion to social rules of conduct.  He is at high risk to re-offend” (para. 34).  These two 
cases were less difficult to code as the judge made clear references to the offender’s 
prospects for rehabilitation.  Such statements, I coded as being illustrative of a judge 
perceiving the offender as having favourable and less favourable prospects for 
rehabilitation, respectively.   
At times, however, a judge did not explicitly state that an offender showed favourable or 
less favourable prospects for rehabilitation.  In these instances, I made inferences based 
on judges’ statements.  For example, in R. v. D.A. (1996), a sexual assault case heard 
under the YOA, the judge stated that “there is no indication of deviant thinking or 
behaviour, either sexual or otherwise, and no indication he was uncooperative when 
charged for this offence” (26).  Such statements, I coded as being illustrative of a judge 
perceiving this offender as having favourable prospects for rehabilitation.  On the other 
hand, if a judge made reference to an offender’s less favourable conduct or behavior 
during the period between the offence charge and sentencing hearing, I coded as the 
judge perceiving the offender as having less favourable prospects for rehabilitation.  For 
example, in R. v. A.A. (2004) the judge in referring to BC stated “it is entirely clear that 
this offender unfortunately has been directionless for many months, and has no obvious 
educational or employment prospects” (at para. 22).   
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Another variable constructed for this study, concerned interim custody.  As it is stated 
under Section 7.1 of the YOA (1984), a youth who would otherwise be detained prior to 
trial can be released to the care of a “responsible person” if the judge deems this 
appropriate (YOA, 1984).  Similarly, section 31(1) of the YCJA states that a young 
person who has been arrested for certain crimes may be placed in the care of a 
responsible person instead of being detained in custody if a youth justice court or a 
justice is satisfied that the person is willing and able to take care of and exercise control 
over the young person; and the young person is willing to be placed in the care of that 
person (YCJA, 2002).  The YOA and the YCJA, therefore, requires that judges inquire as 
to the availability of a responsible person with whom the youth may reside.   
Interim custody (also referred to as pre-sentence custody), for this study, is taken as an 
indicator that a young person who has been charged with an offence is perceived as being 
a threat to the community and requires pre-sentence custody.  Further, if the youth served 
interim custody this would indicate that the youth did not have a responsible adult who 
was able or willing to exercise control over the youth.  One would expect these offenders 
would receive more punitive sentences as they would be perceived to pose a higher risk 
to the community.   
3.6.4 Perceptual Shorthand 
Because judges often have limited information to accurately determine the level of an 
offenders’ dangerousness, culpability, and likelihood for recidivism, they develop a 
perceptual shorthand that is based on stereotypes and attributions that are linked to an 
offender’s characteristics, such as race, sex, and age (Steffensmeier et al., 1998: 767; 
Hartley et al., 2007: 66). A phenomenon referred to as the age-crime curve reveals that 
crime rates tend to peak in the mid to late teens (16-18 years old) (Alam, 2015; Brennan, 
2012; Hirschi and Gottfredson, 1983).  As such, the variable age was created as a 
measure of the offender’s age at the time of the offence.  The ages ranged from 12 to 17 
years old.  I grouped the ages into two categories, 12-15 years old and 16-17 years old.   
Focal concerns theory argues that young offenders are perceived by the judge as being 
less dangerous and crime prone, as compared to the adult offenders.  Drawing on both 
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focal concerns theory and the age-crime curve phenomenon, one might expect that the 
younger offenders (12-15 year olds) in this sample would receive lighter sentences than 
the ‘older’ young offenders (16-17 year olds).  In addition, I considered gender.  Drawing 
on both focal concerns theory and previous research (Heidensohn, 2002; Rodriquez et al., 
2006; Steffensmeier, Ulmer, and Kramer, 1998), which reveals that males commit more 
violent acts than females, we might expect that judges regard males as more dangerous 
than females.  As such, female offenders would be expected to receive a less punitive 
sentence as compared to male offenders.   
3.7 Research Question Three 
The third research question asks if there is evidence of variations in sentencing rationales 
provided by judges, upon sentencing within and across offence type  In order to answer 
this question, I conducted additional qualitative analyses to explore differences in 
sentencing offence type.  For this analysis, I considered the principles of sentencing 
outlined in youth justice legislation, with a particular focus on offender’s prospects for 
rehabilitation and accountability. In the following section, I will provide a more detailed 
discussion of the methods used to answer the third research question.   
3.7.2 Further Analysis:  Rehabilitation and Sentencing 
The Principles of the YOA (1984) state “that young persons are said not to be as 
accountable for their acts as are adults, but even so they must bear responsibility for their 
contraventions” (Preamble).  Rehabilitation is also an underlying principle of sentencing:  
custodial sentences were to be a last resort under both the YOA and the YCJA.  
Rehabilitation, however, cannot be the sole focus for legal intervention, as the courts 
must also take into account the protection of the public.  As the Preamble of the YCJA 
(2002) states, the criminal justice system is to foster responsibility and ensure 
accountability through meaningful consequences and effective rehabilitation and 
reintegration into the community.  
I analyzed the content of the judicial decisions carefully, as discussed earlier to determine 
if and why sentencing decisions may vary within and across offence type.  Drawing on 
the principles and purposes of sentencing under the YOA and the YCJA, I, first, ran word 
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frequency queries to count the number of times responsibility, accountability, 
rehabilitation, reintegration were used.  This query allowed me to identify the location 
within the decisions that these words were referenced and as such, I could then examine 
the meanings the courts’ attached to these principles and whether such principles played a 
significant factor upon sentencing.    
3.8 Data and Study Limitations 
This study sought to build on prior sentencing research; however, there are limitations to 
this study that must be noted.  The Quicklaw database is not absolutely comprehensive 
and it is difficult to determine exactly how cases are selected, thereby raising the problem 
of representativeness.  Cases pass through an editorial filter that could be biased in some 
way (Justice Canada, 1992: vii).  As a result, the decisions obtained for this study are not 
representative of all cases that appear before the court.  The sample included in this study 
reflects a convenience sample, albeit one comprised of significant and influential 
sentencing decisions.  Therefore, sample results analyzed here cannot be generalized to 
the larger population.  An additional limitation is the small number of cases included, 
which prevents detailed and more sophisticated quantitative analyses and limits the 
ability to determine statistical significance.  
Nevertheless, the sample here has several benefits.  As recounted earlier, the cases that 
are catalogued and imported into Quicklaw are a major source of case law in Canada.  
Recall that there is much sentencing disparity across provinces in Canada; thus, while the 
cases included in this study are not representative of the population of young offenders, 
they are representative of the discourse of official case law that gets replicated and 
debated in courtrooms in the province of Ontario. 
The sample of cases, included in this study may pose limitations, however, any “bias” 
that may be created when courts justify their decisions, according to Hall and Wright 
(2008) is precisely what researchers may wish to study (Freidman, 2006; Hall and 
Wright, 2008).  The facts and reasons judges select are the substance of an opinion that 
creates law and binding precedent and as such they merit careful study.  Content analysis 
is, therefore, beneficial to scholars seeking a measurable understanding of substantive 
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law or the legal process (Hall and Wright, 2008).  It can verify or refute descriptions of 
case law that are based on anecdotal or subjective study and more importantly, it can 
identify surface patterns (which may be hidden from the naked eye of casual readers), to 
be explored more deeply through interpretive, theoretical, or normative legal analysis 
(Hall and Wright, 2008).   
Since one cannot assume that the sentencing reports capture accurately all the facts and 
rationales underlying the judges’ decisions, researchers do need to be cautious about the 
meanings they attach to the observations made through their analyses.  Nonetheless, the 
cases do lend themselves to theoretical exploration, despite their lack of generalizability 
to all sentencing decisions.  Furthermore, this methodological approach offers the most 
precise way of documenting what judges decide and how they explain their decisions.  As 
Hall and Wright (2008) argues “this method creates a vessel for exporting the analytical 
insights of legal scholars in a form that the rest of the social science world will treat 
seriously” (p. 122).  In this vein, this study sought to identify the factors that motivate 
judges upon sentencing by identifying themes within judicial decisions.  In essence, this 
study sought to examine what judges ‘do’; after all, as Hall and Wright (2008) argues, 
scholars study cases not simply because they reflect or respond to the law, but because 
they ‘are’ the law (p. 122).  
Table 3.4:  List of Variables 
Penal Populism Variables Description 
 
Legislation     
   
YOA, YCJA; YCJA post 2012 SSCA 
amendments 
 
Crown Sentence   
   
  
 
 
 
Court-Imposed Sentence  
Yes (custodial sentence was sought by the 
Crown); No (non-custodial sentence was 
sought by the Crown); or N/A (no 
specification of Crown’s recommendation 
of sentencing) 
 
Non-custodial sentence; custodial sentence 
 
Offence 
 
 
Sexual assault; physical assault 
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Focal Concern Variables 
 
Court-Imposed Sentence 
  
Level of Blameworthiness 
 
First-time offender (FTO) 
 
Offender’s Plea  
     
 
Non-custodial sentence; custodial sentence 
 
 
 
First-time offender, or repeat offender 
 
Guilty or Not Guilty 
 
Protection of Community 
 
Prospects for Rehabilitation   
     
   
 
Interim Custody 
 
 
Perceptual Shorthand 
 
Age  
 
 
Gender 
 
 
 
No mention; less favourable or poor 
prospects for rehabilitation, favourable or 
good prospects for rehabilitation  
 
No interim custody served; interim custody 
served 
 
 
 
Groupings:  11-15 year olds, 16-18 year 
olds, age not provided 
 
Males; females 
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Chapter 4  
4 Introduction 
This chapter addresses research questions one and two introduced in Chapter 3.  The 
results of the descriptive and simple quantitative  analyses performed to answer the two 
research questions will be presented.  Chapter 5 will present more detailed qualitative 
content analysis to answer the third research question about variations in sentencing 
outcomes within and across offence type.  In this chapter, I first provide an overview of 
the case characteristics from this sample of young offenders’ convicted of sexual and 
physical assault and sentenced in Ontario youth courts between the years 1993 and 2016.  
This overview includes a summary of offenders’ demographic characteristics (age and 
gender), the frequency of the physical offences and sexual offences, the frequency of 
decisions heard under the YOA, the YCJA, and the SSCA (the YCJA post the 2012 
amendments), the frequency of the Crown recommended sentences, interim custody, and 
court imposed sentence for the young offenders convicted.  I will then provide results of 
bivariate analyses that were conducted to examine research questions that have been 
guided by penal populism and focal concerns theory.  
4.1 Demographic Descriptives  
The sample, for this study, was comprised of 44 judicial cases, three of which dealt with 
multiple offenders, for a total of 54 offenders.  Of the 54 offenders, 26 (48.1%) were 
convicted and sentenced for physical assault and 28 (51.9%) were convicted and 
sentenced for sexual assault.  The decisions covered the time frame between 1993 and 
2016.  As noted in Chapter 3, throughout the remaining chapters, the terms judicial 
decisions, sentencing decisions, and cases are used interchangeably, as they relate to the 
results of this study.  
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 4.1.  The modal age of the full sample was 17 
(27.8%) years old, followed by 16 (22.2%) and 15 (14.8%) year olds, which was not 
surprising given the age-crime curve, which reveals that crimes are most prevalent during 
mid to late adolescence (Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990; Hirschi and Gottfredson, 1983).  
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These results are also consistent with Canada’s police-reported data which have 
consistently shown that crime rates tend to peak during late adolescence and early 
adulthood (Brennan, 2012; Alam, 2015: 6).  The results are also consistent with Canadian 
court data, which illustrate a similar trend (Brennan, 2012; Alam, 2015: 6).  For example, 
in 2013/2014 young offenders aged 16 and 17 continued to make up the largest 
proportion of accused persons, representing 62% of cases completed in youth court; 
youth 12 to 15 years old comprised 38% (Alam, 2015: 6).  Therefore, the offenders 
included in this sample fall within the age-crime-curve.   
Of the 54 young offenders included in this analysis, 48 offenders (88.9%) were male and 
6 were female offenders (11.1%).  This gender breakdown is not surprising given that 
research shows that males are arrested, charged, and convicted of more offences than 
females.  Females have lower arrest rates than males for all crime categories except 
prostitution (Tanner, 2001: 183; Canadian Crime Statistics, 1993).  In this sample, of the 
six female offenders included in this study, one (16.7%) was convicted of sexual assault 
and five (83.3%) were convicted of physical assault.  Of the 48 males, 21 (43.8%) were 
convicted of physical assault and 27 (56.3%) were convicted of sexual assault.  
Of the 54 young offenders sentenced, there were 42 (77.8%) first-time offenders in the 
sample and 12 (22.2%) were repeat offenders.  When criminal history data were 
provided, the previous offences listed for offenders convicted of physical assault included 
mischief under $5000, uttering threats, assault, theft, theft and mischief, property 
offences, and breaches of recognizance (R. v. JPG_GE, 1997; R. v. AS(2), 2013; R. v. 
KK, 2011; R. v. RB, 2010; R. v. SL, 2012).  In comparison, when criminal history was 
provided for offenders convicted of sexual assault they included prior sexual assaults, 
assault, weapons charges, trafficking drugs, and failing to comply with probation orders 
(R. v. AA, 2004; R. v. CC, 2002; R. v. KS, 1998; R. v. NP, 1998).   
Thirty-six (66.7%) young offenders pled guilty prior to their conviction and 18 (33.3%) 
pled not guilty.  Further, of the 54 cases, 30 (55.6%) offenders served interim (pre-trial) 
custody, 24 (44.4%) did not serve interim custody.   
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The Crown prosecutors recommended custodial sentences in 48 (88.9%) cases as 
compared to 2 (3.7%) cases wherein the Crown recommended a non-custodial sentence.  
There were 4 (7.4%) cases wherein there was no specification with regards to the 
recommended sentence by the Crown.  These descriptive results are not surprising given 
that the Crown is a ‘spokesperson for the community’, and may be, as was previously 
discussed, increasingly pressured by the public to take a more ‘get-tough-approach’ when 
handling young offenders. 
Of the 54 young offender cases, 13 (24.1%) decisions were heard under the YOA, 31 
(57.4%) were heard under the YCJA, and 10 (18.5%) were heard under the YCJA post 
2012 amendments.  Lastly, of the 54 cases, 43 (79.6%) of the young offenders in this 
sample received a custodial sentence as compared to 11 (20.4%) young offenders who 
did not receive a custodial sentence.   
Table 4.1:  Demographic Descriptives 
Variable    N             Percentage 
 
Gender    54   
Male    48      88.9 
 Female      6      11.1 
 
Legislation 
 YOA    13      24.1 
 YCJA    31      57.4 
 YCJA (2012)22             10      18.5 
 
Offence 
 Physical Assault  26      48.1 
    Males   21      80.8 
  Females    5      19.2 
 Sexual Assault  28      51.9 
  Males   27      96.4 
  Females    1        3.6 
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 YCJA post 2012 amendments 
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First Time Offender 
 Yes    42      77.8 
 No    12      22.2 
 
Plea 
 Guilty    36      66.7 
 Not Guilty   18      33.3 
 
Interim 
 Yes    30      55.6 
 No    24      44.4 
 
Crown Sentence 
 Yes    48      88.9 
 No      2        3.7 
 Not Applicable    4        7.4 
 
Custodial Sentence 
 Yes    43      79.6 
 No    11      20.4 
     
Age 
 12      2        3.7 
 13      4        7.4 
 14      4        7.4 
 15      8      14.8  
 16    12      22.2 
 17    15      27.8  
 Not Applicable23    9      16.7 
4.2 Penal Populism 
Drawing on penal populism, the first research question asked if there is evidence that 
Canada, in particular Ontario, has experienced a penal populist turn in regards to juvenile 
justice.  In particular, are judges taking a more punitive stance in sentencing young 
offenders convicted of violent offences, like sexual assault and physical assault? 
To determine whether judges are becoming more punitive as a result of legislative 
changes, I examined the sentencing outcomes of young offenders convicted of violent 
                                                 
23
 There were 9 judicial decisions in which the offender’s age, at the time of the offence, was not provided.   
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offences (sexual assault and physical assault) heard under the YOA, the YCJA (2003-
2012), or the YCJA (post the 2012 amendments).   
Table 4.2 shows, of the 54 young offenders included in this analysis, 13 (24.1%) 
decisions were heard under the YOA, 31 (57.4%) were heard under the YCJA and 10 
(18.5%) were heard under the SSCA (YCJA post the 2012 amendments).  Of the 13 
sentencing decisions heard under the YOA, over half (7) of the young offenders (53.8%) 
received custodial sentences.  Of the 31 sentencing decisions heard under the YCJA, 26 
(83.9%) offenders received custody.  Of the ten cases heard under the YCJA, post the 
2012 SSCA amendments, all ten (100%) offenders received a custodial sentence.  
As discussed in Chapter 1, under the YOA, there were a large number of youths being 
processed through the courts and placed in custody, often for non-violent offences (Bala 
and Anand, 2012; Bala, Carrington, and Roberts, 2009).  The YCJA, however, sought to 
reduce the role of courts and increased an emphasis on community involvement through 
extra-judicial measures (e.g., diversionary options and community-based sentences).  
Thus, while the results of this study may suggest that Canada, in particular Ontario, is 
taking a more punitive stance towards young offenders, this increase in custodial 
sentencing may reflect the success of extra-judicial measures under the YCJA, thereby 
resulting in a disproportionate number of serious violent offenders processed through the 
court system.  
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Table 4.2:  Court Imposed Sentence by Legislation 
 
Custody 
Yes No                           Total 
Act Young Offenders Act Count 7 6 13 
% within Act 53.8% 46.2% 100.0% 
% of Total 13.0% 11.1% 24.1% 
Youth Criminal Justice Act Count 26 5 31 
% within Act 83.9% 16.1% 100.0% 
% of Total 48.1% 9.3% 57.4% 
SSCA Count 10 0 10 
% within Act 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 18.5% 0.0% 18.5% 
Total Count 43 11 54 
% within Act 79.6% 20.4% 100.0% 
% of Total 79.6% 20.4% 100.0% 
To further examine whether judges are becoming more punitive as a result of legislative 
changes, I explored whether judges’ decisions were influenced by the Crown’s 
recommended sentence.  As I previously discussed in Chapter 2, the Crown prosecutor 
represents a symbol of authority and as such they act as a spokesperson for the 
community in criminal matters and may recommend a more punitive sentence.  Of the 54 
sentencing decisions, 89% (48) recommended a custodial sentence.  Content analyses 
suggest this was indeed the case.  For example, in R. v C.E. (2000), a sexual assault 
sentencing decision heard under the YOA, the crown counsel asked not only that CE be 
sentenced to a period of incarceration, but to a very lengthy period of incarceration of 
twelve to sixteen months (at para. 2).  The Crown based the submission partly on the 
following grounds of general deterrence (at para. 3) and stated “a message must be sent to 
the public that society will not countenance this behaviour, the Court will not 
countenance this behaviour, and the Court will take these offences seriously” (at para. 3).   
Thus, if the penal populism explanation holds, one would expect that the sentences 
imposed by the courts would be consistent with the Crown’s recommendation (a 
custodial sentence).  The bivariate table (see Table 4.3) shows, of the 48 cases in which 
the Crown recommended custody, a custodial sentence was received by 85.4% (41) of the 
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offenders; only 7 offenders (14.6%) did not receive a custodial sentence when one was 
recommended was the Crown.  These results may suggest that judges may be influenced 
by the Crown’s recommendation.   
To explore this finding further, I analyzed the judges’ sentencing rationales.  In these 
decisions, there was little discussion by the courts of the Crown’s recommendation 
(either in support of or against).  There were two particular cases, however, wherein the 
judge did make reference to supporting the Crown’s position.  First, in R. v. A.R. (2008), 
a physical assault case heard under the YCJA, the Crown recommended a six month 
custodial and community supervision sentence on the grounds that there was a negative 
pre-sentence report that described AR as not making any significant changes to her life 
(at para. 4).  AR was not in school and had not pursued full time employment because she 
feared her wages would be garnished if she were to be sued by the victim.  AR did have 
strong family support; however, she claimed to be using drugs to forget her problems and 
had subsequently stopped attending a local drug treatment day program.  The judge when 
imposing the sentence concluded that the sentence proposed by the Crown was both 
required and appropriate (at para. 8).  Furthermore, the judge agreed with the Crown that 
the activities involved in the offence were extremely reckless and inherently dangerous.  
Thus, a custodial period was clearly required and in the judge’s opinion it would provide 
the structure and rehabilitation that AR needed and had failed to obtain in the year prior 
to her sentencing (at para. 8).   
The second case, R. v. J.J.A. (2012), was a sexual assault case heard under the YCJA.  
The judge upon sentencing concluded that a custodial disposition was consistent with the 
sentencing regime in the YCJA (at para. 19).  Furthermore, the judge stated “I agree with 
the range of sentence advanced by the Crown – it is a measured response to the offence 
and the offender” (at para. 19).   
These cases, while informative, do not provide clear support for penal populism.  Upon 
further exploration, there were but two cases wherein the judge made clear and explicit 
reference to supporting the recommendations put forward by the Crown.  Secondly, the 
judge’s rationale did not specifically make reference to meeting public demands for 
harsher punishments.  In the first case, R. v A.R. (2008), the judge in considering the 
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‘appropriate sentence’ placed more emphasis on rehabilitation.  In the second case, R. v 
J.J.A. (2012), the judge emphasized proportionality, the punishment fitting the crime.   
Table 4.3:  Court Imposed Sentence by Crown Recommended Sentence24 
 
Custody 
Total Yes No 
Crown 
Yes 
Count 41 7 48 
% within Crown Sentence 85.4% 14.6% 100.0% 
% of Total 82.0% 14.0% 96.0% 
No 
Count 1 1 2 
% within Crown Sentence 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 2.0% 2.0% 4.0% 
Total 
Count 42 8 50 
To further examine penal populism, bivariate analyses were conducted to examine the 
relationship between offence and the court-imposed sentence.  Penal populist theory 
suggests that the sexual assault offenders would be expected to receive harsher sentences 
than the physical assault offenders as the public deems sexual assault the more egregious 
offence (Roberts et al., 2003). Table 4.4 shows that, of the 28 physical assault offenders 
in this sample 24 (92.3%) received a custodial sentence.  There were 24 sexual assault 
decisions of which 19 (67.9%) received a custodial sentence.  Therefore, a higher 
percentage of young offenders convicted of physical assault received a custodial sentence 
compared to the young offenders who were charged with sexual assault.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24
 Data was missing for some cases and these were excluded from the analysis.   
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Table 4.4:  Court Imposed Sentence by Offence 
 
Custody 
Total Yes No 
Offence Physical Assault Count 24 2 26 
% within Offence 92.3% 7.7% 100.0% 
% of Total 44.4% 3.7% 48.1% 
Sexual Assault Count 19 9 28 
% within Offence 67.9% 32.1% 100.0% 
% of Total 35.2% 16.7% 51.9% 
Total Count 43 11 54 
% within Offence 79.6% 20.4% 100.0% 
% of Total 79.6% 20.4% 100.0% 
4.2.1 Penal Populism Summary 
Overall, the findings provide limited support for the penal populism theory of sentencing.  
On the one hand, there is some evidence that, at least in this non-representative sample, 
penalties for violent offences have become harsher both, post the 2012 (SSCA) 
amendments and under the YCJA (2003-2012) compared to the YOA.  These results may 
suggest that Canada, in particular Ontario, is taking a more punitive stance towards 
young offenders; however, this increase in custodial sentences may reflect the success of 
extra-judicial measures under the YCJA, thereby resulting in the serious violent offenders 
being processed through the court system.  There was no evidence to support the 
hypothesis that judges adopt the harsher sentences advocated by the crown.  Furthermore, 
if we look more closely at judges’ sentencing decisions, harsher sentences are often 
justified with reference to rehabilitation and other factors (e.g., retribution).  It is not 
entirely clear that the harsh sentences are intended to punish or to ‘get–tough’ on crime 
(the justifications provided by judges are explored in more detail later in Chapter 5).  
Last, it is not the case that sexual assault offenders receive harsher sentences than 
physical assault offenders, despite the public’s negative reaction to these crimes.  Thus, it 
would appear from the results of this study that Ontario youth court judges are not 
becoming more punitive as a result of legislative changes in Canada.  Further, the results 
may indicate the success of the YCJA in reducing the number of minor offences being 
processed through the judicial system.   
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4.3 Focal Concerns Theory 
Drawing on focal concerns theory, the second research question asks:  Do legal decisions, 
as they relate to the type (custodial versus non-custodial) of sentencing within the Ontario 
youth justice system, reflect an offender’s level of blameworthiness and need for 
protection of the public? And, can extralegal factors, such as age and gender explain 
disparities in sentencing?  
To answer this question, I first conducted bivariate analyses to examine the relationship 
between offender’s criminal history (as reflected by whether an offender was a first-time 
or repeat offender) and the sentence imposed by the court.  It was inferred that first-time 
offenders would be viewed as less blameworthy than repeat offenders.  The results in 
Table 4.5 show that of the 42 first-time offenders, 34 (81%) of the offenders received a 
custodial sentence.  Similarly, of the 12 repeat offenders, 9 (63%) received a custodial 
sentence.   
Table 4.5:  Court Imposed Sentence by Offenders' Criminal History 
 
Custody Total 
Yes No  
FTO Yes Count 34 8 42 
% within FTO 81.0% 19.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 63.0% 14.8% 77.8% 
No Count 9 3 12 
% within FTO 75.0% 25.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 16.7% 5.6% 22.2% 
Total Count 43 11 54 
% within FTO 79.6% 20.4% 100.0% 
% of Total 79.6% 20.4% 100.0% 
The second variable I created to assess the level of blameworthiness was ‘offender’s 
plea’ which was taken as a measure of the level of remorse expressed by the offender.  
Offenders who plead guilty, may be seen as more remorseful and therefore judges might 
perceive them as being less blameworthy, resulting in a lighter (non-custodial) sentence.  
Table 4.6 shows that of the 36 offenders who pled guilty to an offence of either sexual 
assault or physical assault, 30 (83.3%) were sentenced to custody.  Comparatively, of the 
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18 offenders, included in this study, who pled not guilty to either a sexual assault or 
physical assault, 13 (72.2%) were sentenced to custody.  
Table 4.6:  Court Imposed Sentence by Offender's Plea 
 
Custody 
Total Yes No 
Plea Guilt Count 30 6 36 
% within Plea 83.3% 16.7% 100.0% 
% of Total 55.6% 11.1% 66.7% 
Not Guilty Count 13 5 18 
% within Plea 72.2% 27.8% 100.0% 
% of Total 24.1% 9.3% 33.3% 
Total Count 43 11 54 
% within Plea 79.6% 20.4% 100.0% 
% of Total 79.6% 20.4% 100.0% 
The third variable measures the level of blameworthiness by offence, which represents 
sexual assault and physical assault.  Since both physical assault and sexual assault are 
defined as violent offences against persons under the Criminal Code, the YOA, and the 
YCJA, focal concerns theory would lead us to expect that there would be no difference in 
the judge’s perceptions concerning offenders’ level of blameworthiness or seriousness of 
the offence.  In other words, the court imposed sentences for the sample included in this 
study, should be similar.  As Table 4.4 showed, a higher percentage of offenders 
convicted of physical assault received harsher sentences than those convicted of sexual 
assault, which runs counter to focal concerns theory.   
Focal concerns theory also proposes that judges often have limited information to 
accurately determine the level of dangerousness, culpability, and likelihood for 
recidivism and as such develop, a ‘perceptual shorthand’, which is based on stereotypes 
and attributions linked to an offender’s age and gender (Hartley et al., 2007; 
Steffensmeier et al., 1998; Steffensmeier, Kramer, and Streifel, 1993; Steffensmeier, 
Ulmer, and Kramer, 1998).  This perceptual shorthand can explain disparities in 
sentencing and often leads to discriminatory practices by the judiciary. Unfortunately, 
there were too few females in this study to conduct a proper comparison.  As Table 4.7 
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shows, of the 6 females in this sample, 4 (66.7%) females received a custodial sentence 
compared to 39 (81.3%) of the 43 of males.  
Table 4.5:  Court Imposed Sentence by Gender 
 
Custody Total 
Yes No  
Gender Male Count 39 9 48 
% within Gender 81.3% 18.8% 100.0% 
% of Total 72.2% 16.7% 88.9% 
Female Count 4 2 6 
% within Gender 66.7% 33.3% 100.0% 
% of Total 7.4% 3.7% 11.1% 
Total Count 43 11 54 
% within Gender 79.6% 20.4% 100.0% 
% of Total 79.6% 20.4% 100.0% 
Table 4.8 presents the bivariate analyses for sentencing outcomes by age-group.  While 
young offenders are viewed as less blameworthy than adults, drawing on focal concerns 
theory and the age-crime curve, one could expect that the younger offenders (12-15 year 
olds) would be perceived as less blameworthy than the “older” (16-17 year olds) younger 
offenders and would therefore receive a less punitive sentence (e.g., probation).  As the 
table shows, 15 (83.3%) of the twelve to fifteen year olds in the sample received a 
custodial sentence.  Similarly, 21 (77.8%) of the offenders aged 16 and 17 years old 
received a custodial sentence.  
 
 
 
 
Table 4.6:  Court Imposed Sentence by Age 
 
Custody 
Yes 
No Custody 
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AgeGroup 12-15 Count 15 3 18 
% within AgeGroup 83.3% 16.7% 100.0% 
% of Total 33.3% 6.7% 40.0% 
16-17 Count 21 6 27 
% within AgeGroup 77.8% 22.2% 100.0% 
% of Total 46.7% 13.3% 60.0% 
Total Count 36 9 45 
% of Total 80.0% 20.0% 100.0% 
With respect to the second focal concern ‘protection of the community’, I used two 
variables:  interim custody and prospects for rehabilitation.  Drawing on focal concerns 
theory, it was expected that a higher percentage of young offenders who served interim 
custody would receive a custodial sentence, as they would be the offenders perceived by 
the courts as being a risk to the community.  Table 4.9 looks at interim custody by 
sentencing outcome and the results revealed that of the 30 offenders who served interim 
custody, 24 (80%) received a custodial sentence.  Of the 24 young offenders who did not 
serve interim custody, 19 (79.2%) received a custodial sentence.  
Table 4.7:  Court Imposed Sentence by Interim Custody 
 
Custody Total 
Yes No  
Interim No Count 19 5 24 
% within Interim 79.2% 20.8% 100.0% 
% of Total 35.2% 9.3% 44.4% 
Yes Count 24 6 30 
% within Interim 80.0% 20.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 44.4% 11.1% 55.6% 
Total Count 43 11 54 
% of Total 79.6% 20.4% 100.0% 
 
I next assessed the significance of offenders’ prospects for rehabilitation and sentencing 
outcomes.  Drawing on focal concerns theory, it was inferred in this study, that offenders 
who have poor or less favourable prospects for rehabilitation would be perceived by the 
courts as posing a greater risk to the community.  As such, it would be expected that a 
higher percentage of young offenders, assessed as having poor or less favourable 
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prospects for rehabilitation, would receive a more punitive sentence (custody).  
Comparatively, the offenders who are perceived as having favourable prospects for 
rehabilitation would be viewed as posing less of a risk to the community and as such 
would receive a less punitive sentence (probation).  The results presented in Table 4.10 
show that of the 29 young offenders who were perceived by the court as having 
favourable or good prospects for rehabilitation, 23 (79.3%) received a custodial sentence.  
Of the 18 young offenders who were perceived as having less favourable prospects for 
rehabilitation, 15 (83.3%) received a custodial sentence.  To the extent that offenders’ 
prospects for rehabilitation reflect the level of risk they pose to the public, focal concerns 
theory is not supported here.   
It should be noted that in about 89% of the cases, judges commented on an offender’s 
rehabilitation prospects.  There were six cases (3 sexual assault and 3 physical assault) 
for which I was unable to clearly identify the courts’ perceptions with regards to an 
offender’s prospects for rehabilitation.  These cases were excluded from the analysis 
shown in Table 4.10.  
Table 8:  Court Imposed Sentence by Prospects for Rehabilitation                                                                                      
          Custody 
 Yes No Total 
Rehabilitative 
Prospects 
Favourable Count 23 6 29 
% within Rehabilitative 79.3% 20.7% 100.0% 
% of Total 43.4% 11.3% 54.7% 
Not Favourable Count 15 3 18 
% within Rehabilitative  83.3% 16.7% 100.0% 
% of Total 28.3% 5.7% 3.7% 
Total Count 38 9 47 
% of Total 80.9% 19.1% 100.0% 
4.3.1 Summary Results:  Focal Concerns Theory  
To summarize, my analyses provides no empirical support for focal concerns theory.  
First time offenders and those who pled guilty received comparable sentences to those 
who were repeat offenders and did not plead guilty.  Similarly, offenders who are 
perceived as having better prospects for rehabilitation received comparable sentences to 
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those who are perceived as having poor or less favourable prospects for rehabilitation.  In 
addition, focal concerns theory would lead us to expect no difference in sentencing 
between the two offences, but the results revealed a higher percentage of physical assault 
offenders received a custodial sentence as compared to the sexual assault offenders.   
4.4 Chapter Summary 
This chapter presented the results of the descriptive and simple quantitative analyses 
conducted to answer my first two research questions, which examined the focal concerns 
and penal populist theories of sentencing.  These analyses provide, at best, only limited 
support for penal populism and no support for focal concerns theory.  For instance, in 
support of penal populism, there was some evidence that the penalties for violent 
offences may have become harsher under the YCJA and post the 2012 amendments to the 
YCJA, than under the YOA.  However, it should be noted that the results may reflect the 
success of extrajudicial measures under the YCJA.  It is not clear that judges simply 
follow the recommendations of the Crown when sentencing.  Furthermore, the content of 
sentencing decisions never referenced penal populists beliefs.  In addition, while penal 
populists suggest that the sexual assault offenders would be expected to receive harsher 
sentences compared to the physical assault offenders, the results showed the contrary.  As 
such, the results would suggest that Canada, in particular the province of Ontario, has not 
adopted a penal populist agenda.  
The results provided no empirical support for focal concerns theory in that there was no 
relationship between the court-imposed sentence and the court’s perception of an 
offender’s level of blameworthiness, as measured by criminal history and offenders’ plea.  
Further, offenders who were perceived as having favourable prospects for rehabilitation 
were no more likely to receive a custodial sentence than those perceived as having less 
favourable prospects.  It also appears from the results, that contrary to the argument that 
sexual assault and physical assault are not viewed as similar in severity (in terms of the 
legislative definition and corresponding sentencing ranges), as this study found that a 
higher percentage of physical assault offenders received custodial sentences as compared 
to the sexual assault offenders.   
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The following chapter focuses on this surprising finding.  Using content analysis, I 
answer the third research question:  Is there evidence of variations in sentencing 
rationales provided by judges upon sentencing within and across offence (physical and 
sexual assault) type?  To answer this question, I explore whether the sentencing rationales 
provided by judges upon sentencing varies within and across offence (physical assault 
and sexual assault) type?  In particular, I seek to account for the differences in sentencing 
outcome between the physical assault cases and the sexual assault cases.     
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Chapter 5 
5 Introduction 
The results, as presented in Chapter 4, provided no empirical support for focal concerns 
theory.  However, an interesting finding did reveal itself in the bivariate tables.  Recall 
that under the Criminal Code of Canada, sexual assault (level 1 and level 2) and physical 
assault (level 2 and level 3) are defined as being of equal severity as measured by the 
sentences available upon convictions.  Hence, it was proposed that the courts would 
perceive physical assault as no more severe than sexual assault, and as such the sentence 
received for each would be similar.  Analyses presented in chapter 4, however, showed 
that a higher percentage of physical assault offenders (92%) received a more punitive, 
custodial sentence than the sexual assault offenders (68%).  Also surprising – and 
inconsistent with focal concerns theory – is the finding that 79% of young offenders who 
were perceived by the courts as having favourable prospects received a custodial sentence 
and, similarly, 83% of those with poor prospects for rehabilitation received a custodial 
sentence. In line with focal concerns theory, it was expected that those with poorer 
prospects for rehabilitation would be seen as a greater threat to the community, and hence 
would be more likely to receive a custodial sentence; however, the results did not support 
this assumption.  
This chapter focuses on these surprising findings and seeks to answer research question 3, 
is there evidence that the sentencing rationales provided by judges upon sentencing, vary 
within and across offence type?  To answer this question I report the findings of an in-
depth content analysis of sentencing decisions.  Why have a higher percentage of young 
offenders convicted of physical assault received a custodial sentence as compared to 
those convicted of sexual assault?  What rationales do judges provide for their sentencing 
decisions?  In seeking explanations, I draw on Focal Concerns Theory and return to the 
principles of sentencing that underlie youth justice legislation, especially, responsibility, 
accountability, and rehabilitation.  Specifically, I consider whether the differences in 
sentencing within and across offence (physical and sexual assault) type are explained by 
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differences in prospects for rehabilitation or whether other factors, such as accountability, 
weigh on judges’ minds.  
In earlier chapters, I outlined the Principles of the YOA and the YCJA, which identify 
rehabilitation as being a guiding principle upon sentencing:  it is believed that many 
youths can be reformed and returned to the community.  Nonetheless, rehabilitation 
cannot be the sole focus for legal intervention, as the courts must also take into account 
the protection of the public by imposing a meaningful consequence to foster 
responsibility and accountability.  The YCJA states these principles more succinctly.  As 
stated in the Preamble, Canada should have a youth criminal justice system that fosters 
responsibility and ensures accountability through meaningful consequences and effective 
rehabilitation and reintegration into the community (YCJA, 2003).  In this manner, when 
sentencing young offenders, judges should consider responsibility, accountability, 
rehabilitation, and reintegration into the community, under the YOA and the YCJA.   
To explore the significance of these considerations to sentencing outcomes, in this 
chapter I first present the results of the word query analysis (discussed in Chapter 3).  
Next, I explore whether the differences in sentencing within and across type of offence 
are explained by rehabilitative prospects.  Particularly, were the offenders convicted of 
sexual assault perceived as more likely to be rehabilitated than their physical assault 
counterparts?  In the next, main, section of the chapter, I present ten case summaries, 
detailing the sentencing rationales provided by judges.  I chose these specific ten case 
summaries as they provide the necessary information to give the reader a detailed, 
meaningful, and representative illustration of the research findings more broadly.  These 
cases, not only illustrate the disparities both within and across sentencing, but 
also provide insight into the judicial disposition process for young offenders.  Further, 
they provide a representative illustration of the 'general' two-step process (discussed in 
section 5.5 of this study) that captures or illuminates the process of sentencing and the 
factors that judges consider upon sentencing.    
The ten cases include five physical assault and five sexual assault sentencing decisions.  I 
also discuss the content of these decisions to illustrate the factors and considerations that 
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shape sentencing and provide possible explanations for sentencing disparities within 
offence type.  Lastly, I provide three possible explanations for sentencing disparities 
across offence type.  Ultimately, I argue that focal concerns theory’s emphasis on 
‘protection of the community’, under the guise of rehabilitation, was the prominent 
consideration upon sentencing young offenders.  Thus, while there is much disparity in 
sentencing practices and considerations shaping sentencing are complex, they are 
generally consistent with focal concerns theory.   
5.1 Word Query Analysis  
Taking into account the sentencing principles guiding the YOA and the YCJA 
(responsibility, accountability, rehabilitation, and reintegration), I ran word queries using 
NVivo, to determine the number of times these words were used, where in the decisions 
these terms were located, and whether such principles weigh upon judges’ mind upon 
sentencing.  The term accountability, which included the stemmed word accountable, 
occurred 130 times in the physical assault decisions and 95 times in the sexual assault 
decisions.  The term responsibility, which included the stemmed words responsible, 
responsibilities, and responsibly, occurred 131 times in the physical assault decisions and 
97 times in the sexual assault decisions.  The term rehabilitation, which included 
stemmed words rehabilitate, rehabilitated, and rehabilitative, occurred 181 times in the 
physical assault cases and 276 within the sexual assault cases.  Lastly, the term 
reintegration, which included the stemmed words reintegrate and reintegrates, occurred 
68 times in the physical assault decisions and 52 times in the sexual assault decisions.   
It would appear from the word queries that rehabilitation was a major focus in sentencing 
decisions.  Accountability and responsibility were also important considerations with 
reintegration being relevant but not emphasized as much as the other terms.  Although 
this word query analysis is informative, highlighting the centrality of rehabilitation to 
youth court judges’ decision-making, its significance should not be overstated.  Several 
sentencing decisions simply cited or quoted from youth justice legislation, repeating the 
key terms to remind the court of the principles embedded in the legislation.  Nevertheless, 
the word queries were helpful in that the query located wordings within the decisions, 
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and thereby facilitated further exploration as to how these terms were used, and what 
meanings were attached to them.  
5.2 Rehabilitation and Offence Type  
Since the word ‘rehabilitation’ was mentioned more often in the sexual assault cases, it 
was anticipated that the sexual assault offenders might be seen as having higher prospects 
for rehabilitation.  Conversely, it was expected that physical assault offenders would have 
lower prospects for rehabilitation, thus leading to higher rates of incarceration.  To 
determine if rehabilitative prospects explain the differences across offence type, I 
conducted a bivariate analysis.  The findings reported in Table 5.1 are counter to 
expectations.  A higher percentage of offenders convicted of physical assault (62%) were 
perceived by the courts as having favourable prospects of rehabilitation, compared to the 
offenders who were convicted of sexual assault (46 %), as reported in Table 5.1.  These 
findings are consistent with those reported in Table 4.10 (reported in Chapter 4) which 
showed that differences in sentencing outcomes were not dependent on rehabilitation 
prospects, and in fact hinted that those with favourable prospects for rehabilitation might 
be more likely to receive a custodial sentence than those with poorer prospects.   
Table 5.1:  Offence by Prospects for Rehabilitation 
Offence 
Physical 
Assault 
Sexual 
Assault                           Total 
Rehab Favourable Prospects for 
Rehabilitation 
Count               16 13 29 
% within Offence 61.5% 46.4% 53.7% 
Less Favourable Prospects 
for Rehabilitation 
Count 7 12 19 
% within Offence 26.9% 42.9% 35.2% 
Total Count 23 25 48 
% of Total 47.9% 52.1% 100.0% 
Thus, although word queries and initial bivariate analyses suggest that rehabilitation, 
along with accountability and responsibility, are important considerations in sentencing 
decisions, their impact is not straightforward.  It is not clear how these considerations 
shape differential sentencing outcomes by offence type.  To understand the significance 
of these considerations, a closer look at the sentencing decisions is required.   
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In the following section, I present detailed summaries of the cases, highlighting their key 
elements to illustrate the disparity in sentences imposed for physical assault and sexual 
assault in youth court cases. 
5.3 Sample of Physical Assault Cases and Sentencing 
Of the 26 physical assault offenders, 14 (54%) offenders received a secure/closed 
custodial sentence that would be followed by open custody and/or probation, 10 (38%) 
received an open custodial sentence followed by probation, and only two (8%) received a 
non-custodial (probation) sentence.  These differences illustrate a disparity in sentences 
imposed for physical assault convictions of young offenders.  This section provides 
detailed summaries of five sentencing decisions to illustrate the significance of 
rehabilitation within offences type (physical assault).   At the end of this section, I 
highlight the importance of rehabilitation prospects and accountability to the sentencing 
decisions.  
 
5.3.1 Case 1:  R. v. D.G.J. (2008) 
In R. v. D.G.J. (2008), D.G.J. was convicted of five counts each of aggravated assault and 
the discharging of a firearm.  Five victims suffered serious bodily harm as a result of 
gunshot wounds.  DGJ was also convicted of one count of conspiring to commit 
aggravated assault and a series of firearm charges (e.g., possession of a restricted 
weapon; possession of a firearm without a license) (at para. 3).  DGJ was 17 years old at 
the time of the offence.  This was his first offence and he pled not guilty.     
 
The court determined that DGJ was the ‘prime mover’ in this offence:  “this must be 
stressed from the outset. Mr. D.G.J. was found to be the prime mover in this operation” 
(at para. 6).  The court found that DGJ had arranged for the acquisition and disposal of 
the firearms and ammunition as well as contracting the transportation needed to move the 
other individuals involved in the offence.  Following the shooting, DGJ skillfully 
managed the escape of all involved (at para. 6).  The judge stated “these are serious 
  113 
offences that threatened the sanctity of life and the general safety of the community and 
this young man is fully responsible for what occurred that night” (at para. 11). 
 
Five people were shot and as stated by the court and “only by an Act of Providence was 
anyone not killed” (at para. 7).  One round of ammunition found its way into a residential 
dwelling.  No one was harmed; however, the court could only wonder “as to what would 
have occurred if someone had been in its path” (at para. 7). The injuries of each of the 
victims were not life threatening and it was expected they would make substantial 
recovery with time (at para. 7).  Regardless, as stated by the judge, DGJ had 
displayed a total disregard for human life . . . and he has learned little or nothing 
from that experience.  He is quite capable of performing the cold act of planning 
the shooting of another human being and not caring if people other than his target 
find themselves in the line of fire (at para. 11). 
The judge considered DGJ’s pre-sentence report, which described DGJ as a young man 
who had a stable upbringing, nurtured by attentive and caring parents and siblings.  He 
was not performing at a level forecasted by his intellectual potential and instead 
displayed undisciplined and confrontational tendencies.  The judge, further, noted that 
DGJ did not accept ‘responsibility’ for what had occurred the evening of the events and 
maintained that he was innocent of any wrongdoing, a position that DGJ took in face of 
the overwhelming evidence presented to support the findings of guilt (at para. 8-9).   
The court in considering whether to impose a custodial sentence referenced the principles 
of sentencing, which state the YCJA “aims to hold young people accountable for their 
actions with meaningful consequences that will impose the least restrictions on the 
youth’s liberty and freedoms while ensuring his rehabilitation and reintegration into 
society” (at para. 10).  In addition, “a Court must consider all sentencing alternatives 
short of incarceration before ordering the loss of a youth’s liberty, and if incarceration is 
in order, the Court must explain why it was necessary to do so” (at para. 10). The court 
considered the principles along with DGJ’s behavior during the pre-sentence trial period 
and concluded that DGJ’s prospects for rehabilitation were favourable.  In the judge’s 
words, “it is of note that his behavior and attitude towards legitimate authority has 
  114 
improved since the time he has been at Brookside. He is a person of great potential, 
heretofore wasting” (at para. 12).   
Upon sentencing the judge stated “nothing short of incarceration will bring home to this 
young man the seriousness of his actions, nor will anything short of incarceration ensure 
his rehabilitation and safe reintegration into society” (at para. 12).  In addition, 
“incarceration will ensure that his potential will be well on its way to being fully realized 
by the time he is released” (at para. 12).  Given that the maximum sentence inclusive of 
probation that can be imposed by the court was 3 years, DGJ was sentenced to 12 months 
secure custody and credited 5.5 months for his time spent in pre-sentence custody (at 
Brookside).  The secure custodial sentence was to be followed by 10 months custody and 
supervision and a subsequent period of 12 months of probation.   
5.3.2 Case 2: R. v. A.S. (2013)  
In the case R. v. A.S. (2013), ZN was one of four offenders involved in a ‘brutal attack’ 
on two victims (AK and NK) (at paras. 1-5).  ZN was 17 years old at the time of the 
offence and had pled guilty to three offences:  assault with a weapon (a machete) against 
AK, aggravated assault against AK, and aggravated assault against NK.   
The events had taken place during a birthday party.  AK and NK had stopped by the 
birthday party to hang out with friends and while standing in the mall outside of the 
banquet hall, where the party was being held, AK and NK were attacked by four young 
persons, one of which was ZN.  The injuries NK suffered from the assault included: a 
gash (10 cm long and 5 cm wide requiring 14 staples), a fracture to his forearm, a gash 
near his knee (8 cm long, 4 cm wide and 3 cm deep), required 13 staples, and a 2 cm gash 
to his eyebrow.  AK suffered a machete slice to the back of his neck which measured 10 
cm long, 8 cm wide, 5 cm deep and required 5 stitches and 10 staples.  In addition, the 
cut to the back of his neck was within an inch of AK’s spinal cord and was deep enough 
to expose his spine, leaving AK unable to move for a month after the attack.  He also 
suffered gashes to his leg, a 5 cm long, 4 cm wide, 4 cm deep cut that required 5 staples 
and a cut to his lower leg that needed 2 stitches (paras. 2-11).   
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In determining ZN’s role in the offence, the court found ZN to be “the primary assailant 
and by far the most culpable of the four young persons” (at para. 15).  ZN had been the 
only one who wielded the machete and he inflicted the gravest wounds.  In addition, it 
was determined from a surveillance video that it was ZN’s chain of decisions, such as his 
running to his car, returning with his machete and hacking both victims over and over 
again that recalibrated this incident from a group attack into a brutal, terrifying assault 
that resulted in devastating injuries (at para. 15).  The judge further stated “not only did 
ZN bring the machete into the scene, but he wielded it with such vicious force that he 
broke N.K’s arm and slashed A.K’s neck literally to the bone” (at para. 15).  As such, the 
court found that not only was it ZN’s weapon that inflicted the most grievous harm, but it 
was also ZN’s brutality that was the engine that drove the attack.  It was ZN, not the other 
offenders involved, who directed the full fury of his violence at both AK and NK (at para. 
15).  
The judge considered ZN’s pre-sentence report, which illustrated ZN’s expression of 
remorse.  ZN had also written letters of apology to both the victims and the two witnesses 
who attempted to stop the attack (at para 18).  He had repeated the apology in court 
stating that “he was sorry to everyone affected by the incident, would take it back if he 
could and has learned from his mistake” (at para. 18).  He also expressed profound 
remorse for the impact the offences had on his mother (at para. 19).   
ZN was reported to have a loving and supportive family, he was close to his parents but 
had damaged the relationship, especially with his father, as a result of his oppositional 
and now criminal behavior (at para. 19).  Since being in pre-sentence custody, Z.N. had 
completed his high school diploma and planned to go to university, which in the court’s 
view demonstrated ZN’s aptitude, commitment and ability to follow through with plans 
and to do well (at para. 21).  
ZN along with the other three offenders involved pled guilty to the offence, which 
demonstrated their remorse and acknowledgement of responsibility to the court and pre-
empted the victims from having to testify again at trial (at para. 57).  The guilty pleas, 
however, had not been entered until the end of a lengthy preliminary inquiry and only 
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after two victims and two civilians (witnesses) had provided evidence.  Nevertheless, the 
court was of the view that the four offenders had acknowledged their culpability and were 
seeking to be held accountable for their crimes (at para. 57).  This was viewed by the 
court as a major step towards fulfilling the objectives of the YCJA; all four (including 
ZN) were initiating and taking ownership of their rehabilitation process (at para. 58).   
Upon sentencing, the judge noted that ZN had already spent 14 months and 11 days in 
secure, pre-sentence custody and during this time he had made impressive progress, and 
had taken advantage of the programs and resources that were available to him.  For 
example, the judge commented,  
in my view, Z.N.’s growth and maturation since this offence illustrate that he has 
the strength and character to accomplish his personal goals and to become a fine 
man and citizen.  Moreover, I believe that he has the capacity to turn this 
experience and his pivotal, reprehensible role in these grave offences into a source 
of wisdom, empathy, and renewal.  Whether or how he makes use of all that he 
has learned since July 29, 2012 [day of offence] remains to be seen.  The choice is 
his (at para. 23).   
 
As such, he was credited 21 months and 17 days for time served in pre-sentence custody 
and was sentenced to an additional 21 days of open custody and supervision followed by 
14 months of probation (at para. 105).  
5.3.3 Case 3: R. v. M.A.Z. (2013) 
R. v. M.A.Z. (2013) was a physical assault case heard under the YCJA, post the 2012 
amendments, which permitted “a Court to consider deterrence and denunciation as factors 
on sentencing” (at para. 12).  MAZ pled guilty to aggravated assault, assault with a 
weapon and failing to comply with a recognizance (at para. 1).  
After school, two victims (AN and BL) were outside a library having a cigarette when a 
car pulled up, driven by three males (MAZ and two other males).  The three males exited 
the car and approached AN and BL.  MAZ said to AN “why are you fucking with my 
cousin” at which point he proceeded to strike AN, who fell to the ground.  MAZ along 
with a second offender (HB) both punched and kicked AN.  The second victim, BL, made 
attempts to stop the attack although he was unsuccessful as MAZ had pulled out a knife 
and begun stabbing AN.  AN was stabbed four times in the torso but since he was 
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wearing a down filled jacket and was moving backwards during the attack he had avoided 
being cut.  MAZ proceeded to walk over to BL and began stabbing him in the chest.  
After stabbing BL, the three males all fled in the car (at para. 5-6) 
The judge made reference not only to the seriousness of the offence but also the harm and 
impact the offence had on the victims stating, “the harm caused to the victims was 
serious” (at para. 32).  While AN had not been physically injured, BL had been stabbed 
in the upper chest and this had punctured and collapsed his lung.  In addition, a tendon in 
BL’s hand was severed which resulted in him spending three days in the hospital, 
requiring surgery and physiotherapy (at para 7-9).   
The judge was of the view that there are “many aggravating features of this case” (at 
para. 22).  For example, “this was a very violent attack” (at para. 23).  Not only was the 
weapon concealed and then used but the attack “was clearly premeditated” (at para. 23).  
MAZ had come looking for his victims for the purpose of attacking and stabbing AN and 
BL with both being stabbed multiple times.  There were multiple attackers and it was 
“over the most trivial of slights” (at para. 23).  In addition, MAZ had accepted extra-
judicial sanctions on the day of the attack and was on recognizance (for an earlier offence 
that was not discussed in this decision) which was “very aggravating” (at para. 23).  
Lastly, the concealed weapon in the earlier charge was a knife all of which added to the 
aggravating factors (at para. 23).  The mitigating factors were that MAZ had pled guilty 
and he was still young and had no prior records.   
MAZ had served 229 days pre-trial custody and according to his pre-sentence report 
MAZ was admitted to the Roy McMurtry detention center.  While he had acted 
appropriately at first, less than a month later, he was involved in an altercation.  Four 
months later there was another more serious incident wherein MAZ and another youth 
were involved in an attack on a corrections officer (at para. 20).   
Upon sentencing the judge stated “the need to hold M.A.Z. ‘accountable’ is great. And 
that determination is made before any consideration of the need for specific deterrence or 
denunciation.  M.A.Z. needs to be specifically deterred from committing further 
offences” (at paras. 34-35).  The judge was further of the view that MAZ was not ready 
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for open custody as indicated by his prior conduct while serving pre-sentence custody, 
which demonstrated that he continued to need to be controlled for the safety of others (at 
para. 42). The judge was of the view that it would be in MAZ’s interests to return to 
school in September, and if he successfully reintegrated into society, it would be in the 
public’s interest as well, all of which would promote his rehabilitation and would 
contribute to the protection of society (at para. 42).  MAZ was sentenced to a further two 
months secure custody, followed by six months of open custody that would be followed 
by four months supervision and one year probation (at para. 44).   
5.3.3.1 Brief Summary 
Case 1 (DGJ), Case 2 (ZN) and Case 3 (MAZ) dealt with physical assault cases, all of 
which involved the use of weapons with the victims suffering significant injuries.  The 
disparity in sentencing outcomes appears to reflect the court’s view of the offenders’ 
behavior after the offence, and their level of culpability as measured by their level of 
remorse expressed, in addition to their prospects for rehabilitation.  For example, DGJ 
was not remorseful, and appeared defiant and uncooperative during pre-sentence custody; 
however, the court perceived him as a ‘person of great potential’, therefore, having 
favourable prospects for rehabilitation.  Given the seriousness of the offence (use of 
firearm), his lack of remorse, and the risk to the victims as well as those who had been in 
the path of the bullets, the court believed nothing short of incarceration would send the 
message to DGJ as to the seriousness of his offence and would promote his ‘potential’ 
rehabilitation and reintegration into the community (at para. 12).  As a result, DGJ was 
sentenced to secure custody to be followed with open custody and probation.   
MAZ showed remorse for his actions, but the court appeared to place a higher weight on 
his lack of progress and maturity since the offence, which revealed less favourable 
prospects for rehabilitation.  As a result, the need to hold him ‘accountable’ was ‘great’ 
and more specifically he needed to be deterred from reoffending (at paras. 34 and 42).  
As a result, MAZ was sentenced to a secure custodial sentence, followed with open 
custody and probation, like DGJ.  ZN, on the other hand, was remorseful and appeared to 
have learned from his actions and had made ‘impressive progress’ after the offence, 
which illustrated his favourable prospects for rehabilitation.  Since he had already begun 
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to make progress, and had spent 14 months in secure custody, he was sentenced to open 
custody and probation (at paras. 104-105).   
5.3.4 Case 4:  R. v. K.C. (2011) 
In R. v. K.C. (2011), KC is an Aboriginal female who was 17 years old at the time of the 
offence (at para. 1).  KC was a first-time offender and she pled guilty to the offence of 
aggravated assault (at para. 1).  KC’s developmental years were described as being 
marred by abuse, alcohol, drugs, multiple changes in residences, and instability and as a 
result she had felt a profound lack of hope and an overwhelming sense of despair (at para. 
38).  KC wanted to leave the community she had been living in because many of the 
young people were drinking alcohol or smoking marijuana and there was nothing to do 
there.  As such, at the age of 16 she chose to live with her mother again (at paras 33-34).  
Unfortunately, after KC began to live with her mom, off the Reserve, she experienced 
significant social challenges (at para. 35).   
Feeling isolated and alone, KC left her mother’s residence, where she had lived for the 
four months before the offence and KC planned to return to the Reserve where she had 
lived most of her life (between 4-16 years of age) (at para. 28).  During her travels back 
to the Reserve, KC randomly selected and approached CC’s (victim) house for help (at 
para. 29).  Instead of asking for help, a confrontation occurred and KC stabbed and 
seriously injured CC with a large knife (at para. 29).  Both the Crown and the defence 
counsel sought a serious violent offence designation,25 with which the judge was in 
agreement stating, “no other designation would be appropriate”26 (at para. 26).   
                                                 
25
 Defined as “an offence in the commission of which a young person causes or attempts to cause serious 
bodily harm” (YCJA, s. 2). 
26
 Section 42(9) of the YCJA allows the Crown attorney to make an application to have an offence 
designated as a serious violent offence (SVO) which would become part of the youth’s official record and 
may affect the sentencing being done, or for later offences a youth commits, subsequent SVOs.  For 
example, a third offence designated as a SVO is an offence from which there is a presumption that an adult 
sentence would be imposed (s. 42[5][a]); Bala and Anand, 2012: 597).   
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CC (victim) spoke of the pain he suffered from being stabbed.  His lungs had been 
punctured and his physical recovery had lasted for four months.  He and his family 
continued to feel unsafe in their home and there was continued tension between his wife 
and himself that did not exist prior to the incident (at para. 36-37).  The judge stated that 
“the actions of K.C. in confronting and stabbing C.C., a person K.C. did not know, while 
intentional or reckless, were in the main reactive and were not premeditated or planned” 
(at para. 39).   
The court, in determining whether to impose a custodial or non-custodial sentence, took 
into consideration KC’s level of remorse, which was demonstrated by her plea of guilt, as 
well as that she was a first-time offender and of Aboriginal status27 (at para. 42-65).  In 
addition, KC had served 28 days in pre-sentence custody and following her release was 
on strict house arrest for 7 months without incident.  Upon sentencing, the court stated 
that KC’s case posed “very difficult considerations for the court” (at para. 63).  
Nevertheless, the judge believed a reasonable alternative to custody existed for KC as a 
non-custodial sentence would provide “a meaningful consequence to K.C. and would best 
promote her rehabilitation and reintegration into society” (at para. 64).  As such, KC was 
sentenced to two years’ probation, which according to the judge was “the maximum non-
custodial sentence this court can impose” (at para. 65).  
5.3.5 Case 5:  R. v. A.R. (2008)  
In R. v. A.R. (2008), AR was 17 years old at the time of the offence, and had pled guilty 
to a charge of aggravated assault.  AR and her boyfriend had brought their vehicle to a 
stop at a bus stop when AR leaned out the window to shoot pedestrians waiting for the 
bus, with a paintball gun.  The paintball struck one victim (Ms. R.) in the face and 
exploded her eye.  The victim sustained permanent damage and it was reported that she 
was unlikely to regain useful vision in her eye.  The victim (Ms. R.) had specifically 
recalled hearing AR laughing as the two drove away (at para. 1-2).  In this case, the 
                                                 
27
 “The YCJA directs that alternatives to custody must be considered when imposing sentences, especially 
for Aboriginal young offenders (s. 38(2)(c)).  
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defence conceded that the offence met the definition of a “serious violent offence” as 
described in the YCJA stating the “Crown properly put before me the facts and law to 
support the designation I make that this senseless brutal act constitutes a serious violent 
offence”28 (at para. 1). A second victim (AS) was shot in the leg.   
AR’s presentence report was not positive, in the judge’s view, as it was reported that 
since AR’s arrest, she had not made any significant changes to her life.  For example, she 
was not in school and had not pursued full time employment as she feared her wages 
would be garnished, if she was to be sued by the victim.  This negative report diminished 
greatly, the judge’s view of AR’s remorse that “she professes to feel” (at para. 4).  While 
she had strong family support, AR claimed to be using drugs to forget her problems and 
had discontinued her attendance at a local drug treatment day program.  She had also 
been apprehended by police for being in possession of drugs but was let off with a 
warning.  Thus, the court stated “the only mitigating factors present are the absence of a 
record and the plea and early acceptance of responsibility” (at para. 4).   
The harm to Ms. R., according to the judge, was extreme and permanent.  She had 
suffered tremendously through prolonged treatment and surgeries with more surgeries 
planned for the future.  As stated by the judge the  
Crown suggests, and I agree, the activities here are extremely reckless and 
inherently dangerous.  To shoot at people at a bus stop, in a drive by shooting, is 
significantly dangerous and callous because they had no forewarning, no ability to 
escape or take defensive action.  I consider very aggravating the fact that the 
accused laughed as they sped off.  A custodial period is clearly required (at para. 
8).   
 
                                                 
28
 Section 64(1) of the YCJA states the Crown may make an application to the youth justice court for an 
order that the young person is liable to an adult sentence if the young person is or has been found guilty of 
an offence from which an adult would be liable to imprisonment for a term of more than two years and the 
young person committed the offence after he/she attained the age of 14 years old.  Further, under section 
42(7) a youth justice court may make an intensive rehabilitative custody and supervision order … if the 
young person has been found guilty of a serious violent offence (a[i]) or the young person has been found 
guilty of an offence and which caused serious bodily harm for which an adult would be liable to 
imprisonment for a term of more than two years, and the young person had been found guilty of at least two 
prior such offences (a[ii]).   
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AR was sentenced to a period of six months open custody and community supervision, 
followed by 18 months of probation.  The judge was of the view that the six-month 
sentence was “clearly required” in order to provide the structure and rehabilitation AR 
needed and had failed to address in the year prior to sentencing (at para. 8).  The judge 
also made reference to other aggravated assault sentences stating “the sentences that have 
been imposed on youth for aggravated assault have almost exclusively been custodial in 
nature, and there is nothing in this case which would justify a non-custodial sentence” (at 
para. 8).   
5.3.5.1 Brief Summary 
Case 4 (KC) and Case 5 (AR) are physical assault offences with a weapon.  Both KC and 
AR were 17 years old at the time of their offences.  KC was an Aboriginal female, who 
had a troubled past.  While the assault was serious, her actions appeared to the courts as 
being reactive and unplanned.  In addition, while not explicitly stated by the court, it 
appears that since KC had made attempts at improving her life and family situation, a 
non-custodial sentence was viewed as better suited for KC’s rehabilitation and 
reintegration into the community.  On the other hand, AR received an open custodial 
sentence.  AR had shown no remorse for her actions and her behavior after the offence 
was not exemplary.  The court concluded that a custodial sentence would provide the 
structure necessary to promote AR’s rehabilitation.  AR and KC were two females and 
the court’s leniency in terms of the punitiveness of their sentences as compared to the 
male offenders in this sample, may reflect their gender.  
Given the small sample size, an analysis of gender differences in sentencing is beyond 
the scope of this study.  However, it should be noted that research (Statistics Canada, 
2009; Minaker & Hogeveen, 2009; Bala and Anand, 2012) has revealed that youth courts 
are more lenient with female young offenders than with males, as an adolescent female is 
less likely to receive a custodial sentence for any given offence than male youths (Bala 
and Anand, 2012: 76).  Such leniency may appear, on the surface, advantageous to 
females may reflect judicial biases about females; however, Bala and Anand (2012) 
propose this leniency may instead reflect a judicial recognition that females have lower 
rates of recidivism (p. 76).  In instances where a custodial sentence is imposed, the goal is 
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directed towards “protecting them” from engaging in high-risk activities (e.g., 
prostitution and drug use) as compared to concerns about accountability or protection of 
the public (Sprott, Doob, and Zimring, 2009; MacDonald and Chesney-Lind, 2001; Bala 
and Anand, 2012: 76).  A disproportionate number of female offenders have been victims 
of physical and sexual abuse and given that females constitute a relatively small 
proportion of the young offender population, there is inadequate number of programs and 
services and as such female young offenders do not have access to adequate treatment in 
custody (Bala and Anand, 2012).   
5.3.6 Physical Assault Section Summary 
The previous sections provided sentencing summaries for five young offenders convicted 
of physical assault.  Rehabilitation was a key consideration in all decisions and there was 
much discrepancy between sentences. Custody, for example, was seen as a means to 
facilitate, and in some instances continue, an offender’s rehabilitation.  In other cases, 
where the prospects for rehabilitation were less favourable, custodial sentences were 
viewed as holding young offenders accountable to ensure their rehabilitation and future 
reintegration into society.  In both instances, the courts appear to be attempting to predict 
the level of dangerousness and threat the offender posed to the community at large, which 
mirrors focal concerns theory ‘protection of the community’.  
Other factors, highlighted by judges, appeared to have shaped sentencing outcomes.  First 
family and personal circumstances were frequently noted.  For instance, DGJ and ZN had 
come from stable upbringings, with attentive, supportive, loving, and caring family 
members.  ZN’s supportive family may have been a factor in encouraging a lighter 
sentence.  A supportive family, however, was not enough to benefit DGJ as the 
seriousness of the offence and his lack of remorse appeared to outweigh a stable home 
life.  The lack of remorse appeared to increase DGJ’s level of culpability, resulting in a 
more punitive sentence being imposed to hold him accountable for his behavior.  MAZ 
had demonstrated some level of remorse (by pleading guilty) but the judge still felt that 
he needed to be held accountable for his actions because of the seriousness of his offence 
and a closed custody sentence was issued.  In addition, MAZ’s trial was heard after the 
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amendments to the YCJA, which reintroduced deterrence as a principle of sentencing, 
which also provides the courts with the opportunity to impose a more punitive sentence.   
Behaviour since arrest was also taken into account.  For instance, the court was 
concerned that AR had not made any significant changes to her life since her arrest, 
suggesting that she had not taken responsibility for her actions.  As a result, a custodial 
sentence was ‘clearly required’ to provide her with structure and rehabilitation.  KC, on 
the other hand, was a young Aboriginal female who appeared to be attempting to improve 
her situation both before and after the offence.  The court took these attempts into 
consideration upon sentences and as a result, a non-custodial sentence was imposed so 
that KC’s progress would not be hindered by the imposition of a custodial sentence.   
5.4 Sexual Assault Cases 
It should be noted that, of the 28 sexual assault offenders, 10 (36%) received secure 
custody followed by open custody and probation, 9 (32%) received open custody 
followed by a period of probation, and 9 (32%) received a non-custodial (probation 
sentence).  This section provides summaries of five cases, allowing for an analysis of 
what factors judges take into consideration when sentencing.   
5.4.1 Case 6:  R. v. K.H. (2000)  
In R. v. K.H. (2000), KH was convicted of sexual assault and forcible confinement of 
victim (TA).  It was reported that TA (victim) had met with KH at a friend’s apartment 
where the two had consensual sex.  Subsequently KH facilitated TA’s sexual assault by 
several others. While TA was getting dressed and as KH was leaving the bedroom, CE, a 
friend of KH, entered the room and asked TA if he could have sex with her, and TA said 
no.  TA was only clothed from the waist up and had a blanket covering her legs.  CE 
proceeded to force TA to submit to sexual intercourse, while she was fighting and telling 
him to get out.  TA also yelled out for KH’s help, but he ignored her (at para. 2).   
While CE was attacking TA, KH came to the bedroom door, ignoring her pleas for help, 
and asked how to buzz DH into the building.  After the incident with CE, TA began to get 
dressed again and just as she was about to leave the bedroom KH came in with a “new 
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spectator” (DH).  After a brief verbal exchange, both KH and CE left the bedroom, 
leaving TA alone with DH.  DH sexually assaulted TA. KH was viewed as facilitating 
DH’s sexual assault of TA.  KH also forced TA to stay in the apartment when she tried to 
leave, further facilitating the ongoing sexual assault and confinement.  TA was 
subsequently sexually assaulted by C(1), an individual by the name of C, with KH’s 
encouragement (at paras. 6-12).   
The court, after considering all the evidence and while “suspicious there is a conspiracy 
here to make TA available to others for “sexual sports” (at para. 11) concluded that “I 
cannot say that there is sufficient hard evidence that K.H. was orchestrating the series of 
attacks and confinements of T.A.” (at para. 11).  As such, the court concluded that KH 
had “aided and abetted and encouraged at various times at least three other young men in 
their sexual assaults and confinement of T.A.” (at para. 12).  He had demonstrated 
appalling disrespect for TA, according to the court, including her physical, emotional, 
and sexual integrity and “facilitated a horrific violation of her person that undoubtedly 
had a lasting emotional effect” (at para. 13).  The judge described TA as being an 
“emotionally reserved, self-contained individual,” which made it impossible to “say what 
the extent of the emotional effect was beyond what could be described as lasting” (at 
para. 13).   
In consideration of KH’s pre-sentence report, which the court stated “is a very good 
report” demonstrating that KH had the capacity to show respect for other people, to 
counsel others and showing he had respect for other youths’ physical integrity whether it 
be sexual or simply physical violence (at para. 16).  The court was impressed by the 
extent that KH had availed himself of the opportunities with various youth service 
organizations and youth committees.  As the judge stated KH “has made an impressive 
contribution in everything he has done in that capacity” (at para. 16).  It was also 
recognized that KH had the support of his mother, which was considered a “significant 
indicator of an individual who has considerable potential for rehabilitation . . . it is almost 
impossible to account for what appears to be something relatively out of character for his 
life experience to this point” (at para. 16).   
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The judge when considering the appropriate sentence made reference to the sentencing 
features of the YOA stating it requires  
among other things that deterrence be given less significance than it would in the 
adult court, nevertheless it is my view that because of the horrific violation of 
T.A.’s sexual integrity on this date and the necessary ensuing emotional 
repercussions, it must be demonstrated by this court that the community will not 
tolerate this kind of activity without some severe sanction being imposed (at para. 
18).   
KH was sentenced to eight months open custody on the first offence (sexual assault) and 
eight months open custody concurrent on the second offence (forcible confinement), 
meaning that the total length of custody was eight months.  The period of custody would 
be followed by a two-month period of probation (at para. 20).  Upon sentencing, the 
judge stated this was the  
appropriate level of incarceration because, in my view, K.H. would be best 
rehabilitated in the kind of setting where he can continue on his contact with his 
mother in an effective way with his family and continue in whatever work is 
available through agencies he has been currently employed.  That is an advantage 
to him.  It is an advantage to the community.  I do not see that there is any 
significant security risks that K.H. function at that level of custody and I do not 
think that the deterrent requirements of sentence necessitate a secure custodial 
sentence.  In my view, that length of sentence is an ample demonstration of the 
significance of the effect of this offence on T.A. and the type of sanction that the 
community would expect for this particular offence (at para 19).   
In this manner, the judge emphasized a variety of factors in sentencing KH, including 
rehabilitation, community well-being, deterrence, and accountability.  
5.4.2 Case 7: R. v. D.H. (2014)  
In R. v. D.H. (2014), DH was found guilty of one count of sexual assault and two counts 
of sexual interference.  The assaults had occurred over a period of five years.  The victim 
was his cousin who was six years of age when the assault began.  DH was thirteen at the 
outset of the assault, however, at the time of the sentencing hearing, the victim was 
twenty-two and DH was thirty (at paras. 1-2)29 The victim was DH’s paternal cousin and 
from the time she was an infant she had regularly spent weekends at DH’s home, where 
                                                 
29
 In Canada, there is no statute of limitations for sexual assault or any indictable offences.   
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her father, although rarely present, had resided (at para. 2).  Since the victim’s mother 
worked on weekends, DH’s mother and paternal grandmother looked after her and it was 
reported that the victim had regularly slept in DH’s bedroom and bed.  The abuse 
included repeated acts of a sexual nature (at para. 3).   
The victim did not tell anyone until she was eleven years old at which time she informed 
her mother.  She did not report the abuse to the police until 2011 (at paras. 2-3).  The 
victim reported that she was slow to disclose and subsequently to report the abuse 
because she was ‘embarrassed; and ‘disgusted’ (at para. 3).  There was considerable 
evidence from both the victim and her mother about the victim’s behavioural problems 
during the years in which the abuse took place, which included persistent anger, 
defecating in her underwear, smearing feces, and sexual acting out (at para. 4).   
During her testimony the victim was also highly emotional and volatile and repeatedly 
shouted at DH and his mother.  The victim had also been diagnosed with Crohn’s disease 
and she testified that the stress and anxiety before and during the trial were making her 
sick (at para. 4).  The victim stated “. . . I feel so worthless… Like I feel disgusting. It’s 
embarrassing and it hurts so much…” (at para. 4).  The Crown submitted a written 
victim’s impact statement, which the judge called “a statement of abject despair” and 
concluded, “it is apparent that the psychological and emotional consequences of D.H.’s 
offences have been severe” (at paras. 5-6).   
DH had continued to deny his guilt and there was no evidence of remorse.  He stated the 
victim had “made up the stories” (at para. 7).  In fact, the only indication of remorse that 
occurred was when DH was 17 years old.  During a phone call (which he subsequently 
denied took place) his mother had confronted him about the abuse, and he replied “Yes I 
did it. I was experimenting.  You can send the police to pick me up because I know what 
I did was wrong” (at paras. 21-23).  Upon sentencing the judge stated “because D.H. has 
never faced his responsibility, there is no obvious route to a rehabilitation plan” (at para. 
21).  And in determining the sentence, the judge stated 
I must consider all available sanctions other than custody that are reasonable in 
the circumstances.  Would it be reasonable to impose a period of probation, or of 
deferred custody-dispositions which would permit D.H. to serve his sentence in 
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the community?  Upon reflection I have concluded that such sentences would be 
unreasonable, and inconsistent with the sentencing principles of the Act.  In my 
view, a community sentence would not achieve the purpose of holding D.H. 
accountable, because the consequences would not be meaningful to him.  Nor 
would a community sentence promote his rehabilitation, his sense of 
responsibility, or his acknowledgement of the harm done to the victim and the 
community.  Despite the restrictions on his way of living inherent in a probation 
or deferred custody order, the effect of such sentences, would permit D.H. to 
continue to avoid confronting the facts about his behavior, and the harm he has 
caused to the victim (at para. 22).   
 
In considering the phone call between DH and his mother, what the judge found striking 
about the exchange was DH’s response “I was experimenting” (at para. 23).  The judge 
concluded that “neither at that time, nor since has DH acknowledged the humanity of the 
victim.  Nor has he acknowledged even the possibility that his behavior caused her 
trauma” (at para. 23).  And while DH was a youth during the period the abuse was taking 
place, “this was not impulsive behavior.  The victim was, for him, an object available for 
his experimentation.  The victim knew this, and it has devastated her” (at para. 23).   
The court concluded that a period of incarceration was required and DH was sentenced to 
a closed custody and supervision order of 9 months followed by a period of probation of 
18 months (at para. 26).   
5.4.3 Case 8:  R. v. A.A. (2004)  
R. v. A.A. (2004) was the first case of gang rape governed by the sentencing regimes of 
the YCJA.  BC was one of the four offenders involved in the rape.  Although the facts of 
the case were minimally reported in this decision, the court made reference to the Victim 
Impact Statement, which discussed the impact on the victim (EA).  Under the heading 
“Personal Reaction”, EA made statements such as, “When I went to court and I saw all of 
them again, that bothered me a lot.  The physical pain and emotional pain I went through 
on my birthday.  I have had nightmares at first and still once in a while do. Some were so 
bad I woke up crying.  I feel so angry from what happened now that sometimes I almost 
completely isolate myself from everyone. It still often bothers me. I still often cry.  I 
dream about it, and even daze off about it and it scares me” (at para. 10).   
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BC was the second oldest of the four offenders (at para. 20) and while he had no previous 
records at the time of the offence, he had committed subsequent offences (e.g., failed to 
comply with conditions of his bail, assault of a fellow student, possession of prohibited 
substances) while on bail for the current sexual assault offence.  The judge stated  
obviously I cannot consider them [the subsequent offences] as aggravating factors 
in sentencing.  I presume that the probation officer who wrote the PSR [Pre-
Sentence Report] included the references to these charges both to provide some 
factual context for what has happened recently in the offender’s life, and in 
support of her pessimistic conclusion that, based on his “not… positive” probation 
reporting history to the date of completion of the PSR on March 25, 2004, he is 
unlikely to comply very readily with either mandatory or optional conditions of 
any probation order (at para. 21) 
The judge further stated  
I caution myself that it is not my function to punish the offender for being a 
reluctant probationer, the overall impression presented is of a person who is 
willing to assume ownership of an involvement in only that which he finds 
pleasurable, and who will evade his responsibilities whenever convenient and 
wherever possible (at para. 23).   
The court carefully read through, several times, a letter written by BC.   The portion the 
judge wished to highlight was that the note did not contain any express recognition or 
acknowledgement of the harm he caused to the victim (at para. 26).  At the same time, 
reference was made to an Ontario Court of Appeal ruling, which cautions trial judges not 
to consider lack of remorse as an aggravating factor in sentencing, except in very rare 
circumstances R. v. Kozy (1990) 58 C.C.C. (3d) 500; R. v. Valentini (1999) 132 C.C.C. 
(3d) 262; R. v. Levert (2001) 159 C.C.C. (3d) 7 (1) (at para. 26).  The judge concluded, 
the fact that BC had not pled guilty and appeared to maintain his innocence was a matter 
that was between himself and his conscience.  As such, the court would not increase his 
sentence for either of those reasons (at para. 26).  
Further, the judge stated 
In the case at bar, I propose to deal with this as follows: in this province, I am the 
initial decision-maker as to whether this sentence is to be served in secure or open 
custody.  Despite what Crown counsel has proposed, I see no reason why these 
offenders need to be warehoused – for that is largely what it amounts to – in 
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secure custody for any portion of their sentences.  Thus, all sentences will be 
served in open custody (at para. 50).   
BC was sentenced to concurrent terms of 21 months which were to be served as 14 
months in open custody followed by 7 months community supervision and 14 months of 
probation (at para. 52 and 54).   
5.4.3.1 Brief Summary 
Case 6 (KH), case 7 (DH) and case 8 (AA_BC) are sexual assault cases.  The courts 
viewed KH as having favourable prospects for rehabilitation, since his pre-sentence 
report was a ‘very good report’.  KH came from a supportive and loving family and his 
actions appeared to be out of character and unexpected.  Although not proven, the court 
may have suspected that KH had conspired and orchestrated the series of attacks and the 
confinement of the victim, who was also his girlfriend, thereby requiring a more punitive 
sentence (open custody versus probation).     
DH and BC, both showed no remorse for their actions, and the courts perceived the 
offenders as having less favourable prospects for rehabilitation.  In order to ensure DH 
received meaningful consequences to hold him accountable for his actions and to 
promote his rehabilitation, the court imposed a secure custodial sentence.  On the other 
hand, even though BC did not express remorse or acknowledge the harm he had caused 
his victim, the judge ‘saw no reason to warehouse the offenders’ in a secure custodial 
setting (at para. 50) and BC received an open custodial sentence followed by probation.  
DH was sentenced after the 2012 amendments to the YCJA, which reintroduced 
deterrence as a principle of sentencing, which may have provided the courts with the 
opportunity to impose a more punitive sentence.   
5.4.4 Case 9:  R. v. C. B. (2010)  
In R. v. C.B. (2010), CB pled guilty to three counts of sexual assault and two counts of 
child pornography.  CB was 16 years old at the time of the offences and had molested 
nine and ten year old children and filmed the molestation using his cell phone.  The first 
victim (JS) was ten years old at the time of the incident and was staying at the same resort 
as CB’s family.  JS and CB were alone in the change room after swimming and CB asked 
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JS to fondle his penis in exchange for a form of credit relating to the Pokemon 
videogame.  Similar incidents occurred the following two days and on the second 
consecutive day, CB asked JS if he could make a video of the sexual acts.  The video was 
approximately ten seconds long and both CB and JS were reported to have watched the 
video.  CB told JS that he had deleted the video, although, upon a search of CB’s cell 
phone incidental to the arrest, the police received other video clips from the memory 
drive, which disclosed CB touching JS and JS touching CB (at paras. 3-8).   
The police also found three additional clips of two unidentified young boys and as a 
result another investigation ensued in an attempt to locate the two additional young 
victims.  CB was arrested for the offences against the two victims known as John Doe 1 
and John Doe 2.  A search of CB’s residence led to the seizure of various items that 
included cameras, computers, and media storage devices as well as CB’s diary.  One 
entry of CB’s diary, which was presented as evidence, described the evolution of his 
attraction to young boys and how he had engaged in twenty-five to thirty-five sexual 
encounters with MB, which had escalated to oral sex and masturbation.  At a later date, 
CB provided the names of the two John Does (MD and MB) on the videos (at paras 3-
15).   
JS, the victim in this case, did not himself make a victim impact statement, but his 
parents’ spoke on his behalf.  His parents described the emotional turmoil for their family 
and spoke of how their child had been “robbed of his innocence” that the incidents had 
left them all facing a lifetime of dealing with the impact of the crime.  They described 
how their son had changed from a confident, innocent, and trusting young boy to a child 
filled with anxiety, self-doubt, guilt and shame.  The judge stated “the statement speaks 
eloquently of further consequences of C.B.’s conduct and the fact that the family is 
apparently in counseling to try to deal with the ‘shock, pain and outrage of this crime’” 
(at para. 17).   
CB, it was reported, had a supportive family with both parents being present at every 
court proceeding.  He was described as being a high achiever, excelling both 
academically and athletically at school and was viewed by his teachers as having 
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leadership qualities.  There were no reported substance abuse problems and he 
maintained positive peer associations.  Both his parents and his teachers never considered 
him to have any behavioural issues (at paras. 31-33).   
CB’s “Psychological Assessment” rated him on a “qualitative estimate” to be in the low 
to moderate range for reoffending (para. 23).  A psychiatrist, assessed CB as suffering 
from pedophilia, a disorder wherein the preferred method for achieving sexual arousal 
and gratification is through the fantasy of or interaction with prepubescent or early 
pubescent children (para. 27).  This psychiatrist noted that pedophilia is a lifelong 
disorder with no known treatment that has been scientifically proven or established 
effective in changing sexual orientation or preference (para. 28).  He also felt that CB 
should not have unsupervised access or care of children and should have psychological 
treatment to understand the implications of his sexual preferences (para. 29).  While both 
doctors were in disagreement over CB’s diagnosis, they did agree that CB was at low to 
moderate risk of reoffending (para. 25).   
CB had no prior record and it was reported that since his arrest he had experienced 
symptoms of anxiety and depression.  CB had also pled guilty to the charges and 
“accepted responsibility from the outset” and “appears to be a young person who is 
distressed over his action” (at para. 34).  He had also directed comments to the court, 
which the judge assessed “clearly show that his remorse for his actions is genuine and 
sincere” (at para 34).  The judge, in response to both physician reports, stated “it is clear 
from both doctors’ reports that understanding and treatment will be of assistance to C.B. 
in preventing him from becoming involved in similar behavior in the future.  The 
prospects of rehabilitation appear to be excellent and I am satisfied the safety of the 
community will not be compromised at all by C.B. remaining in the community” (at para. 
56).   
CB was sentenced to two years’ probation, which the judge felt would both hold him 
accountable and facilitate his rehabilitation (at para. 60).  In determining the appropriate 
sentence, the judge stated “This is a difficult sentencing . . . I have come to the 
conclusion that the purposes and principles of sentencing set out in the YCJA are best 
  133 
accomplished in this particular case with this particular offender by imposing a non-
custodial sentence and placing him on probation for a two year period on strict terms and 
conditions” (at para. 58-60).   
Upon sentencing, the judge further stated 
I am of the view that this sentence will hold him accountable and promote his 
rehabilitation and reintegration and thus will benefit the community in the long 
term.  He is involved in programming in the community, has the support of his 
family and although a custodial sentence certainly may be viewed as an available 
disposition, I feel that such a sentence would not ultimately recognize the 
progress and the steps that C.B. has taken nor the commitment that he has made 
as evidenced by not only his words, but more importantly by his actions to date.  I 
have no concerns about the protection of the public being a factor by allowing 
C.B. to remain within the community (at para. 60). 
Thus, in sentencing CB, the judge balanced accountability, rehabilitation, and the best 
interests of the community.  Rehabilitation was seen to be best achieved outside of 
custody.  
5.4.5 Case 10:  R. v. P.S.P. (1997) 
R. v. P.S.P. (1997) was a case heard under the YOA, wherein PSP was convicted of 
sexual assault on ASP.  The assaults had taken place over a period of approximately three 
years.  The events of the assault were minimally reported in this decision but it was 
reported that the victim was his six-year-old cousin and PSP was 16 years old at the time 
of the offence (at para 5-10).   
The judge read a victim impact statement wherein the victim stated 
My life has been terrible since I’ve been abused by my cousin.  I’ve had 
nightmares, migraines, and problems at school getting my work done.  I’m afraid 
to walk out the road and in my back yard because I’m afraid someone will hurt 
me. I’m afraid to go out at school.  I am upset about Grandma S.P. because we 
were close at one time and now they have turned against me.  It hurts me when I 
say hi to Grandma and she walks away from me. (at paras. 11-13).   
The judge made an additional two comments stating 
The report parallels victim impact statements that the Court has seen from persons 
who have been sexually mistreated.  It confirms in the Court’s mind that we really 
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do not understand, as a community, the significance of the mistreatment of young 
persons in a sexual context, particularly in a context where persons are related or 
where there is the aspect of breach of trust in that one person is older or one 
person has a special responsibility towards the other persons.  I am not surprised 
at the disruption to the complainant. As I say, it parallels many victim impact 
statements which I’ve seen, which to me underscores the seriousness of the results 
of the experience to the victim.  The second point I want to make is that the 
incident also can be a source of disruption in the family, or in the community, that 
goes beyond the two persons involved.  It is very disruptive and pits family 
member against family member and causes serious dislocation (at paras 14-16).    
The judge also drew on the pre-sentence report, which described PSP as a disadvantaged 
person who was struggling to be useful in the community.  He was unemployable and 
seemed to not have much “applicability” (at para. 42).  He was also described as being 
emotionally immature, illiterate, dependent on his extended family, and uncertain about 
his future.  He had the emotional development of half of his chronological age (at para. 
49 and 51).  The judge considered the harm done to the victim along with her potential 
for recovery and the particular disadvantage of the accused and his vulnerability in 
society as well as the administration of the criminal justice system, where the accused 
would be particularly vulnerable (at paras. 55-57).  Taking all of this into consideration, 
the judge imposed a term of probation for the “longest period possible”, that being 24 
months (at para. 67).   
Upon sentencing the judge stated 
In this case there are two matters that concerns me.  I have in a sense, I believe, 
understated the vulnerability of the accused as reflected in the pre-sentence report 
before the Court.  The accused in my opinion, looking at pre-sentence report, is 
borderline dysfunctional.  He has great problems in functioning in anything but a 
helpful, sympathetic, non-threatening environment.  In addition to that, I am 
concerned that if the accused is sent into a purgatory, . . . - - that is, the Court is 
alerted that we just don’t know where or what would happen to him as a result of 
a custodial disposition, - - . . . that there is a hazard that could have serious 
consequences upon this accused, unlike other persons who don’t suffer his 
particular vulnerability (at paras. 64-65).    
5.4.5.1 Brief Summary 
Case 9 (CB) and case 10 (PSP) are sexual assault cases wherein the offenders received 
non-custodial sentences.  The two offenders differed.  For instance, CB was viewed by 
the court as having favourable prospects for rehabilitation whereas PSP was viewed as 
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having less favourable prospects for rehabilitation.  The victims of both offenders were 
young children (below the age of 10) and both offenders were 16 years old when the 
assaults began.  CB came from a supportive family and took responsibility for the 
offences.  The court believed CB did not pose a risk to the community as he had 
‘excellent prospects for rehabilitation’.  These considerations led to a non-custodial 
sentence.  PSP, on the other hand, was found to have the emotional development of half 
his chronological age and was unable to function in anything but a helpful, sympathetic, 
non-threatening environment (at para. 64).  PSP’s vulnerability appears to have 
encouraged a non-custodial sentence (probation).     
5.4.6 Sexual Assault Section Summary 
Of the five sexual assault cases discussed, two offenders (KH [Case 6] and CB [Case 9]) 
were perceived by the court as having favourable prospects for rehabilitation, while three 
of the offenders (DH [Case 7], BC [Case 8], and PSP [Case 10]) were perceived as 
having less favourable prospects for rehabilitation.  Whether a person received a 
custodial sentence or not was not as closely tied to the offenders’ prospects for 
rehabilitation in these cases.  Rather, the courts took other factors into consideration.  
These factors better explain the sentencing disparities within offence type.   
First, sentencing decisions frequently make reference to the offenders’ character.  For 
example, the court did not take lightly that DH and BC were evading responsibility, and 
refusing to express remorse.  As a result, DH and BC both received custodial sentences.  
In contrast, KH was praised for his willingness to take advantage of opportunities 
provided to him, post-arrest, and his capacity to demonstrate respect.  KH received an 
open custodial sentence, as it was believed this kind of setting would be the best 
environment for him to continue his rehabilitation (at para. 19).   
The courts appeared troubled by offenders who showed no remorse or guilt for their 
actions, as illustrating by the judges’ disgust at DH’s statement he “was experimenting” 
(at para. 23).  As we have seen DH’s lack of remorse and his statement he ‘was 
experimenting’ likely encouraged the judge to sentence him to secure custody.  At the 
same time, BC also refused to express remorse or acknowledge the harm he had caused 
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his victim and while the judge ‘saw no reason to warehouse the offenders’ in a secure 
custodial sentence, BC did receive a custodial sentence, albeit open custody (at para. 50).   
A related concern appears to have been offenders’ vulnerability.  In the case of PSP, 
whose emotional development was half his chronological age, the judge provided a light 
sentence.  It was believed that PSP was unable to function in anything but a helpful, 
sympathetic, non-threatening environment.  The court considered what sentence would be 
in the best interests of the offender, as well as society more broadly.  
5.5 Analysis 
A key principle of sentencing is to hold a young person responsible and accountable for 
an offence through the imposition of just sanctions that have meaningful consequences 
for the young person and that promote his or her rehabilitation and reintegration into 
society, thereby contributing to the long-term protection of the public.  In the previous 
section ten cases were provided to illustrate the complexity of sentencing:  judges are not 
only guided by the legislation but also consider a wide range of factors.  In particular, as 
focal concerns theory contends, protection of the community appears to be a fundamental 
consideration. 
This study reveals at least two key steps and considerations that judges follow in reaching 
sentencing decisions.30  First, the courts determined and analyzed the details of the 
offence(s) and the involvement of the offender in order to gain an overall picture of what 
occurred.  For example, the courts took into consideration the facts underlying the 
conviction, such as the offender’s role in the offence, as well as the harm and impact on 
the victim.  This step helps the court made a ‘general’ assessment as to whether a 
custodial or non-custodial sentence would best foster an offender’s responsibility and 
accountability for the offence.  More punitive sentencing is believed to hold offenders 
more accountable for their actions. Central to this step is determining the 
                                                 
30
 Each judge approaches sentencing with their own individualized approach and as such, there is no one 
‘specific’ formula for sentencing.  For this study, I constructed a ‘general’ two-step process that captures or 
illuminates the process of sentencing and the factors that judges consider upon sentencing.  
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‘blameworthiness’ of the offender, such as an offender’s level of remorse and plea of 
guilty or not guilty, as highlighted in focal concerns theory. 
In the second step, the courts considered offenders’ actions before and after the offence, 
their plans for their future, growth and maturity, and overall health (e.g., physical, 
emotional, and mental).  The courts also took into account other special considerations 
including offenders’ family background, and the challenges they face in their lives, such 
as abuse.  If these actions and special considerations were favourable, the sentence was 
often reduced from what it might have otherwise been.  Many of these considerations 
concern the likelihood that the offender will re-offend as reflected in their prospects for 
rehabilitation, and perceived threat/risk to the community; hence mirroring the focal 
concern “protection of the community”. 
Overall, the courts try to achieve a difficult balance, considering the best interests of 
society, and the best interests of young offenders by predicting an offender’s level of 
dangerousness, their likelihood to reoffend, and their prospects for rehabilitation.  From 
these case studies, it appears that rehabilitation can be achieved a number of different 
ways depending on the particularities of the case and the offenders’ character.  
5.5.1 Comparing Physical and Sexual Assault Sentencing 
In the previous section, I outlined the key steps and considerations that judges appeared 
to follow when sentencing young offenders.  These steps, in and of themselves, cannot 
fully account for the variations in sentencing observed across offence type.  Nevertheless, 
they are informative, as they draw our attention to key elements in sentencing, including 
the nature of the offence, and the character of the offender.  In this section, I propose 
three possible explanations for sentencing variations across offence type, by drawing on 
the sample cases presented earlier in the chapter, and a few others included in this study.   
First, it appears that judges believed rehabilitation for the two different crimes was best 
achieved in different settings.  Specifically, a custodial sentence was believed to be best 
for rehabilitating many physical assault offenders.  Judges explicitly stated that physical 
assault offenders would benefit from closed custody.  For example, in R. v. J.P.G. (1997), 
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the judge noted that GE -- one of four offenders convicted of kidnapping, forcible 
confinement, assault causing bodily harm, aggravated assault, and manslaughter (at 
headnote) -- had made a great deal of progress while being in a structured environment, 
during his pre-sentence custody.  It was believed that this was the environment in which 
GE could continue to progress (at para. 1560:  “It [pre-trial custody] has provided the 
consistency, structure limits, rules and discipline that have enabled Mr. G.E. to make 
significant progress.  It is clearly a rehabilitative setting” (at para. 156).  GE received a 
secure/closed custodial sentence.  Similarly, the judge upon sentencing DGJ (Case 1) 
stated that ‘nothing short of incarceration will ensure his rehabilitation and safe 
reintegration into society’ (at para. 12).  This pattern was evident in other cases included 
in this sample, such as MAZ (Case 3) and ZN (Case 2) which were profiled earlier.  
In contrast, a secure/closed custodial sentence was less common for sexual assault 
offenders and when it was used the goal seems to have been accountability, rather than 
rehabilitation.  Recall, Case 7, R. v. D.H. (2014), in which the court concluded that a 
community sentence would not hold DH accountable as such a consequence would not be 
meaningful to him (at para. 22).  To ensure that DH confront the “facts about his 
behavior” as well as the harm caused to the victim, DH was sentenced to a closed 
supervision order (at paras. 22 and 26).   
Judges appear to take the view that rehabilitation would be best served for the sexual 
assault offenders in an open custodial sentence or a non-custodial sentence.  For example, 
recall Case 8, R. v. A.A. (2004), the first gang rape tried under the YCJA, the judge ‘saw 
no reason why the offenders needed to be warehoused’ and sentenced the offenders to 
open custody followed by probation.  Similarly in the case against KH (Case 6), the 
offender was deemed to have “considerable potential for rehabilitation” and hence was 
sentenced to open custody.  In the sexual assault case against CB (Case 7), the judge felt 
that two years of probation would facilitate his rehabilitation. Thus, it would appear that 
judges are of the view that physical assault offenders would be better rehabilitated in a 
secure/closed or open custodial sentence, whereas the sexual assault offenders were better 
rehabilitated in open and non-custodial sentences.  This finding runs contrary to research, 
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which has shown that custody is neither a deterrent nor a rehabilitative measure (Anand, 
1998; Bala and Anand, 2012; Corrado and Peters, 2015: 557).  
Second, the offenders’ relationship to the victim appears significant in shaping sentencing 
outcomes across offence type.  In the ten cases presented earlier, many of the physical 
assaults were crimes against acquaintances and random strangers, while many of the 
sexual assaults were crimes against intimates.  In further follow-up analyses of all the 
cases included in this study, this pattern held.  Of the 40 victims of physical assault, 26 
(65%) were random assaults (the victim was unknown to the offenders).  In contrast, of 
the 43 victims of sexual assault, only 4 (9%) were random assaults.  It appears that the 
courts took a more punitive stance when the assaults were random attacks, given that a 
higher percentage of physical assault offenders (92%) received a custodial (open and 
closed) sentence as compared to the sexual assault offenders (68%).  Follow-up analysis 
examined this hypothesis and revealed that of the 21 offenders who assaulted a random 
victim 19 (91%) received a custodial sentence.  Comparatively, of the 31 offenders who 
assaulted victims known to them, 24 (77%) received a custodial sentence. Drawing on 
these results, sentencing differences between physical and sexual assault offenders could, 
therefore, be explained by offenders’ relationships to the victims.  Those who attack 
strangers at random may be perceived as greater threats to the community at large, than 
those who attack intimates.  This explanation is consistent with the focal concern 
‘protection of the community’.   
Lastly, it is also possible that the physical assault offenders were more likely to be 
sentenced to a custodial sentence as the result of precedence.  As Anand (2003: 957) 
states, “one of the largest obstacles to overcome in reducing the use of youth 
incarceration is judicial inertia”.  Anand (2003: 957) maintains that even though certain 
provisions under the YCJA have been drafted in such a way that significantly reduces the 
scope of creative judicial statutory interpretation, there is the real prospect that some 
judges may choose to ignore the requirements of a new legislative regime.  An example 
of this can be seen in Case 4, R. v. A. R. (2008), a physical assault case, a 17-year old 
female offender who had been convicted of aggravated assault.  The youth court judge 
sentenced AR to six months open custody and community supervision, to be followed by 
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18 months of probation (at para. 9).  This was a random attack of violence labeled 
“dangerous and callous” by the judge (at para. 8).  The judge also added, “the sentences 
that have been imposed on youth for aggravated assault have almost exclusively been 
custodial in nature, and there is nothing in this case which would justify a non-custodial 
sentence” (at para. 8).   
The utilization of precedent is not restricted to cases dealing with similar charged 
offenders but can be broad enough to include the consideration of similar applicable 
principles.  An example of this can be found in R. v. J.D. (2015) a physical assault case, 
heard under the SSCA (post-2012 amendments) wherein the court referred to R. v. N.B. 
(2011), a sexual assault case heard under the YCJA (pre-2012 amendments), and which 
was included in this study.  The judge stated “similar to Justice Hearn in R. v. N.B., I 
want to emphasize that here there is at least one gateway to custody in this case under s. 
39 (1)(a) and the court is of the view that s. 39 (1)(d) is also appropriate” (at paras 64-66).   
On the one hand, while the YCJA was enacted with the overall goal to reduce the number 
of young offenders being incarcerated, “judicial inertia”, through the application of 
precedence, according to Anand (2003), may hinder the reduction in youth incarceration, 
in particular, for the physical assault offenders.  Further, one can only wonder if the re-
introduction of deterrence into the YCJA, as a result of the amendments under the SSCA, 
will continue to encourage courts to resort to incarceration.  While previously 
incarceration was adopted under the guise of rehabilitation, judges may now invoke 
incarceration under the guise of deterrence.  
On the other hand, if judicial inertia plays a role in the sentencing of young offenders 
convicted of sexual assault, it does not encourage incarceration.  This may reflect 
research, which has shown that while many sexual offenders begin their offending in 
adolescence, only a small percentage of juvenile sex offenders reoffend into adulthood 
(Knight, Ronis and Zakireh, 2009; Riser et al., 2013: 10).   According to Riser et al. 
(2013: 9), adult sex offenders are among the criminals with the highest likelihood of 
sexual reoffending.  In contrast, adolescents are more likely to respond positively to 
treatment, and as such this group represents an excellent opportunity for prevention and 
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intervention efforts (Knight, Ronis and Zakireh, 2009; Riser et al., 2013: 10).31  In other 
words, recidivism among young sex offenders decreases when these youths receive 
treatment.   
5.6 Analysis Summary and Application of Focal Concerns 
Theory 
The results of this study have revealed that the courts appear to be more punitive when 
sentencing young offenders convicted of physical assault as compared to sexual assault, 
in that they were more likely to receive a custodial (secure and open) sentence.  Even 
when custodial sentences were imposed for young offenders convicted of sexual assault, 
they were less punitive than those imposed on the physical assault offenders.  I proposed 
three possible explanations for these differences, two of which mirror focal concerns 
theory ‘protection of the community.’  First, in this study, protection of the community is 
balanced with the rehabilitation of an offender.  More importantly, when the offence is a 
physical assault, rehabilitation in a custodial setting appears to be more promising.  
Second, an attack on a random victim may appear to be more dangerous and threatening 
to the well-being of society and therefore, a custodial sentence will not only rehabilitate 
offenders, but will protect the community, at least for the time they are in custody.  
Lastly, while not in line with focal concerns theory, ‘judicial inertia’ may have played a 
role as there may be a lag between legislative changes and changes in sentencing 
patterns, as a result of judicial precedence.   
While the overall findings of this study provided limited support for penal populism and 
focal concerns theory, neither theory was able to capture all of the nuances inherent in 
sentencing.  As the detailed look at sentencing decisions provided in this chapter reveals, 
sentencing is complex, with many factors taking into consideration.  Chapter 6 will 
explore these nuances, review the shortcomings of these two theories, and consider 
implications for further research.  
                                                 
31
 It should be noted that the number of sexual assaults reported by police in Canada is an underestimate of 
the true extent of sexual assault cases as these types of offences are likely to go unreported (Boyce, 2015: 
17; Statistics Canada, 2010).    
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Chapter 6 
6 Introduction  
This study arose out of an interest in how legislative changes affect judicial decisions 
concerning the sentencing of young offenders convicted of violent crimes.  After a review 
of the literature, I discovered that there was a gap in the literature pertaining to the 
analysis of judicial decisions, in particular as they relate to young offenders convicted of 
violent offences in the province of Ontario.  This study sought to fill that gap and to add 
to the criminological and sociological literature examining young offenders in Canada.   
I focus on judicial sentencing decisions for young offenders convicted of physical assault 
and young offenders convicted of sexual assault.  I chose these two types of decisions for 
two reasons.  First, physical assault and sexual assault are considered violent offences in 
that, in the commission of the crime, they both involve violence against persons.  Second, 
both offences are treated under the Criminal Code of Canada, the YOA, the YCJA, and 
the SSCA, as similar in severity, as both are subject to the same potential range of 
custodial sentences.  An examination of judicial decisions for young offenders convicted 
of these two crimes was used to illuminate the broader social and cultural forces that 
shape the judicial system.  Overall, an analysis of judicial discourse upon sentencing can 
reveal the competing pressures on the courts, as judges must balance the public interest, 
with the dictates of youth crime legislation, and the needs of young offenders convicted 
of violent crimes.   
The findings of this study provided limited support for penal populism and limited 
support for focal concerns perspective; neither theory was able to capture all of the 
nuances inherent in sentencing.  In this chapter, I will explore these nuances, provide a 
summary of the findings, review the shortcomings of these two theories, discuss the 
limitations of this study, and consider implications for further research.  
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6.1 Scope of the Current Study 
During the late 1990s, the media began broadcasting an increasing number of stories 
about youth violence, leaving the Canadian public with the impression that youth crime 
was on the rise (Bala, 2003; Batacharya, 2006; Beaulieu and Cesaoni, 1999; Corrado and 
Markwart, 1999; Dorfman et al. 1997; House of Commons, 1993; Innes, 2004; Newburn, 
2002; Perrone and Chesney-Lind, 1977; Pollak and Kubrin, 2007; Roberts and Stalans, 
1998; Roberts et al., 2003, 2004; Tanner, 2001; Young, 1996).  These media stories 
fostered the view that legislation (the Young Offenders Act) governing the criminal 
justice system was not effectively handling youth crime.  Members of the public and 
politicians began calling for change.  Conservative politicians and federal opposition 
parties, along with provincial governments, demanded that Canada adopt a “get tough” 
approach to youth crime (Bala, 2003: 991).  During the same period, however, academics 
and youth justice system professionals, including the judiciary, expressed concerns that 
Canada was being too tough on young offenders as there was an overuse of both the 
courts and custody under the YOA (p. 991).  The federal government, in enacting the 
YCJA, attempted to balance a get-tough approach with a commitment to rehabilitation.  
The YCJA would reduce the reliance on courts and custody, while ensuring young 
offenders, in particular violent and repeat offenders, were made accountable for their 
actions.  The Act focused more on violent and repeat young offenders providing the 
courts with direction to provide ‘meaningful consequences’ that would ensure 
‘accountability’ and ‘rehabilitation’, with the protection of society becoming the 
overriding consideration.   
The YCJA also had its critics; it was viewed as being too lenient on youth crime (Roberts 
and Bala, 2003; Bala and Anand, 2012).  In 2006, the Conservative government proposed 
a complete overhaul of the YCJA, arguing that harsher sentences needed to be 
implemented.  Parliament brought forth the Safe Streets and Communities Act (SSCA) 
with amendments coming into force in October 23, 2012 (Bala and Anand, 2012; 
Leschied, 2015; Roberts and Bala, 2003).  These amendments were designed to 
strengthen the ways in which the youth justice system dealt with young offenders.  The 
principle of ‘deterrence’ was reintroduced into the YCJA.  After 2012, judges could again 
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(as was the case under the YOA) consider deterrence, along with rehabilitation and 
accountability, when sentencing.  
Ashworth (2002) states the adjudication and imposition of a sentence on an offender is 
probably the most public face of the criminal justice process, and as such it is through 
sentencing that existing social structures can be legitimized and ideologies (e.g., get-
tough on crime, rehabilitation, protection of the community) can be constructed and 
reinforced within society (Chimombo and Roseberry, 1998; Hall, 2008, 2011).  When 
sentencing, judges must navigate through complex political and public climates, and take 
into account a variety of concerns, principles, and influences (Beaulieu and Cesaroni, 
1999; Corrado and Markwart, 1999).  This may be particularly true in youth court.  
Several theories have been advanced to account for these various influences and concerns 
shaping sentencing.  This study examined two theoretical perspectives:  penal populism 
and focal concerns perspectives of sentencing.   
Penal populists (Bartlett, 2009; Bottoms, 1993, 1995; Canovan, 1981, 1999; Freiberg & 
Gelb, 2008; Garland, 1996, 2001, 2002; Matthews, 2009; Pratt, 2007; Roberts, 2008; 
Roberts et al., 2003; Shils, 1956) argue public and media pressure encourage politicians 
to radically redefine official thinking on crime and punishment.  The results are new 
policy agendas with new laws and policies aimed at implementing harsher punishments 
for criminals (Garland, 2002: 172).  These pressures affect criminal justice actors and 
agencies, may reduce their discretion, and force them to ‘get tough’ on crime.  
As we have seen penal populists contend that judges are influenced by a get-tough 
approach advocated by the public and politicians.  For example, the United States has 
adopted statutes that require mandatory prison sentences for certain offences, such as 
violent, drug, and property offences, which as resulted in increases in sentence lengths as 
well as an increase in the number of admissions to custody (Roberts et al., 2003).  In 
comparison, a number of criminologists have argued that Canada has not followed the 
path of its neighbor to the south, and as such is the exception to the trend (Christie, 2004; 
Comack and Silver, 2003; Doob, 2016; Meyer and O’Malley, 2005; Moore and Hannah-
Moffit, 2007; Pratt, 2007; Roberts et al., 2003).  Meyer and O’Malley (2005), however, 
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caution that making such broad claims about Canadian criminal justice policies and 
practices is problematic as criminal justice interventions – from policing to courts to 
prisons – are complex and may differ from region to region and city to city.  They, 
instead, call for closer investigations of the ways in which criminal justice policies and 
practices emerge and play out in particular local contexts (Meyer and O’Malley, 2009).   
This study, therefore, attempts to fill this gap in the literature by examining whether and 
who judges’ sentencing decisions have been affected by legislative changes by examining 
judicial sentencing decisions heard under the YOA, the YCJA, and the SSCA (the YCJA 
post the 2012 amendments).  Drawing specifically on penal populism, this study asks, is 
there evidence that Canada, in particular Ontario, has experienced a penal populist turn in 
regard to juvenile justice?  Are judges taking a more punitive stance in sentencing young 
offenders convicted of violent offences (sexual and physical assault)?  
Focal concern theorists argue that judges take into consideration at least one of three 
focal concerns – blameworthiness, protection of society, practical constraints -- when 
sentencing offenders (Hartley et al. 2007; Kurlychek and Johnson, 2004; Steffensmeier, 
1980; Steffensmeier et al., 1998; Steffensmeier, 1993, 1998; Steffensmeier and Demuth, 
2001; Spohn and Holleran, 2000).  Proponents of this theory argue that the more 
blameworthy an offender is perceived to be, the more likely they are to be incarcerated 
and required to serve a longer sentence.  Moreover, they contend that judges evaluate the 
risk to the community if and/or when the offender is released back into the community 
(Hartley et al. 2007; Steffensmeier, 1993; Steffensmeier, 1998).  Further, judges may 
consider practical constraints including an offender’s ability to do ‘the time’, for 
example, whether an offender is the caregiver of a child or children, or how a sentence 
will impact their ability to seek or maintain employment (Hartley et al. 2007; 
Steffensmeier, 1993; Steffensmeier, 1998).  Last, judges may take into account extra-
legal factors (perceptual shorthand) such as age, race, and gender, when sentencing.   
Drawing on these two theoretical perspectives, and an analysis of judicial sentencing 
decisions, this study sought to answer three research questions, which will be discussed 
in more detail in the following sections.    
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6.1.1 Research Question One 
The first research question asks:  is there evidence that Ontario has experienced a penal 
populist turn in regards to juvenile justice?  That is, are judges taking a more punitive 
stance in sentencing young offenders convicted of sexual assault and physical assault as a 
result of legislative changes?  
To examine this theory, this analysis focused on three dimensions.  First, penal populism 
suggests that sentencing is becoming harsher (more likely to involve custodial sentences) 
over time.  Hence, it was expected that sentencing would be harsher under more recent 
legislative regimes (YCJA, 2002 and the YCJA, post the 2012 amendments).  Second, it 
was expected that judges would be influenced by the Crown’s recommended sentence, as 
it is the Crown who represents the voice of the people – the inference being Crown 
attorneys are more likely to recommend to the courts a more punitive sentence be 
imposed (Roberts et al., 2003).  Third, penal populists would argue that even though 
physical assault and sexual assault are viewed as similar in severity under the Criminal 
Code of Canada, the public views sexual assault offenders as reprehensible.  Influenced 
by public opinion judges may punish those convicted of sexual assault more severely 
(Roberts et al., 2003).  
The results of this study provide, at best, limited support for the penal populist 
perspective.  The results of simple quantitative analysis revealed that all (100%) of the 
offenders whose case was heard under the YCJA (post 2012 amendments) received a 
custodial sentence, compared to 54% of the offenders whose case was heard under the 
YOA, and 84% of the offenders whose case was heard under the YCJA (prior to the 2012 
amendments).  These results are consistent with the penal populist argument; however, it 
must be remembered that the cases analyzed here are not representative.  Further, as 
previous research (Bala, Carrington, and Roberts, 2009; Milligan, 2010; Sprott and Doob, 
2008) has found, the YCJA has achieved its goal of reducing court hearings and 
incarceration for young offenders.  Therefore it may only be the most serious cases that 
now result in a trial and a sentencing hearing.  An increase in more punitive (custodial) 
sentences may not reflect penal populism, but rather suggest that diversion, under the 
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YCJA, has been successful.  Cases that resulted in lighter sentences under the YOA, may 
not even reach the courts under the YCJA.  
The relationship between the Crown’s recommended sentence and the court-imposed 
sentence were not consistent with penal populism.  Youth court judges did not appear to 
impose a custodial sentence as the result of recommendations by the Crown.  This finding 
is, therefore, not consistent with the penal populism perspective (Roberts et. al. 2003), 
which suggests that the courts may place greater weight on the Crown’s proposed 
sentence.   
Lastly, the relationship between offence and court-imposed sentence is not consistent 
with penal populism.  While some penal populists (Roberts et al., 2003) suggest that the 
public views sexual assault as more reprehensible than physical assault, in the judicial 
decisions analyzed the sexual assault offenders received lighter sentences.  Of the 26 
offenders convicted of physical assault, 92% received a custodial sentence as compared 
to the 68% of the 28 sexual assault offenders.   
The findings of this study, therefore, suggest that penal populism has not influenced the 
sentencing of young offenders in Ontario to any great extent.  This finding is consistent 
with the Canadian literature (Christie, 2004; Doob, 2016; Meyer and O’Malley, 2005; 
Moore and Hannah-Moffit, 2005; Roberts et al., 2003).  As Doob (2016) states, the 
legislative changes under Harper’s Conservative government may reflect a penal populist 
turn; however, this was a short-term trend in Canada, and one that had little impact on 
sentencing practices.  The results of this study suggest that, at least in Ontario, the youth 
courts have not become more punitive as a result of legislative changes.   
6.1.2 Research Question Two 
Drawing on the focal concerns perspective (Hartley et al. 2007; Kurlychek and Johnson, 
2004; Steffensmeier, 1980; Steffensmeier, 1993; Steffensmeier et al., 1998; 
Steffensmeier and Demuth, 2001 Spohn and Holleran, 2000), the second research 
question asks: do judicial sentencing decisions, within the Ontario youth justice system, 
reflect an offender’s level of blameworthiness and the need for protection of the public?  
Do sentencing disparities reflect differences in age and gender?   
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In this study, to assess ‘blameworthiness’, I considered whether offenders were first-time 
offenders or not, and whether they pled ‘guilty’ or not were perceived as more 
blameworthy.  I examined what percentage of first-time offenders and those who pled 
guilty received a custodial sentence as compared to repeat offenders and those who pled 
not guilty.  Analysis showed that first-time offenders did not receive lighter sentences 
(e.g., probation versus custodial sentence).  Neither did those who pled guilty.  Thus, it is 
not clear that judges considered ‘blameworthiness’ when sentencing young offenders: the 
first-time offenders and those who pled guilty were viewed as no less culpable or 
blameworthy than the repeat offenders and those who pled not guilty.   
The focal concerns perspective suggests judges may have incomplete information when 
imposing a sentence and as a result may use age, gender, and race as a ‘perceptual 
shorthand’ to assess danger, with females, the young, and members of racial majorities 
being perceived as less threatening.  This study had limited data on race, and there were 
few female offenders in the data set, making it impossible to assess the role of race and 
gender.  For instance, there were only 6 females in the study, four (67%) of whom 
received a custodial sentence; this number is too small to draw conclusions.  Analyses to 
assess age groups showed that judges did not treat the ‘older’ young offenders (16-17 
year olds) more harshly than the younger ones (12-15 year olds).  However, it may be the 
case that all young offenders, regardless of age, may be treated differently.  
Community protection was assessed through variables measuring interim custody and 
prospects for rehabilitation.  The results revealed no association between serving interim 
custody and sentencing outcome; it appears that young offenders who served interim 
custody were not perceived as being more of a risk to the community than those who did 
not serve interim custody.  Similarly, there was not a clear association between prospects 
for rehabilitation and sentencing outcome.  In fact, the offenders who were perceived as 
having favourable prospects for rehabilitation (79%) were just as likely to receive a 
custodial sentence as those who were perceived by the courts as having less favourable 
prospects for rehabilitation (83%).   
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With respect to sentencing variations between offence type the, focal concerns 
perspective of sentencing would lead us to expect no differences between offence, since 
physical assault and sexual assault are ‘crimes against persons’ and defined as equal in 
severity under the law.  However, the analyses showed that the physical assault offenders 
received harsher sentences.  In combination, the findings of the quantitative analyses 
provided no support for focal concerns theory.   
6.1.3 Research Question Three 
The third research question aimed to explain sentencing differences within and across 
offence type through an examination of sentencing rationales.  The questions asks, is 
there evidence of variations in sentencing rationales provided by judges upon sentencing 
within and across offence?  
I explored possible answers to this question by taking an even closer look at the content 
of judges’ sentencing rationales to identify patterns in sentencing that may illustrate 
judicial discretion when sentencing young offenders convicted of a violent offence.  In 
seeking explanations, I began with a consideration of the principles of sentencing that 
underlie youth justice legislation, considering the role of accountability and in particular, 
rehabilitation.  I considered whether the differences in sentencing across offence type 
could be explained by differences in prospects for rehabilitation or whether other factors, 
such as accountability, appeared to weigh on judges’ minds.  In other words, how are 
judges interpreting the legislative principles of sentencing and does their interpretation 
differ by offence type?   
Since the physical assault offenders (92%) had a higher percentage of custodial sentences 
as compared to 68% of the sexual assault offenders, I assumed the physical assault 
offenders would also be perceived by the judges as having less favourable prospects for 
rehabilitation and therefore required incarceration to protect the public.  Interestingly, the 
results showed the opposite.  Of the 26 physical assault offenders, only 27% were 
perceived by the courts as having less favourable prospects for rehabilitation as compared 
to 62% who were perceived as having favourable prospects for rehabilitation (in 11% of 
the cases prospects for rehabilitation were not clearly specified).  More of the sexual 
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assault offenders (43%) were perceived as having less favourable prospects for 
rehabilitation, but they received less punitive sentences regardless.    
The content analyses showed that judges considered a wide range of factors when 
imposing a sentence.  In particular, judges assessed what sanction would best ensure both 
‘rehabilitation’ and ‘accountability’ for young offenders – as they are required to do 
under young offender legislation; however, these concerns led them to treat the two 
groups of offenders differently.  After careful consideration of cases, I proposed three 
explanations for these differences between offence types.  First, it appears that judges 
believed that physical assault offenders would be better rehabilitated with a custodial 
sentence (secure and open), while rehabilitation for sexual assault offenders was often 
believed to be better achieved by non-custodial sentences (e.g., probation).   
The Crime Severity Index suggests that sexual assault is a much more severe crime than 
physical assault and yet the findings of this study suggest that, for youth, it is taken less 
seriously. This difference may be explained by an examination of the relationship 
between the young offender and the victims.  The physical assaults were predominantly 
committed against strangers, while the sexual assaults were committed disproportionately 
against people known to the offender.  I suggest that – in accordance with focal concerns 
theory – those random attacks on strangers may be perceived to be a greater threat to the 
community than attacks on people they know.  Custodial sentences would, therefore, 
serve two purposes, one being to rehabilitate the offender and the second being to protect 
the community.  These findings are consistent with focal concerns theory, since 
protection of the community (attacking random strangers) and prospects for 
rehabilitation, appear to have been taken into account by judges in their decision-making.  
Lastly, ‘judicial inertia’ (Anand, 2003) may have played a role in that there may be a lag 
between legislative changes and changes in sentencing patterns, as a result of judicial 
precedence.  Past practice may have been to incarcerate young offenders convicted of 
physical assault, so this has continued over time.  Sexual assaults committed by young 
offenders may have traditionally been treated more leniently.   
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6.2 Evaluating Focal Concerns Perspective 
The focal concerns perspective attempts to explain and quantify what influences judicial 
decision-making, arguing that it is a “complex interplay” (Steffensmeier et al., 1998: 767) 
between three different focal concerns (Hartley et al., 2007: 58; Pierce, 2012: 19).  While 
Steffensmeier et al. (1998) have provided a number of variables to test the focal concerns 
perspective, they have been criticized for not clearly explaining how each of these 
variables should be measured (Pierce, 2012).  The findings of this study support this 
observation.  For instance, consider the concept ‘protection of the community.’  The 
perspective tells us judges assess protection of the community by attempting to predict 
the level of dangerousness of an offender, generally defined as the risk of future violence 
and measured by criminal history, facts of the crime (e.g., use of a weapon), and the 
characteristics of an offender (e.g., drug dependency, education, employment, or family 
history) (Steffensmeier et al., 1998: 767).  In this study, prospects for rehabilitation were 
also found to be an important consideration for judges; however, the impact of 
rehabilitation prospects was complex.  Whether a judges’ assessment of rehabilitation 
prospects resulted in a custodial or non-custodial sentence varied across offence.  This 
finding has two implications for the theory.  First, it suggests that rehabilitation should be 
recognized as an important focal concern relating to protection of the community.  
Second, it indicates that the impact of this focal concern can be complex, and may vary in 
meaningful ways, not currently accounted for by the theory.  
Focal concerns approaches also define blameworthiness in terms of an offender’s 
culpability and the degree of harm caused (Steffensmeier et al., 1998: 767).  This focal 
concern is associated with retribution/proportionality: the view that the punishment 
should fit the crime.  In addition to offence severity, the main factors that influence 
judges’ and other criminal justice agents’ assessment of an offender’s level of 
blameworthiness are biographical factors, such as criminal history (increased perceived 
blameworthiness and risk), prior victimization (mitigates perceived blameworthiness) and 
offender’s role in the offence (Steffensmeier, 1998: 767).  Drawing on the findings in this 
study, it may be argued that sexual assault offenders may be perceived by the judges as 
being less blameworthy and less of a risk than the physical assault offenders, and 
  152 
therefore, seen as less of threat to the community as they are more likely to assault 
someone they know.  An alternate explanation is that young sexual assault offenders may 
be viewed as more likely to age out of such behavior, and therefore, are regarded as less 
blameworthy and less of a risk, thereby requiring a less punitive sentence.  The physical 
assault offenders, on the other hand, may be perceived as more blameworthy and a 
greater risk to the safety of the community, as they may be more likely to assault a 
stranger.  In this sense, ‘blameworthiness’ is clearly ‘offence-specific’ and context-
dependent, as sentences may vary by type of offence or status as a young offender versus 
adult.  Young offender status appears more important than age per se since no difference 
between the sentences received by younger and older young offenders was observed.  
Focal concerns theory has been used to explain the disparities in sentencing outcomes 
between males and females, especially among adult offenders, with females being 
perceived as less blameworthy, posing less of a risk to the community, and less able to 
serve a custodial sentence due to practical constraints, such as childcare (Hartley et al. 
2007; Steffensmeier, 1993; Steffensmeier, 1998).  In this small sample, there is no clear 
evidence of gender disparities in sentencing.  Larger, more diverse samples are likely 
necessary to test this aspect of the theory.  
When applying this perspective in a Canadian context, it is important to understand that 
judges, while having judicial discretion, may have limited discretion as they are guided 
by sentencing principles established through youth justice legislation.  Focal concerns 
perspectives pay limited to no attention to legislative guidelines and principles, but these 
are important ‘concerns’ that should not be under-valued.  Overall, I suggest several 
improvements can be made to strengthen focal concerns theory, especially as it is applied 
in Canadian contexts.  First, legislative principles in youth justice legislation – 
accountability, rehabilitation, and at times deterrence – should be included as potential 
focal concerns.  Second, the approach should consider how core concepts are best 
operationalized and measured.  Third, the perspective should perhaps take into account 
the importance of precedence in shaping judicial decisions.  Fourth, the theory should be 
altered to explain when and how focal concerns (and their application and/or 
interpretation) may vary across offence type and social context.  Variations across 
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legislation are particularly important.  With such changes the perspective’s applicability 
to the Canadian context would be improved significantly.  
6.3 Contributions  
The main contribution of this study to the sociological and criminological literature is the 
insight it provides into judicial discourse, and the sentencing of violent young offenders.  
Specifically, the findings suggest that physical assault offenders, regardless of their 
prospects for rehabilitation may face harsher penalties upon sentencing.  Drawing on the 
data, I have proposed several possible explanations for this finding, which future research 
can explore in greater detail.  Further, there is a limited amount of research examining 
judicial discourse surrounding young offenders, particularly decisions heard in Ontario 
youth courts; as such this research fills a gap in the literature.  Moreover, much of the 
research provides quantitative analyses of custodial sentences in Canada, focusing on 
incarceration rates, but few studies examine judicial decisions (case law) to identify the 
factors shaping judicial decisions, and to determine how judges explain or rationalize 
their decisions.   
A prominent finding of this study revealed that a higher percentage of physical assault 
offenders, were perceived by the courts as having favourable prospects for rehabilitation, 
and yet a high percentage of physical assault offenders received a custodial sentence.  
Drawing on Anand (2003), I suggested that ‘judicial inertia’ may have led to the 
continued punitiveness directed at young offenders convicted of physical assault.  Such 
uses of incarceration is in direct opposition to the original goals of the juvenile justice 
system, which are to reduce the number of custodial sentences under the YOA and more 
importantly to focus on the rehabilitation of young offenders, under the YCJA, rather 
than to simply punish them by imposing a custodial sentence.  
Another key finding of this study is the increase in custodial sentences with successive 
pieces of legislation.  While this sample is not a representative sample, the finding is 
concerning, as the cases that are imported into Quicklaw constitute the official record of 
judicial decision-making.  More specifically, these cases are the primary source of case 
law upon which Crown attorneys, and Defence counsel rely when preparing and 
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presenting their submissions and recommendations to the court, and on which judges 
draw upon when imposing a sentence.  In other words, the cases reported to Quicklaw are 
reasoned decisions; they are precedential and are relied upon by the agents of the justice 
system (Busby, 2000).  Thus, whether, it be the result of ‘judicial inertia’ or ‘judicial 
precedence’, these are the cases that set precedence for future cases being decided by the 
courts.  The result may be higher rates of incarceration for young offenders tried in courts 
in the years to come.  In addition, one can only wonder if the re-introduction of 
deterrence into the YCJA, as a result of the amendments under the SSCA, will only 
encourage incarceration, which now can be justified on the grounds of deterrence rather 
than (or in addition to) rehabilitation.  
6.4 Limitations of Study and Future Research 
The sample of cases used in this study were obtained from Quicklaw.  In using Quicklaw, 
I obtained a sample of cases that, while being a small sample, are representative of the 
discourse of official case law that gets replicated and debated in courtrooms across 
Ontario.  The decisions obtained in Quicklaw, however, are not representative of all cases 
that appear before the court.  As such, one of the limitations of this study is that the 
decisions included in the analysis, are not an accurate sampling of the range of situations 
that come before the court (Busby, 2000).  Since Quicklaw filters the cases that are 
reported and given that the focus of this study was on sentencing outcomes of young 
offenders convicted of sexual and physical assault in Ontario, the sample of cases is 
small, which limited more sophisticated quantitative analysis and statistical significance 
and the results cannot be generalized to the larger population.   
Further, the cases did not provide enough information to adequately measure all the 
variables, outlined by the two perspectives that guided this study.  For example, a 
comparison of gender, race and sentencing was not available as there were few reported 
cases of young female offenders and minority youth.  There were young Aboriginal 
offenders included in this sample; however, similar to the number of females, there were 
few reported cases, thereby limiting a test of focal concerns theory’s concept ‘perceptual 
shorthand’.  Moreover, it is possible that the lack of support for both focal concerns 
theory and penal populism was related to the operationalization of their core concepts.  
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For example, the third focal concern, ‘practical constraints and consequences’, is based 
on both organization and individual concerns.  Organizational concerns include the 
maintenance of working relationships among the courtroom actors, ensuring a stable flow 
of cases, and being sensitive to local and state correctional crowding and resources 
(Steffensmeier et al., 1998; Steffensmeier et al., 1993).  The courts may weigh individual 
concerns, such as the offender’s “ability to do time” (e.g., health conditions, special 
needs, costs to be borne by the correctional system, disruption of ties to children and 
other family members) (Steffensmeier et al., 1998; Steffensmeier, 1980; Steffensmeier et 
al., 1995; Ulmer and Kramer, 1996).  This study suggests that organization and individual 
concerns, for young offenders, may be especially relevant.  As was seen in the case R. v. 
P.S.P (1997), presented in Chapter 5, wherein the court appeared to be concerned with 
PSP’s vulnerability and his lack of ability to function in anything but a helpful, 
sympathetic, non-threatening environment.   
In this study, there was not enough data within the cases to further examine such practical 
constraints and consequences.  I have criticized focal concerns theory for its ambiguity, 
but it is possible that different measures could reveal more support for the two theories 
than identified here.  Thus, this study suggests that focal concerns theory may be 
improved by taking into consideration how a young offender’s status interacts with 
organization and individual constraints.   
In terms of future research, this study suggests many possible directions.  First, research 
on judicial decisions using a more representative sample would be worthwhile for testing 
various theoretical accounts.  A larger sample also leads to more representative results.  
Unfortunately, I was not able to examine gender in its institutionalized form as the cases 
included in this study did not warrant such an analysis.  Thus, increasing the sample size 
would allow for a proper examination of if / how gender shaped sentencing outcomes.  In 
other words, an examination could be conducted to determine whether the assumptions 
about gender and the mechanisms that reproduce gender inequality are embedded within 
the system.     
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More research on changes in judicial decisions across legislation – again using a more 
representative sample and more recent cases – would be valuable; this study has hinted 
that the greater emphasis on deterrence under the Safe Streets and Communities Act 
could lead to more custodial sentences, amongst those cases that are tried in youth court.  
Lastly, this study has focused on two violent offences – physical and sexual assault – 
whether the findings hold for other offences is worth exploring.  In particular, research 
should explore whether the relationship between the offender and the victim plays a 
significant role in sentencing, as it appears to be here.  
A continued examination of judicial discretion through the judicial interpretation of youth 
justice legislation especially with regards to young sexual offenders is also necessary.  It 
is important to not just examine what interventions are most effective but also what 
judges are ‘doing’ when young violent offenders are in front of the courts.  Future 
research would benefit from an examination of other provinces to determine whether this 
is a consistent theme across Canada.  Quebec, for example, is less likely to criminalize 
youth misbehavior and is more willing and able to use alternative measures to the youth 
justice system (John Howard Society of Ontario, 1998: 2).  The province of Quebec has 
historically had a unique approach to youth justice (Public Safety Canada, 2009: 6).  
More than the other provinces in Canada, Quebec has promoted a child welfare/child 
protection approach to youth at risk of offending.  Dating back to the late 1970s 
(introduction of Quebec’s Youth Protection Act) Quebec has espoused a social 
development philosophy where rehabilitation and reintegration are the primary goals 
through the use of both diversion and alternative sentences (Public Safety Canada, 2009: 
6).  Thus, while Ontario became the starting point for this study a comparison study of 
Ontario and Quebec in future research would be valuable, as Quebec is the province that 
is closest to Ontario in size and urban make-up.   
6.5 Conclusion 
There has been “an unprecedented increase in worldwide interest in youth violence” 
(Leschied, 2015: 144) as a result of increased media attention, public pressure, and 
political discourse; however, there is limited research examining how the courts are 
responding to youth violence in Canada.  This study examined the forces and factors that 
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shape sentencing of young offenders in the province of Ontario.  Rehabilitation and 
protection of the community are fundamental goals of the youth justice legislation (YOA 
and YCJA) in Canada, and while there is much literature to suggest that rehabilitation is 
effective in reducing the recidivism rates in young offenders, the actual sentencing 
practices, as illustrated in the current study, do not conform to such views – at least 
among physical assault offenders.  
This study found a higher percentage of physical assault offenders received custodial 
sentences, and while imposing a custodial sentence may protect the community in the 
short-term, it does not protect it in the long-term. Research has shown that incarceration 
is a well-established contributor to juvenile delinquency (Bala, Carrington, and Roberts, 
2009: 134); as such, the results of this study not only raise the question as to why there 
are differences surrounding how violent offences are perceived within the juvenile justice 
system, but it opens up the dialogue around the use of custody as a rehabilitative tool for 
certain offences, like physical assault.  Following Leschied (2002), I contend that the 
criminal justice system can be improved for youth, as law reform alone can neither 
decrease the number of custodial sentences nor reduce the incidence of reoffending 
(Leschied, 2002: 84).  The results of this study suggest that while there is a greater 
emphasis under the YCJA for the use of community-based sanctions and the reduction of 
custodial sentences, it is the sentencing judges who must, first, be convinced to re-think 
the role of custody as a means to rehabilitating young offenders and protecting the public 
(Leschied, 2002: 84).   
Furthermore, the public must also be educated as to the harms of ‘getting tough’ on 
crime, especially with regards to young offenders.  As the New Brunswick’s Office of the 
Child and Youth Advocate (2015: 151) purports, crime prevention is not primarily a 
matter of corrections and courts, rather it is an overall community matter.  As such, it 
requires the informed efforts of police, lawyers, and judges as well as government 
Departments, such as Public Safety, Health (Addiction and Mental Health), Social 
Development, Education, and Early Childhood Development, Justice, and the office of 
the Attorney General (p. 151).  
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While there may always be offenders who commit crimes that are egregious enough that 
they warrant incarceration, we cannot forget that most young offenders ‘age out of 
crime’.  In addition, we cannot forget that adolescence is a critical stage of development, 
a period when interventions (e.g., programs and services to address mental health and 
behavioural needs) can help at-risk youths attain a healthy developmental trajectory into 
adulthood (Rawana et al, 2015: 251).  As research has continued to show, incarceration 
harms not only youths but society in the long term.  The results of this study, therefore, 
provide further support for the argument that there needs to be education as well as 
commitment on the part of youth court justices towards cooperative and continual 
dialogue between all agents of the criminal justice system as well as other community 
and social services within society towards addressing and treating the root cases of crime.   
As the Office of Child and Youth Advocate (2015) states “perhaps most importantly it 
[crime prevention] requires the efforts of various members of civil society, including 
families, youth peers, non-governmental organizations, community volunteers, group 
home staff and foster parents” (p. 151).   
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